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ABSTRACT 
The historiography of the Vietnam War’s effect on American society and culture often 
focuses on the public image of its veterans.  Historians and other scholars credit liberal 
and apolitical Vietnam veterans for reshaping Americans’ opinions of those who served.  
These men deserve significant recognition for these changes; however, historians 
consistently overlook another aspect this topic.  Conservative Republicans in the mid-
1970s through the early 1990s made a concerted effort to alter how Americans viewed 
Vietnam veterans and their performance in the conflict.  The few scholars who have 
examined this issue suggest conservatives wanted to quell Americans’ distaste for 
military endeavors after the loss in Southeast Asia, a concept known as the Vietnam 
Syndrome.  
This dissertation argues conservatives’ efforts were more complex than simply 
wanting to break down the syndrome.  The war and its loss threatened their 
understandings of the exceptional nature of the United States.  This notion of 
exceptionalism stemmed from the immense success of the country territorially, 
economically, and in the international system, accomplishments realized with the 
assistance of the American military.  The performance of the military establishment and 
its soldiers in the Vietnam War and the negative international and domestic opinions of 
the country in the wake of this loss threatened those elements of American success that 
conservatives viewed as imperative to maintaining the idea of exceptionalism and the 
power of the United States.  As a result, a disparate group of conservative Republicans in 
the post-Vietnam era attempted to alter American understandings of the nation’s martial 
tradition and the concept of martial masculinity, both ravaged by the war.  This 
ii 
dissertation adds another layer to the historiography of the effects of the Vietnam War by 
arguing that conservatives not only shored up Americans’ belief in the martial tradition 
and reshaped the definition of martial masculinity, but that they also significantly 
influenced Americans’ newfound positive opinions of Vietnam veterans. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 28, 2012, President Barack Obama spoke at the Vietnam Wall in 
commemoration of what the U.S. government deemed the 50th anniversary of the 
Vietnam War.1  Standing at the monument, a symbol of a war that left a deep scar on the 
United States, Obama echoed the sentiments of many Americans, especially veterans, 
who struggled during the 1980s to change the negative image of those who served in the 
war.  The young president, who was only a child when Saigon became Ho Chi Minh 
City, empathized with the Vietnam Veterans, praising their valor for serving honorably 
only to have their service reviled or ignored by the American public.2  
However, Obama’s words turned sharply from a simple commendation of the men 
who fought in the war toward a justification of why they deserved such accolades. “All 
too often it's forgotten,” remarked the president, “that you, our troops in Vietnam, won 
                                                           
1
 Readers should bear in mind that American military intervention began in the region much 
earlier than 1962. However, the date May 28, 2012 marked the beginning of a 13-year program to 
commemorate the half-century anniversary of the war. “Presidential Proclamation: Commemoration of the 
Vietnam War, Press Release from the Office of the Press Secretary, May 25, 2012.” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/25/presidential-proclamation-commemoration-50th-
anniversary-vietnam-war. For a discussion of American involvement in the region before this date see 
Mark Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: the Making of Post-Colonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); George Herring, America’s Longest War, 4th ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 1-129; and Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the 
Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012). For background information on the 
Vietnamese perspective of the lead up to the Vietnam War, see David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest 
for Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Good primers on the Vietnam perspective 
during the war include William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995) and Troung Nhu Tang, A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the 
Vietnam War and its Aftermath (New York: Vintage Books, 1986). 
 
2
 “Remarks by the President at the Commemoration Ceremony of the 50th Anniversary of the 
Vietnam War, May 28, 2012,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/28/remarks-president-
commemoration-ceremony-50th-anniversary-vietnam-war. 
 
2 
every major battle you fought in.” He suggested they suffered a poor image for years 
because of the “misdeeds of a few.” He highlighted their achievements abroad and lauded 
their accomplishments at home after war, building to an emotional crescendo: “So here 
today, it must be said—you have earned your place among the greatest generations. At 
this time, I would ask all our Vietnam veterans . . . to please stand . . . as we say those 
simple words which always greet our troops when they come home from here on out:  
Welcome home . . . Thank you.  We appreciate you.  Welcome home.”3 
The tone and language of this speech, given thirty-seven years after the fall of 
Saigon, largely reflected of the efforts of Vietnam veterans across the American political 
spectrum who worked for decades to gain proper recognition for their service.4  Veterans 
who helped memorialize their comrades through the Vietnam Wall sought recognition of 
reintegration issues and fought to gain respect and honor for the duties they performed for 
their country. Yet, upon closer examination, the language of Obama’s speech also 
paralleled a style of rhetoric used during the 1980s by many conservative Republicans 
who hoped to change the public’s perception of a war that signified the country’s first 
military defeat.5   
                                                           
3
 Ibid.  
 
4
 Veterans of all political persuasions participated in efforts to change Americans’ opinions of 
Vietnam veterans and their role the controversial conflict. These efforts ran the gamut of press campaigns, 
literature, monument creation, parades, and political participation. A listing of historical literature on this 
subject can be found as references throughout this dissertation, but an excellent overview of the efforts of 
veterans can be found in Gerald Nicosia, Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans Movement (New 
York: Crown Publishers, 2001). However, it is important to note that Nicosia mainly focuses on the efforts 
of liberals, Democrats, and non-political participants. 
 
5
 Historical literature on conservative efforts to change the memory of the Vietnam War has been 
limited to works connected to the Reagan administration and its role in the creation of the Vietnam Wall, as 
well as the president’s campaign to re-assert America’s military and political strength after its 
diminishment from the loss of the war. Works with an emphasis on conservatives and the creation of the 
Wall include Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the 
3 
Obama’s speech reflected the reality that the Vietnam conflict had created a 
national trauma that had political, cultural, and foreign policy reverberations for decades. 
The physic wounds of the war affected the public’s mood in a multitude of ways, as did 
the painful embarrassment of its loss.6 Outside of the United States, questions over the 
prosecution and the loss of the war corrupted the perceived prestige the United States had 
solidified for itself during World War II.7  
In conservative Republican circles, the war fused with issues of civil rights, 
women’s liberation, and the sexual revolution to create what conservatives deemed a 
crisis of American identity and traditional values.8 The crisis widened after Watergate, 
bringing even some moderate Democrats into the fold.9 The election of Ronald Reagan in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Politics of Healing (University of Massachusetts Press, 2009). Works with an emphasis on the campaign to 
re-strengthen America during Reagan’s terms include Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the 
Reagan/Bush Era, 1980-1992, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Reckoning with Reagan: 
America and Its President in the 1980s, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).   
 
6
 For a discussion of the psychic wounds caused by Vietnam see, George Herring, America’s 
Longest War, 4th ed. For a discussion of the turbulence of the decade of the 1960s see Maurice Isserman 
and Michael Kazin, Divided America: The Civil War of the 1960s, 4th edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) and Terry H. Anderson, The Sixties, 4th edition (Boston: Pearson, 2012). 
 
7
 As George Herring suggests in America’s Longest War, Vietnam “discredited and crippled the 
military, at least for a time, and temporarily estranged the United States from the rest of the world,” 346. 
German political scientist Helga Haftendorn pushed this idea further stating that “high on the Reagan 
foreign policy agenda was the need to reinvigorate alliances and work together with friends around the 
world. It was part of the Administration’s credo that America’s partners expected strong leadership and that 
some of the misunderstandings and problems of the past had originated in the very absence of such 
leadership,” i.e. Vietnam. Helga Haftendorn, “Toward a Reconstruction of American Strength,” in The 
Reagan Administration: A Reconstruction of American Strength?, eds. Helga Haftendorn and Jakob 
Schissler, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1988), 17. 
 
8
 For an excellent discussion of the rise of the “New Right” in relation to the turmoil of the 1960s 
see, Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the 
Transformation of American Politics, Second Edition, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2000), 294-323.  
 
9
 In 1968, many Democrats had already moved away from the party as a part of a targeted 
demographic group identified by Republicans.  Nixon’s administration lumped disaffected Democrats in 
with white, ethnic and blue-collar members of the working class (regardless of their political affiliation in 
what its aides and the president termed the “silent majority.” Although Watergate sent many Democrats 
4 
1980, who ran on a platform of the regeneration of American values and strength, 
suggested that many Americans either agreed or simply tired of change.10 
The Vietnam conflict also created the Vietnam Syndrome; a reluctance of the 
American public to support future military interventions. The more martial-minded and 
conservative members of the Republican Party lamented this consequence of the war. It 
stymied their goal of spreading American values throughout the world via military 
pressure and intervention, and it prevented them from reaffirming the American military 
in order to preserve the long-standing martial tradition that helped shore up the notion of 
American exceptionalism. Because of this frustration of their ideals, many conservatives 
worked during the 1980s to refashion the meaning of the conflict as a way of lessening 
this “syndrome,” as well as to restore the image of the military to reestablish American 
supremacy.11 
                                                                                                                                                                             
back into the fold, the lackluster presidency of Jimmy Carter combined with the memories of the turbulence 
of the 1960s and the corruption of the early 1970s sent many Democrats to the polls to vote for Ronald 
Reagan in the 1980 election. For a more detailed discussion of the “silent majority” see, Dan T. Carter, The 
Politics of Rage, 324-370.  For a good discussion of the Nixon years and their effect on America (including 
the “silent majority) see Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, 
and Politics (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2002) 23-52. For a discussion on the Carter years and their effect on 
the populace see, Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the Reagan-Bush Era, 1980-1992 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27-48 and Schulman, The Seventies, 121-143. 
 
10
 Historian Bruce Schulman notes, “Many Americans sensed that the nation had entered a period 
of decline. No longer able to lead the world, the United States could no longer even find its own way 
home…Even those who could not point to specific political events like the war or the scandal felt that 
something had passed—the American Century, however abbreviated, had ended, The Seventies, 48-49. 
 
11
 A strong discussion of the theory that the Reagan administration wanted to break down the 
“Vietnam Syndrome” occurs in political scientist William LeoGrande’s work Our Own Backyard: The 
United States in Central America, 1977-1992, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 
specifically see pages 3-9. Arnold R. Issacs goes into much greater depth on the “Syndrome” in Vietnam 
Shadows (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 65-102. 
 
5 
 The most studied aspect of this attempt is Ronald Reagan’s efforts to re-establish 
the U.S. image at home and abroad via the expansion of American military might.12 
However, the Reagan story has many more layers than simply rebuilding a fabled nation; 
it ties into the larger campaign by the president and other conservative Republicans to 
reconfigure the martial tradition of the country and save the notion of exceptionalism,  
concepts on which U.S. military and international political prestige rested and from 
which American nationalism found much of its cement.13 
The historical work closest to this dissertation’s subject is Patrick Hagopian’s The 
Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing, 
published in 2009.14  This work, however, only covers the role of the Reagan 
administration in this campaign.  Hagopian concludes that Reagan discarded the noble 
                                                           
12
 Discussions of Reagan’s desire to rebuild the American image are prominent in Michael 
Schaller Reckoning with Reagan and Right Turn; Gil Troy Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan 
Invented the 1980s, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Martin Anderson Revolution (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988).  An interesting, more abstract look at Reagan and his desire to 
renew American military might can be found in Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender 
and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989). 
 
13
 Much of modern conservatism’s adherence to the military tradition comes from its strong focus 
on national defense, the defense of freedom, and a respect for tradition. Good examinations of conservative 
tenets can be found in Charles W. Dunn and J. David Woodward, The Conservative Tradition in America 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996) and Varieties of Conservatism in America, 
ed. Peter Berkowitz, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2004). Also, for a strong overview of the 
American military tradition, see John M. Carroll and Colin F. Baxter, eds., The American Military 
Tradition: From Colonial Times to Present, second edition, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2007).  
 
14
 In The Pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern 
American Conservatism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), Sandra Scanlon touches on 
some of the subject matter contained in this dissertation as well. Scanlon argues that it wasn’t until 1980 
that a  “strong consensus” had emerged among conservatives that “the alleged lessons of Vietnam related to 
how the war was fought, not to the principles on which U.S. intervention had been based,” 2.  It is this 
author’s contention that this consensus was there from the start.  Conservative tenets made the war 
important in relation to the principles on which the United States entered the conflict.  The conservatives 
treated in both Scanlon’s work and this dissertation never deviated in their understandings of the reasons 
for and the lessons of Vietnam. The only two influential figures Scanlon treats that do not fit this mold are 
Richard Nixon (often dismissed by staunch conservatives as one of their own) and Barry Goldwater (much 
less of a conservative icon than Scanlon portrays him).  
 
6 
cause idea early on because it “was politically problematic and divisive” and accepted 
that the message needed to be one of reconciliation.15 He also argues that, although 
Reagan played a role in rehabilitating the war, he mainly passed off the task to veterans’ 
groups and others who wanted to memorialize the war.16  When Reagan’s rhetoric did 
engage with the memory of the war, it was in “a less polemical way, by lauding those 
who fought in it.” As a result, Hagopian argues, Reagan played a minimal role in the 
revision of the Vietnam War’s consequences.17    
This dissertation posits that the Reagan administration was an insignificant actor 
in the larger campaign to fight off the war’s efforts.  Although healing was an element of 
Reagan’s plan, the administration did not fully discard the noble cause campaign when it 
moved to a focus on the men who served. It simply modified it to include the nobility of 
those who participated in the war. Both Reagan and other conservatives rhetorically 
seized these men and their service in order to reconfirm the martial nature of the United 
States and its male citizens in the hopes of perpetuating the myth of America’s special 
nature. In many ways, they strongly influenced Americans opinions of the aspects of the 
war and its participants.   
The story told by this dissertation, set mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, highlights 
the efforts of a collection of conservatives who used their positions as prominent 
politicians, veterans, and intellectuals to recast the narrative of the Vietnam War and its 
meaning for American military tradition. A former general, a decorated Marine, a 
                                                           
15
 Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the 
Politics of Healing, 12.  
 
16
 Ibid., 16. 
 
17
 Ibid., 16. 
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presidential administration, and the editors of the quintessential magazine for 
conservatives all fought their own battles to protect and redefine this martial tradition in 
order to save its corollary of perceived exceptionalism. At times their efforts intertwined, 
while at others their campaigns were distinctly their own. Woven together they highlight 
a concerted effort of adherents to the same political ideology that helped undo the 
damage of Vietnam. They promoted a revisionist narrative that explained the defeat and 
simultaneously resurrected the nobility of the military and its soldiers.18  
In overlooking conservative Republicans’ contributions to the much-altered 
understanding of the Vietnam War, historians have overlooked the significance of their 
influence in a multi-faceted story.19 Although much of the American public rejected 
efforts to redefine the war to garner support for military endeavors in the 1980s, the 
conservative rhetorical campaign helped reconfirm Americans’ faith in the martial 
tradition. They successfully influenced the breakdown of long-held stigmas toward the 
                                                           
18
 A good discussion of the tenets of modern conservatism can be found in Michael Schaller and 
George Rising, The Republican Ascendency: American Politics, 1968-2001, part of The American History 
Series (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davison, Inc., 2002), 1-26. The authors point out that by the 1950s and 
1960s American conservatism became a “fused” and much more cohesive ideology that downplayed some 
of the tensions between “social conservative traditionalism and fiscally conservative libertarianism” via a 
focus on combating the communist threat. These tensions supposedly were eased by the efforts of National 
Review editor Frank Meyer, as well as further efforts by the periodical and its creator William F. Buckley.  
In this “new” conservatism, support of isolationism became a thing of the past. 
 
19
 Although Patrick Hagopian devotes his book The Vietnam War in American Memory to the 
contributions of the Reagan administration to the memory of the Vietnam War, most books regarding the 
re-fashioning of the war’s narrative and the memory of it among the public do not lend these individuals 
much credence in shaping the American consciousness on the subject in the 1980s. These works include: 
Kristin Hass, Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Jerry Lembcke The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy 
of Vietnam (New York: New York University Press, 1998); and Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: the 
Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997). Moreover, many of the works regarding how Americans views of veterans changed only 
focus on liberal and non-political veterans.  These books include Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing: 
Vietnam and the Haunted Generation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984); Gerald Nicosia, Home to War: 
A History of the Vietnam Veterans Movement New York: Crown Publishers, 2001; and Fred Turner, Echoes 
of Combat: Trauma, Memory, and the Vietnam War (New York: Anchor Books, 1996).  
 
8 
war’s participants that often stemmed from the controversial nature of the defeat. 
Conservatives contributed to shaping the new images of Vietnam veterans and the 
institution for which they served when they emphasized their martial nobility and duty to 
country, and they helped salvage the character of the military itself. This emphasis 
reaffirmed the martial tradition and shored up the myth that America’s success as a nation 
was somehow a divinely inspired destiny that elevated it to a special status in the world.  
This story begins with the first conservative to tackle the campaign to reverse the 
Vietnam War’s effects, General William C. Westmoreland.  In an attempt to save face for 
himself and the American military, he jump-started conservative efforts long before 
Reagan’s insistence, during his 1980 presidential campaign, on the noble cause of 
Vietnam.20 The general spent his time as Army Chief of Staff (1968-1972) attempting to 
rehabilitate the image of the Army and its members. He continued after his retirement to 
hawk his claims of the media’s role in the loss of the war and the military’s lack of 
battlefield defeats to anyone who would listen. Yet, throughout, his insistence on the 
valor of the men who fought in this unpopular and poorly executed war softened their 
                                                           
20
 Ronald Reagan typically holds credit for applying the term “noble cause” to the Vietnam War.  
Reagan used the term in his August 18, 1980 speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars’ national convention. 
However, as this dissertation argues, the spirit of this term turns up in numerous writings and speeches of 
other conservatives.  Moreover, other historians claim that Reagan started using the term in 1980 and 
stopped using it by the next year, when it became clear Americans would not accept the war in that way 
(Patrick Hagopian argues this in The Vietnam War in American Memory). Although Reagan did not use 
this exact term he carried a 20 plus year legacy with him of talking about the war in similar, but not the 
same terms. Not only does this dissertation suggest Reagan never stopped pushing the idea of the “noble 
cause,” but historian Toby Glen Bates documents Reagan’s rhetoric on the war, not that the idea of nobility 
began floating around in Reagan’s language in the early 1960s and remained with him after he left the 
presidency, The Reagan Rhetoric: History and Memory in 1980s America (DeKalb: Northern Illonois 
University Press, 2011), 44-63. The “noble cause” speech is called “Peace: Restoring the Margin of 
Safety,” A Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Chicago Illinois, August 18, 1980, The 
Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/8.18.80.html. 
 
9 
image and made their entrance into the martial tradition more palatable by the mid-1980s, 
reconfiguring this major element of America’s folklore of exceptionalism.  
The story’s next subject is former Marine and eventual Democratic senator James 
Webb who began his crusade to redeem the tarnished character of the Vietnam veteran 
during the 1970s. Sitting in a classroom at Georgetown University in 1974, frustrated by 
his invisibility to those for whom he fought, Webb decided to begin writing what would 
become a best-selling, hyper-masculine, and over-the-top novel, Fields of Fire; a tale that 
supposedly closely resembled his and others’ time in Vietnam.21 He also worked to soften 
the blow of reintegration, in turn, attempting to moderate many Americans’ harsh views 
of a group of men they believed were crazy, non-functional, and an embarrassment. His 
determination to place himself and his comrades into the tradition of martial masculinity 
opened up a dialogue about the nobility of the warrior (and veteran) who served, but lost 
the war.  This modification of one of the most significant concepts of the martial tradition 
helped to repair it in the wake of the war and created the possibility of closing the 
wounds the loss in Vietnam caused to the notion of exceptionalism.  
The most public figure of this tale of national reaffirmation and the renewal of 
conservative principles is President Ronald Reagan. During his eight years in the White 
House, he and his advisors made a concerted effort to wipe away the stigma placed on the 
war and its participants by insisting that both symbolized the United States’ highest 
ideals: commitment to freedom, honor, and duty. Reagan shamelessly focused on the 
pomp and circumstance and the symbolism of medals and memorials as a way to reveal 
the most positive aspects of the war and elevate the controversial defeat into the 
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American military tradition. That unabashed tribute to militarism created a path for 
Americans to accept the Vietnam veteran as a valiant member of the U.S. military and 
glorified the institution as one of the most important actors in the history of the nation 
and its perceived exceptional nature.   
In contrast, the members of the last vein of this story, the editors of conservative 
periodical National Review and its creator/editor William F. Buckley, spent little time 
trying to situate the war or the men who fought it within the martial tradition because 
they deemed it unnecessary.22 Their campaign focused on the creation of a savior of the 
American military establishment and of American exceptionalism, rather than working to 
justify the already valiant efforts of the men who fought in Vietnam. They began this 
effort, reluctantly, with Richard Nixon who quickly disappointed them.  After the 
election of Ronald Reagan, they renewed their attempts to redeem the country and its 
values, but they ultimately deemed Reagan’s attempts at a strong and redemptive foreign 
policy in Central America a failure. It was not until the Gulf War that the magazine’s 
editors found its true knight in shining armor; a new, improved, and technologically 
savvy American military that could reestablish perceptions of America’s special nature.  
Tied together these stories illustrate the determination of conservatives to keep the 
stigma of Vietnam from destroying American military tradition and the notion of 
American exceptionalism, a campaign that went well beyond trying to restore public 
support for interventionist foreign policy endeavors.  The individuals involved wanted to 
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preserve the tradition of militarism that undergirded the country’s role in world affairs, 
while saving its fabled image as a beacon of hope and strength across the globe. 
The possible destruction of the concept of America’s special nature moved these 
conservatives to refashion the war and perhaps alter its far-reaching impact on their goals 
for the country. Although the participants in this campaign did not destroy the Vietnam 
Syndrome and usher in an era of major public support for military interventionism, they 
stopped the bleeding of the martial tradition and its corollaries in the wake of the 
Vietnam War. American notions of martial masculinity and militarism during this period 
of revisionism changed radically, sustaining their importance and preserving their 
influence on the country’s mythology.  
 12 
CHAPTER 2 
AN EXCEPTION TO THE WORLD: THE CREATION OF AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
In late spring of 1945, just weeks after the death of Adolf Hitler and Germany’s 
unconditional surrender to the Allied forces, President Harry S. Truman addressed the 
American people regarding the Allies’ ability to win the war in the Pacific.  Of course, 
the atomic bomb determined the outcome of the Second World War, but before that 
fateful decision came to fruition, the country’s citizens needed reassurance that a defeat 
of the Empire of Japan in a larger ground war existed.  
Japan, Truman told the American public “should realize that this Nation, now at 
the peak of its military strength, will not relax, will not weaken in its purpose” as it 
moved from a dual front war to one solely focused on the Asian empire.  With a freshly 
produced and massive arsenal of weaponry, as well as a significant amount of well-
trained manpower, he argued, the country no doubt has “the men, the material, the skill, 
the leadership, the fortitude to achieve total victory.”1  
In fact, Truman declared, the melding of American war production with the heart 
and soul of its warriors allowed the United States to reach this martial pinnacle.  Akin to 
the men of the Revolution, “the American soldier of this war is as brave and as 
magnificent as the American soldier has always been.  He has the initiative and ingenuity 
he has always had.” But matching that soul with the United States’ relatively newfound 
manufacturing abilities, according to the president, was the recipe for triumphant success 
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that made him “a better soldier and a more successful soldier than he has ever been 
before.”2 
In assuring the American people that the nation’s martial strength would defeat 
the Japanese forces, Truman presented a rhetorical message that helped define how the 
United States and much of the world viewed America’s military, its soldiers, and its 
international power after World War II. These words and the eventual outcome of the war 
shaped the pathway for the solidification of its veterans’ place within the hallowed myths 
of America’s martial tradition and its corollary of martial masculinity. Moreover, they 
promoted the myth of American exceptionalism to unprecedented heights.  
Many believed the post-World War II clout of the United States rested on the 
special nature or divinely-inspired destiny of the country, a concept helped along by the 
U.S. military’s numerous and often surprising successes dating back to the Revolution. 
When the nation’s power reached its pinnacle in World War II and the early Cold War 
era, this myth, along with martial tradition and the concept of martial masculinity, 
strengthened and solidified.  Yet, just over twenty years after the end of the Second 
World War, America’s inadequate performance in Southeast Asia threatened these major 
elements of the country’s image of itself and of its place in the world. 
 
The Origins of the Exceptionalism Notion 
The first time a discussion of the special nature of the United States arose was as 
the Puritans crossed the Atlantic Ocean under the guidance of John Winthrop.  He told 
the colonists to start a new life free of religious persecution that “we must consider that 
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we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.”3 Winthrop’s words 
admonished his fellow travelers that the world would scrutinize their actions, and 
therefore, their failures. This initiated among this set of new colonists a sense of 
exceptionalism when their colony succeeded; something other, non-Puritan colonists also 
conformed to over time.4  
As the colonies expanded in number, many more settlers adopted this 
understanding of their ability to survive and eventually thrive in their often harsh, new 
physical environment.5 Historian Reginald Horsman suggests, “in less favorable 
circumstances the Americans could have become one of those many groups of people 
who have believed themselves favored by Providence, but who eventually have been 
chastened by disappointment.” But their experience differed, and “what was unique in the 
American experience was overwhelming success on the bountiful North American 
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continent and the remarkable events that dominated its history from the seventeenth to 
the mid-nineteenth century.”6  
Moreover, their attitudes toward Native Americans and their aggressive 
interactions with them augmented among the colonists a mentality that they were special, 
as many settlers brought with them racial ideologies of the “Old World” that deemed the 
Anglo-Saxon race superior to the “savages” they encountered in the “New World.”7 
The first elements of an American military tradition arose in the era as well.  The 
colonies created local militias to protect the colonists, an act that took on new urgency as 
they moved further inland and precipitated more conflict with Native Americans.  
Initially, male colonists saw participation in a colony’s militia as a significant burden, as 
the protection of their family and property held greater importance than the security of 
their colony. Historian Harold Peckham argued decades ago in his seminal work The 
Colonial Wars that, although colonists and the future Americans loved the heroism of the 
citizen soldier, “indifference” marred commitment to the militias and the early American 
military.8  
This understanding played a role in morale during wars with Native Americans 
and the Wars for Empire that reached all the way to North America. However, that 
mindset changed during the American Revolution, augmenting, but not solidifying, 
men’s comfort with the realities of the citizen soldier. George Washington’s leadership of 
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the Continental Army, according to noted military historian Don Higginbotham, had 
much to do with this change as he “had to create a new army without shared traditions . . . 
composed of men almost exclusively from civilian backgrounds from all over America.”9  
Washington, albeit ignoring the dissension and lack of strong cohesion among many of 
these men, highlighted this diversity in his “Farewell Orders to the Armies of the United 
States,” noting his surprise “that Men who came from different parts of the Continent . . . 
would instantly become one patriotic band of brothers.”10 
Washington and the soldiers of the Revolution clearly reflected a new variety of 
masculinity forming in American society.11 Previously, cultural and social norms in the 
colonies made submission to the crown a significant part of the definition of masculinity 
because that characteristic ensured stability.12 Now, this newly popular definition of 
manhood accepted mental and physical aggression and frowned on male submission to a 
higher institutional authority, at least in the material world. This type of masculinity also 
included characteristics like “ambition, assertiveness, and a lust for power and fame.”13 
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The pinnacle of manhood was one successful in being “independent, virtuous, honest, 
stalwart, [and] loyal to male comrades.”14  
Moreover, supplanting the colonial desire to protect family and property, rather 
than giving one’s all to the militia, was the idea of responsibility to the new nation. Duty 
became “a crucial word for manhood” after the Revolution, according to E. Anthony 
Rotundo, a concept that stemmed from New Englanders’ devotion to community and 
developed from their Puritan background and the religion’s influence on the region’s 
society.15 By the late 1700s, Americans had laid much of the groundwork for its national 
traditions and concepts.  
 
The Establishment of a Strong Martial Tradition 
Detachment from the motherland gave the Americans the opportunity, as Thomas 
Paine concluded, to “begin the world over again,” and the successful challenge to 
England’s power augmented the notion of American exceptionalism, which amplified the 
military’s role in helping America fulfill its destiny and created along the way what 
would become a concept of persisting importance: martial masculinity.16 
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The early 1800s saw a continued evolution of all of these concepts and traditions; 
the U.S. military’s role in the supposedly exceptional nature of America and the events of 
these years had a significant impact on the concept of the martial man. Further territorial 
expansion created by the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 created a need for exploration of the 
West, starting with the Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804.  This voyage and others that 
followed included many army volunteers due to their experience in wilderness survival 
while protecting the country’s frontier.17   
The efforts of the military in this and future expeditions both on the land and at 
sea served to professionalize the military and garnered the fledgling institution and its 
soldiers’ significant respect among the American people. Their examination and 
documentation of the wilderness and the land itself created a sense of career 
professionalization for the military among the populace as soldiers and officers’ 
knowledge expanded scientific understandings of the world.  
Moreover, their experiences in the “wild” made them heroes willing to sacrifice 
their comfort and maybe even their lives for the development of the nation. Filibuster 
William Walker personified this perceived selflessness to many in the mid-nineteenth 
century, Amy S. Greenberg contends, because he, like others before him, “proved his 
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masculinity through heroic courage, aggressivity, and rejection of both physical and 
financial comfort.”18  
As for professionalization of military affairs, the first step in that direction 
occurred the year before the Louisiana Purchase with the formal authorization of the first 
U.S. military academy at West Point, NY.19  Although helpful in preparing a small 
number of cadets for military service in its first decades, it initially focused on expanding 
American knowledge of engineering, math, and science.20  
It was not until the Mexican-American War that a significant number of West 
Point-trained men proved their mettle on the battlefield, part of an era that Stephen E. 
Ambrose called its “The Golden Age.”21 Their successes institutionalized the importance 
of professional training of the country’s military leaders and formalized the issue of 
martial masculinity.   
However, the War of 1812 played its own part in solidifying the American martial 
tradition and notions of exceptionalism.22  British threats and disrespect of the United 
States on the high seas led to domestic concerns about the country’s place in an 
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international system that was becoming increasingly important to the United States, 
especially in relation to economics.  The country took a risk to defend its honor on the 
high seas as well as to defeat Native Americans within the United States that aligned with 
Great Britain in what many called the “Second War of Independence.”  Historian Donald 
S. Hickey suggests this was an exaggeration, as the threat “was more imagined than real” 
because Britain’s real objective simply was to win the Napoleonic Wars at any cost.23   
Yet, the ability to survive the war, which turned out to be a diplomatic draw 
despite the weakness of a small American military in the face of a mighty superpower 
(albeit one preoccupied with the events on its own continent), served to augment the 
country’s belief in its exceptionalism. Moreover, it led to the election of another popular 
military veteran to the presidency in 1828, Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of 
New Orleans.24  
This continued a rather steady tradition of the election of veterans to the 
presidency rarely broken for any real length of time until the period between 1912 and 
1945 and again in 1992 with the election of Bill Clinton.  Diplomatic historian Alexander 
DeConde noted in his study of masculinity and the presidency, Presidential Machismo, 
that “in times of real or imagined international crises” historically the American populace 
always tended to support their presidents “as though they were father figures.”25 As a 
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result, it made sense that American voters often turned to a presumably strong and 
valorous military veteran for leadership. 
President James K. Polk’s chance to become a martial father figure arrived in 
1848, as aggressive thirst for territorial growth forced a war with Mexico so the United 
States could claim California, allow the country to traverse the continent, and gain new 
ports to the Pacific.26  The military’s role in this expansion of the country’s territory and 
its international power solidified during the Mexican-American War, enhancing its 
prestige.  A victory that relied on officers and soldiers from the military and citizen 
volunteers, it created a new sense that the United States military and its martial men were 
a powerful force with which to be reckoned and it further professionalized the 
institution’s ranks.  
John S.D. Eisenhower argued “the success of American arms represented a 
remarkable feat,” even though many are “tempted . . . to regard the unbroken string of 
American victories as easy.”27 Yet, it was quite easy for Americans of the time to see the 
hyper-successful outcome of the conflict as reinforcing the idea of a powerful, 
unstoppable America fulfilling its manifest destiny.28 
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The acquisition of new territories of the United States, the Mexican-American 
War, and military filibustering turned into proving grounds for American masculinity.29 
Greenberg argues, “New American territories were embraced by some American men 
because they offered opportunities for individual heroic initiative and for success in love 
and war.”30 Other forms of accepted masculinity existed, such as restrained manhood in 
which men used “their religious faith, their domestic virtue and treatment of family 
members, their ability to abstain from drinking . . . and their success as breadwinner” to 
highlight their virility.31 However, many men now based mainstream masculinity on the 
characteristic of great physical strength and the ability to dominate others with 
“aggression and violence.”32 
By the 1860s, men throughout the United States and the Confederate States of 
America had the chance to prove they possessed these characteristics on the battlefields 
of the Civil War. Participation in the War Between the States often hinged on a main 
ideal of martial masculinity, duty to nation and its ideals; however, it also allowed for the 
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evolution of one of its key components: martial brotherhood, which often maintained 
combat motivation.33  The band of brothers George Washington spoke of regarding the 
Continental Army became of the utmost importance in the Civil War. Historian of the era 
James M. McPherson, suggests that this “experience of combat did more than strengthen 
existing bonds; it also dissolved the petty rivalries and factions that existed in some 
regiments and forged new bonds among men who saw the elephant together.”34  
In the years after the Civil War, as a new generation of men came to the forefront 
of society, men who had not had the chance to participate in war, the definition of 
manhood seemed to go into crisis.  The significant technological and industrial changes 
of the latter half of the 19th century altered everyday life.35  These changes damaged male 
understandings of their place in society.  Although some like sociologist Michael Kimmel 
suggested this occurred because “the courage and self-sacrifice demanded by that great 
struggle [the Civil War] contrasted sharply with the soft, pampered life of the business 
and professional classes after the war,” it was much more complex.36 
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The massive influx of immigrants in the mid and late nineteenth century from 
Germany, China, and multiple areas in Southern Europe, purportedly threatened the 
livelihood of the common man due to a loss of jobs, while the women’s suffrage 
movement that began in 1848 endangered men’s traditional roles in society.37 The closing 
of the frontier also threatened their virility because as Frederick Jackson Turner believed 
the rugged individualism developed by forging a life and new communities in the 
wilderness would die out and endanger the advancement of America’s exceptionalism.38 
Then, in the early 1890s, a severe economic downturn hit the country that would last until 
1898, further preventing men from fulfilling the simple task of providing for their 
families.39  Fear of not meeting the requirements of American masculinity, including the 
lack of war to serve as a proving ground for it, led many men to question their ability to 
achieve manhood.40 
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In the meantime, the country itself seemed on the verge of failing in its role as an 
exceptional nation.  Concerns arose among some in the government and the military over 
whether or not men emasculated by domestic problems would make good soldiers, 
especially since the country needed them for the next stage of American expansion after 
the close of the American domestic frontier: international territorial acquisition.  
Moreover, many men began to wonder if they would ever get the chance to prove their 
martial manhood like their fathers and others in the Civil War. The battlefield, in the eyes 
of many, both the elite and the common man, taught “courage, strength, endurance, duty, 
principled sacrifice,” the exact elements of what it meant to be “real” man.41  
Many young American men of the late 19th century got the chance to test their 
manhood in the Spanish-American War, an event for which pro-imperialist politicians, 
businessmen, yellow journalists, and jingoists clamored.42 Even members of the upper 
echelon of the military seemed to point toward the United States’ aggressive entrance 
into international affairs, with naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan suggesting it would 
prove the nation’s masculinity and point it toward its intended greatness.43 The war ended 
with the United States taking on the role of an imperialist international power in both 
Cuba and the Philippines, while its quick and successful outcome in Cuba again 
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amplified the strength of the American military and reiterated the importance of martial 
service for achieving manhood.44 
After the war, martial masculinity remained for many the pinnacle of manhood, 
and it became important for men who were not actively engaged in the military to 
maintain the aggressive characteristics of the concept.  Eventually, competitive sports and 
an element of competition in all areas of life arose as a means to maintain the aggressive 
strains of one’s manhood.45 This preservation, or for younger generation of males, 
creation, of the bellicosity of maleness outside of war meant that the martial man was 
always waiting in the wings to perform the psychological and physical duties necessary 
to engage in warfare.  
Vocal American imperialist Theodore Roosevelt campaigned for the maintenance 
of the virtuous characteristics present in this aggressive style of manhood.46 He told the 
American public in 1899, “I wish to preach, not the doctrine of ignoble ease, but the 
doctrine of the strenuous life, the life of toil and effort, of labor and strife.”  He wanted 
“to preach that highest form of success which comes, not to the man who desires mere 
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easy peace, but to the man who does not shrink from danger, from hardship, or from 
bitter toil, and who out of these wins the splendid ultimate triumph.”47  
Roosevelt, soon to be president in 1901 after the assassination of William 
McKinley, also wanted this form of manhood to survive because it assisted in keeping the 
idea of American exceptionalism alive among the populace. Moreover, it would bolster 
the new empire and reinforce the martial strength of the country. He implored his fellow 
citizens to “shrink from no strife, moral or physical, within or without the nation . . . for it 
is only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win 
the goal of true national greatness.”48  
 
The Solidification of the Exceptionalism Myth 
This notion of exceptionalism and the strength of the U.S. military found another 
test in the ethnic tensions and system of alliances in Europe in the 1910s.  The desire to 
seek economic advantage in the situation in Europe, and the isolationist tendencies of the 
populace regarding warfare, initially kept Woodrow Wilson from entering World War I 
and forced his administration, according to David M. Kennedy, “to cultivate—even 
manufacture—public opinion favorable to the war.”49  
When the Americans finally entered into battle in 1919, victory occurred rather 
swiftly. European soldiers on both sides of the conflict were war weary, and the infusion 
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of American blood psychologically benefitted the Allies, while it psychically defeated the 
Germans.50  As Robert H. Zieger argues, “one clear result of direct U.S. participation in 
the Great War was that the fighting ended in western Europe at least a year earlier than 
would have been the case without American belligerency.”51 The Americans left the war 
with even greater international political capital, particularly in relation to Europe, and 
Ziegler claims this “drove home the fact that America was Europe’s offspring and 
successor.”52 
As for the war’s veterans, many did not fare well under the stresses of the war, 
overwhelmed by the sights and sounds of bomber planes and their ammunition, gassings, 
machine gunfire, and the horrific nature of trench warfare.53 However, it is important to 
note that Europeans endured more, and for a much longer period, than the Americans did. 
David M. Kennedy notes that “most of the young men in the AEF (American 
Expeditionary Force) had arrived too late and moved too swiftly to be deeply disabused 
of their adventurous expectations” of warfare.54 Indeed, they experienced shell shock too 
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and came to the “realization that modern military combat was something quite different 
from what they as eager troops had been led to expect.” Yet, many used the “outrage” 
they felt at the impersonal nature of new warfare to psych themselves up and mete out 
retribution. As Kennedy suggests in his study of these American participants, “what 
strikes the reader of these personal war records is their unflaggingly positive, even 
enthusiastic note.”55  
Many believed that the best and the brightest died on the battlefields in World 
War I, and the war, with its death and destruction, led to a disillusionment and despair 
among the world’s “Lost Generation” that matured during the war.  However, that notion 
held stronger ties in Europe and among a community of intellectuals and literary 
writers.56 American understandings of the martial nature of masculinity and the power 
and strength of their nation stayed well engrained in mainstream culture and the 
government during this period. Although Kennedy argues, “despite the dreams of some 
men at the time . . . the United States was not in 1919 . . . yet heir to the mantle of 
‘empire’ . . . still a pretender to the title,” the nation certainly did not perceive it that 
way.57  The United States, now a major player in the international system, prepared for 
what many saw as inevitable future conflict, mobilizing its industry and readying its 
military during the interwar period.58  
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The Empire of Japan’s decision to bomb Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 set 
the fruits of this planning into motion.  In the Pacific Theater of World War II, the 
strategically prepared United States with a strong naval machine behind it, fought with 
Australia and New Zealand against a determined, but militarily weaker Japan.59  The 
United States and its allies in the European Theater, despite the tactics of the maniacal 
Adolf Hitler, successfully pushed back the Germans, liberating the countries taken by 
Hitler, and occupying Germany.60 When the final phase of the war ended with the 
Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945 just weeks after the United States dropped 
atomic bombs on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that American technological, 
industrial, and economic might gathered prior and during the war proved more than 
effective.  
At the end of the war, the martial masculinity of the United States busted at the 
seams.  The images of the major heroes of the Second World War demonstrated the 
strength, power, and manhood of the United States, no nonsense men such as Generals 
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Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, and Dwight Eisenhower. Yet, the average solider of 
the war proved the mettle of the country even more, and he exemplified what it meant to 
be a martial man. 
John C. McManus, in his attempt to understand how they fought in the war so 
“effectively and cohesively” using “reserves of courage that they probably thought they 
did not possess,” pinpoints martial brotherhood as the answer.61  Many volunteered while 
others waited for the draft, but almost all adhered to an intense camaraderie that became 
their “single most important sustaining and motivating force,” an understanding that “was 
pervasive among the troops who fought the war.”62 At its end, the war established the 
pinnacle of George Washington’s belief in the band of brothers, and was a culmination of 
well over 100 years of American efforts to prove the notion of exceptionalism, develop 
the martial tradition, and cultivate martial men.63 
The Second World War led the United States to new economic, political, and 
cultural heights due to its own performance, the use of the atomic bomb, and the 
significant damage done to Western Europe’s cities, populations, and economies.  The 
men who served, now known popularly as the “Greatest Generation,” returned home to 
ticker-tape parades, received the G.I. Bill, and went on to augment and utilize the new 
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American economy.64  Michael D. Gambone argues, they “deserve equal credit for 
establishing the footing of a stable and prosperous America. Guardians of the country in 
time of war, they took it upon themselves to act as caretakers of the peace. The skills they 
gained through the provisions of the GI Bill fueled and sustained the postwar boom.”65 At 
home, much as they did during the war, they became quintessential American men, this 
time as husbands and fathers, economic providers, and productive political and economic 
citizens. 
 
The Devolution of American Exceptionalism and its Corollaries 
As for the government, the hegemonic position the United States took in the 
international system after the war had its only real military rival in the Soviet Union, 
seemingly proving the special nature of nation.  The ideological incongruence between 
the countries and their inhabitants pitted them against each other. At home, Americans 
feared anything that even resembled communism. Politicians used fabricated stories of 
communistic tendencies to deem their opponents as “soft” on communism, a euphemism 
for their lack of masculinity.66   
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K.A. Cuordileone explains that this “preoccupation with masculine regeneration 
and toughness” did not originate simply with fears over communism; it “was the product 
of a singular historical moment in which a complex of shock-waves and circumstances . . 
. converged to summon a sense of beleaguered manhood in need of rehabilitation.”67 
Those issues included concerns of a standardized American identity, homosexuality, 
gender roles, economic overabundance, and global American power.68 It was during this 
early post-war period that modern American conservatism took shape with its emphasis 
on tradition, national defense, and the destruction of the Communist enemy and its 
supposed American conspirators. 
Internationally, Cold War tensions created a three-year military conflict in Korea 
that ended in a stalemate.69  Americans often ignore this conflict and historians deemed it 
“The Forgotten War;” however, when the conflict was in progress, it certainly garnered a 
great deal of press coverage. The martial men who fought in this conflict had rather large 
shoes to fill when it came to the image of the American soldier and the military, and it 
would seem the unsuccessful outcome of their war could somehow tarnish the image of 
the martial man and the America military. Yet, in many ways, the conflict failed to 
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blemish either, and unlike the men who would fight in the next decade in Southeast Asia, 
Korean War soldiers found dishonor did not befall them.   
According to Andrew Huebner, credit for this belongs to American journalists. 
Throughout the war, the media painted the picture that “despite being outnumbered, 
outgunned, and bone tired, American GIs were fighting heroically,” and were simply 
valorous “victims of circumstance.”70 This representation to Huebner “added complexity 
to the warrior image. By showing a greater degree of discouragement, sorrow, agony, and 
fear, these image makers widened the definition of the masculine, American fighter.”71 
This addition to the definition of the martial man faded quickly. In the next decade, the 
men who fought in similar circumstances in the Vietnam War were not as lucky to have 
their experiences portrayed by the press or accepted by the American public in the same 
way. 
The political climate in Southeast Asia, a mix of nationalism and communism that 
the United States could never disassociate from the communism of the Stalin era and 
beyond, embroiled the country, its institutions, and its ideals in their greatest test. The 
United States, with its new powerful role as the leader of the Western World, saw the 
situation in Vietnam as dire.  From 1956 through 1975, the United States spent money, 
gave military assistance, and then, eventually, joined in the fighting to prevent the 
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communist takeover of South Vietnam.72  The task seemed like an easy one for the 
greatest military power of the West. 
Then, in the 1960s, the idyllic environment created in the 1950s with its suburbs, 
revolving credit, and picket fences, all courtesy of World War II prosperity, began to 
crumble.  Of course, as Cuordileone pointed out, that fantasy never fully existed, and 
when it did, its participants were white, middle class families.73 The true story of the 
1950s involved increasing frustration, particularly among the African-American and 
female population.74 The Civil Rights Movement questioned America’s basic political 
values, while the second wave of feminism forced men and women to reexamine issues 
of gender inequality and sexuality.  With these queries and their eventual demands came 
social instability, cultural reassessment, and political ramifications. 
Many who believed in these changes began to question the government, leading 
to the largest anti-war movement the once isolationist United States ever encountered.75 
Protestors, in turn, created a sense among outsiders that the country’s domestic problems 
would affect its international obligations. In a many ways, they did. Lyndon Johnson and 
Richard Nixon both made decisions about the war informed by concerns over the ever-
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increasing negative opinion of it among the populace. Often, the main worry was what a 
loss in Vietnam would mean for American exceptionalism.  All of this enraged American 
conservatives who rallied against the social and political climate, as well as the influence 
they had on political, foreign policy, and military decisions.  
Moreover, the social and cultural changes of the 1960s exacerbated the crisis of 
manhood, one of the most important aspects of American power.  The men fighting in 
Vietnam were losing, and the power of the men on the homefront began to wane. Long-
held notions of American manhood, the concept’s military ties, and its effect on the 
power of the United States seemed in jeopardy.  The chaos of the era, according to 
Michael Kimmel, “provided a frontal assault on the traditional way that men had defined 
their manhood—against an other who was excluded from full humanity by being 
excluded from those places where men were real men.”76 
By the time the country withdrew from the Vietnam War, having failed at its main 
objective to drive out communism and stop another domino from falling, as well as 
losing 58,000 military personnel in the process, the United States appeared both 
domestically and internationally weak. Many within the country, particularly 
conservative Republicans, believed that America needed to inflate its image. As Susan 
Jeffords suggests, “the stability of the ground on which patriarchal power rests was 
challenged” by the 1960s and a renegotiation would occur in the 1980s via “a revival of 
the images, abilities and evaluations of men and masculinity in dominant U.S. culture.”77 
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The chaos of the 1960s also challenged long-held traditions about the 
“specialness” of the United States and wounded the American military in a way that it 
had never previously known. Because of the significant role of the American military in 
gaining and maintaining the power and prestige of the United States, these wounds would 
have a considerable effect on its own confidence and its image in the eyes of the world. 
Conservative Republicans reeled from this loss of the country’s “specialness,” as 
promoted in the mythology so important to their ideology. The weakened view of the 
nation made them fear the collapse of American hegemony, leading various adherents to 
participate in a concerted campaign to shore up the long-established traditions and might 
of the American military, the country’s notions of martial manhood, and the idea of 
exceptionalism that they believed made the United States of America soar above all 
others.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESTORING THE SACREDNESS OF MILITARY TRADITION: WILLIAM 
WESTMORELAND’S MISSION TO DELIVER THE AMERICAN MILITARY FROM 
THE VIETNAM WAR 
“The Vietnam experience was, as President Reagan has described it, a ‘noble’ 
undertaking. Those who gave their full measure of devotion to the cause—both the living 
and the dead—have much to be proud of. Individually and collectively, they have earned 
the undying gratitude and respect of the vast majority of their countrymen, they were 
stouthearted men and women. They merit our understanding and deserve our respect.”  
 
William Childs Westmoreland1 
 
 On a spring morning in Chicago, Illinois, almost twenty years after the Tet 
Offensive, General William Westmoreland, once again, stood before a large contingent of 
soldiers. The men, now veterans, converged on the streets of the fabled Midwestern city 
for a “Welcome Home Parade,” meant to thank them for their service. For hours, an 
estimated 200,000 vets “some in civilian clothes and others in baggy fatigues and 
battered hats, bearded and long- haired,” many without limbs and the ability to walk 
paraded behind the former general and past half a million spectators.2   
 This was not the first much overdue “welcome home” parade orchestrated for 
Vietnam veterans in the 1980s. Just over a year earlier, a much less attended parade 
occurred in New York City, while smaller parades occurred around the country 
throughout the mid-1980s.  It also was not Westmoreland’s first time serving as grand 
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marshal of such a parade. However, this one differed. The number of participants and 
spectators, and the warm reception for the veterans was equaled only by the dedication of 
the Vietnam Wall.3 The elderly Westmoreland’s participation as the grand marshal of this 
moment of unprecedented public acceptance of the Vietnam veteran, stoically dressed in 
full military regalia, symbolically culminated close to two decades of service to his 
personal vision of redeeming the image of the war. 
Westmoreland’s ultimate objective, however, was not simply to alter the 
country’s perspective on Vietnam. He wanted to stop the negative social and cultural drift 
toward the war’s participants and the American military.4  If he could do this, he believed 
it would save the image of both, culminating in the salvation of the country’s martial 
tradition and the notions of exceptionalism it conjured up.  As Westmoreland knew, the 
public’s perception of the armed forces influenced its numbers and its federal support, 
and any diminishment of its real or perceived supremacy affected the country’s position 
as the leader of the free world. The general, a tried and true conservative, did not simply 
want to save the tradition that defined his life; he also wanted to protect American 
exceptionalism.5 
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Westmoreland started this process in the mid-1960s when he commanded U.S. 
military operations in Vietnam.6 It was then that he began to recognize a perceived lack 
of gratitude among the American populace for the servicemen fighting in the conflict. As 
divisions over the war intensified and contempt for its veterans and the military escalated, 
Westmoreland began a crusade to set the record straight and reaffirm American pride in 
its soldiers’ sacrifices. By the mid-1980s, his earlier efforts converged with those of other 
conservatives to change how Americans viewed the veterans and their war, to salvage the 
historical image and traditions of the American military, and to re-establish the country’s 
international strength. 
 
The Making of a Loyal General and Adherent to the Military Tradition 
On March 26, 1914, William Childs Westmoreland was born in Saxon, South 
Carolina to a multi-generational southern family whose American roots date to the 1650s.  
The first generation of Westmorelands arrived in Virginia in flight from England during 
the Civil War due to their martial support of King Charles I.7  The family became well-
established in the American south, and, as Westmoreland biographer Samuel Zaffiri 
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notes, “there were Westmorelands in the Confederate Army from every southern state 
except Florida.”8  
The South Carolina branch of the family tree, Westmoreland’s direct ancestors, 
arrived in the Piedmont in the early 1730s. Continentals in the Revolution, a choice rarely 
made by South Carolinians, during the Civil War they turned against the Union and 
fought for the Confederacy. After the war, they continued to celebrate the cause, 
attending reunions and participating in parades to honor Confederate veterans.9  
Westmoreland’s father, sired by a man whose own father named him after 
Abraham Lincoln’s assassin, married into the Childs family, which had similar 
understandings of the Civil War.  By the time the future general arrived, the once rather 
poor Westmoreland family had begun to rise in social and economic stature due to its 
coupling with the Childs.10 The new opportunities afforded them meant young William, 
who loved dressing in military uniforms and performing Cub Scout duties, held great 
promise for the family. His sister Margaret said “from day one they kept a tight rein on 
him and began inculcating him with the idea that he was something very special.”11  
The first institution to which he gave his allegiance was the Boy Scouts of 
America. Being a scout was a role he took seriously and at which he excelled through his 
teenage years.12 However, it was the Army that would become his lifelong love.  As 
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Samuel Zaffiri claims, the future general’s father often drilled Robert E. Lee’s famous 
words “duty is the sublimest word in the English language” into young William’s head.13 
This lesson in masculine responsibility influenced his future desire to attend some form 
of military school after he graduated from high school. While he hoped to attend the 
Naval Academy, South Carolina Senator James F. Byrnes, a family friend, convinced 
Westmoreland that he needed a less “technical” curriculum in order to be successful.14  
He enrolled at the Citadel and went on to make an indelible impression on his 
classmates there, as well as on his instructors—well-experienced men who knew the 
characteristics needed to succeed in the military. The instructors and administrators 
pegged him as leadership material early on, and by the end of his nine month initial 
training period, they listed him first out of a ranking of ninety-six students for 
promotion.15  
The future general’s outstanding performance at the Citadel gave him the 
opportunity to transfer to West Point, where many faculty members praised him as “one 
of the most outstanding” new cadets. The Class of 1936, whose commencement speaker 
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was General Pershing, boasted a wide array of eventually preeminent men with whom 
Westmoreland had no problem competing.16 A confident cadet, who took the motto of 
duty, honor, country to heart, Westmoreland ended up receiving the “Pershing Sword” 
from the man himself at graduation, indicating that he “surpassed all others in military 
proficiency” during his time at the academy.17  
Before World War II, Westmoreland spent two years in Hawaii, coming back to 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina just a few months before Pearl Harbor.18 His participation in 
World War II began in North Africa as the commander of the 34th Field Artillery 
Battalion of the 9th Infantry Division and continued in Italy. He rose to become Chief of 
Staff of that infantry during its time in France and Germany.19  However, it was his role 
in the Vietnam War, twenty years later, as the commander of the United States’ Military 
and Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) that defined his career and the rest of his 
life. 
 
Image is Everything: Shoring up America’s Perception of the Military 
As the commanding general of American operations in Vietnam from 1964-1968, 
Westmoreland believed he “owed it to history” to provide the American public with the 
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story of the Vietnam War as he understood it.20  Early on, even while he was “in 
country,” he focused on how the public perceived the soldiers in the conflict, especially 
as the public’s support of the troops serving in Vietnam waned. As Americans’ feelings 
about the Vietnam conflict fractured under the pressure of social and cultural upheaval 
and undermined the military, the general went into full protection mode for the institution 
and the war’s participants. As the war progressed, he sensed there would be an image 
issue for those who served. Ideas of how to respond began percolating. 
Westmoreland tested a theme in the spring of 1967 that eventually matured into a 
full-fledged crusade to change the image of the Vietnam veteran. In a statement read to 
the Ohio Veterans of Foreign War (VFW), Westmoreland presented a “proud father” 
stance toward his men he would never relinquish.  Homing in on three tenets of the 
martial tradition, “Duty, Honor, Country,” he desperately tried to communicate that there 
was honor in the deeds of men serving in an unpopular conflict.21  He proclaimed to his 
comrades in the VFW, “I wish all of you could see, as I am privileged to see, how 
magnificently these young Americans are performing here. They are truly inspiring. They 
are aggressive and courageous…They are dedicated to the service of their nation and the 
cause we serve in Vietnam—the cause of freedom.”22 To the veterans he declared these 
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men as their martial equals who represented the best of the U.S. military and America’s 
male population.    
By late 1967, Westmoreland realized the controversial nature of the war created 
reintegration difficulties for returning servicemen and that their image and Americans’ 
opinions about the military would need strengthening.23 He enlisted Congressman John 
Marsh (D-VA), who visited American bases in Southeast Asia, to work on a coordinated, 
non-governmental effort to welcome Vietnam veterans home. Marsh eventually 
spearheaded a program to honor the returning serviceman called ‘Operation Gratitude.”24 
The Virginia Jaycees pilot project, which mirrored later efforts of the Vietnam Veterans 
Leadership Program, mixed propaganda and veteran appreciation. Coordinated 
community outreach events arose to promote awareness of the soldiers’ “sacrifice,” to 
explain the reasons behind the war, and to give citizens the chance to express their 
gratitude to the veterans.25 
When he asked Marsh to work on these issues, Westmoreland had not seen the 
worst of the Vietnam conflict or its damage to his beloved military. The infamous Tet 
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Offensive in the first weeks of 1968, regardless of its complicated outcome, destroyed 
many Americans’ faith in their political and military institutions.26 While President 
Johnson had already decided in late 1967 to replace Westmoreland, the timing of his 
removal in June 1968 coincided with Tet, tarnishing his image.27  
Returning home somewhat disgraced, Westmoreland accepted an appointment as 
Army Chief of Staff in July of 1968.  During his four-year tenure, he attempted to 
strengthen the image of the American military. A major part of his efforts coincided with 
a push throughout the military to bring respect back to military service, to re-establish 
active soldiers’ pride in their duties and institution, and to entice young men to join.28  
Westmoreland conveyed his logistical “philosophy for continuing the work of the 
Army” to the attendees of the Army Commanders’ Conference in December 1968. He 
stressed his four M’s for the branch—Mission, Motivation, Modernization, and 
Management.29  He wanted to bolster those already in the army, but he also sought to 
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polish its tarnished image and bring others into the fold.30 He boasted to those attending 
that “[t]he Army has responded magnificently to the challenge of Vietnam,” but stressed 
that it was an institution “in transition in a society in transition.” In order to combat 
societal change, the army needed to focus on “the continued enhancement of the dignity, 
pride, and motivation of the members of the Army,” while working “to increase the 
attractiveness of service” among the general male population. The key was to cast “the 
Army image in a light that will engender a high degree of public respect and appreciation 
for the Army’s vital contributions in securing the national objectives.”31   
When Westmoreland’s role as Army Chief of Staff ended and he retired from the 
Army in the spring of 1972, he believed the institution had fixed itself internally, but not 
necessarily publically. He informed President Nixon in his final Army status report that 
Vietnam had forced the Army to deal with “unique difficulties” and “unprecedented 
challenges.” Even though he “pushed to restore traditionally high Army standards” and 
re-established soldiers “professionalism, discipline, and morale,” Americans’ still had a 
low opinion of their national army, and he resented it.32  
The general held a skewed view of why the American public held the military in 
such low esteem.  He felt their opinion stemmed from a mistaken focus on the appalling 
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behavior of a few soldiers in the war, rather than on the nobility of the many and the 
institution.33 These indiscretions, he claimed about six months before his retirement, 
obscured the courageous and dedicated efforts of the great majority of our fighting 
men.”34   
His frustration with the American public’s opinions also came up in 
Westmoreland’s final letter to Nixon with the accusation that Americans had overblown 
these “transgressions of a few” and transferred them to the institution. He pleaded with 
the president to make the next goal of the army a ramping up of his efforts to change its 
image among the country’s citizens. Among other things, it would enhance the military’s 
ability to prepare for the next conflict.35  
The general also commented on a topic that became the center of his post-
retirement efforts to heal the wounds of the American military. He declared to Nixon that 
the men who participated in the war deserved and needed acknowledgment for their 
nobility and dedication to American efforts in Vietnam.  Westmoreland believed that 
such recognition must have a strong link to the army itself, so no further doubts existed as 
to its capabilities.36 After leaving his position within the Nixon administration and 
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settling into civilian life, Westmoreland eventually made changing the impression 
Americans had of the military’s role in Vietnam his defining quest.  
 
Revisionism: Controlling the History of the Military’s Role in the War 
Directly after he retired, Westmoreland at first spent little time on changing 
perceptions of the war, and this was likely due to his unsuccessful run for governor of 
South Carolina.37  The topic often arose during his bid for office, but the message lacked 
the focus it manifested later. However, with the release of the American prisoners of war 
in 1973, Westmoreland mentioned his hope that their freedom and the “excellent 
impression” they made on the American people would help change attitudes.38 He 
commented “someday, and it may be soon, the American people will appreciate the 
excellent job done by their military representatives in Southeast Asia.”39 
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Beyond that, he did not make a significant effort in the direction of revising 
public understandings of the war until the late 1970s. Once the general started, however, 
he rarely slowed down until age began to catch up with him. One of the most important 
issues that needed addressing, according to Westmoreland, was the media’s role in 
creating an erroneous history of the war.40   
This subject first appeared during his tenure as commander of MACV, as he often 
criticized media coverage of events as “confused news accounts” that would prevent 
anyone from forming “a true understanding of the situation.”41 As time moved on and his 
career and reputation suffered from poor public opinion, he became fixated on the idea 
that he should step forward and be the voice of the war and his men. His desire to shape 
the legacy of the war appears in an editorial he wrote in late 1970 in which he worried 
praise for the army from future “objective historians” might “be too late.”42 Instead of 
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relying on those historians who might never come or who might be ignored, 
Westmoreland decided to take up the mantle himself, even before the conflict ended.43  
In the editorial, Westmoreland outlined what would become the main points of his 
efforts to shape Americans’ understandings of the Vietnam War and salvage the military 
institution. He argued for focusing on the importance of the army’s “overall 
performance,” its truly remarkable performance in “carrying out the directions…under 
most difficult and trying conditions,” and its major successes in holding off the Viet 
Cong and the Army of North Vietnam, rather than on possible mistakes and “the inferior 
performance of a few senior officers and NCOs.”  The military, to him, had accomplished 
all of this “despite opposition, the incredible personal turbulence, the dissent, the lack of 
U.S. mobilization, the race problems, and the attitudes that have pervaded the Nation 
during the past few years.” Westmoreland found he needed to address these issues 
continuously, regardless of the forum.  The fact that Vietnam remained a point of 
discussion made him believe, “blame has been firmly paced [sic], lessons have been 
learned, some heeded.”44 
In 1978, the general began making speeches on college campuses throughout the 
country and before veterans’ organizations that concentrated on how to revise negative 
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understandings of the military’s participation in Vietnam. One of his major speeches was 
“The TET Offensive and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, 1965-1968.” In it, he 
acknowledged that the war had been a “shabby performance by America, a blemish on 
our history, and a possible blight on our future.” But he also refused to blame the military 
or the majority of its members for these issues, suggesting that poor domestic and 
military choices by political leaders had weakened the war effort, while college 
deferments that were “discriminatory and undemocratic” had created “substandard 
officers” and led to “marginal types” who created situations like My Lai.45 
Although Westmoreland made public statements in the late 1970s suggesting he 
hoped “history will put the matter into accurate perspective,” he wanted to speed up the 
process rather than let things work themselves out.46 He based his reasoning for moving 
forward on the proliferation of “distorted ‘historical’ accounts” of the conflict. One of 
those came about in 1978, in a “Reader’s Digest” collection named Great Events of the 
20th Century and How They Changed Our Lives. Its chapter “1964 – Vietnam: The Bitter 
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Ordeal” disturbed Westmoreland greatly because he believed it contained false 
information.47 
Given that a well-circulated periodical with “a reputation for accuracy and 
objectivity” published the book, it prompted Westmoreland to launch a letter writing 
campaign to force a review by the publisher.48 He explained to a former colleague that if 
veterans made it a point to “express our disapproval of accounts based on uninformed 
opinion, it could have a salutary effect.”49  
Westmoreland’s desire to control the portrayal of the war came on the heels of his 
book A Soldier Reports, released in 1976.50  Although he “felt he owed it to history to tell 
[the] story” of the war through his eyes and the eyes of the military, the continued 
publication of articles and books that did not present the war in the way he wanted 
reinforced his belief that he and other senior officers needed to get their story out to the 
public. To General William E. DePuy, he wrote that they owed it to their men “to bring 
forth the facts and raise them above propaganda.” He remarked to DePuy that 
“Misleading ‘history’ is but another slap at the morale of the poorly informed soldier, 
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sailor, marine, or airman. You and I can help hasten the process of setting the record 
straight...and at the same time maintain a soldierly stance.”51 
With or without assistance from his former colleagues, Westmoreland continued 
taking a stab at revisionist history during his speeches at colleges throughout the United 
States.  In late 1978, he arrived at the University of Nebraska to give an oft-made speech, 
‘Vietnam in Perspective.’ He lectured the crowd of professors, students, and ROTC 
members, giving typical talking points of how the media gave “distorted, misleading, and 
irresponsible” reports that undermined the military, while traitorous war protestors 
encouraged the Vietnamese enemy to keep fighting.  
But many in the audience, which exceeded the allotted seating, gave him a chilly 
reception. Some booed, anti-war demonstrators carried signs and shouted anti-war 
slogans, and someone called in a bomb threat. The majority of the audience found his 
revisionism unimpressive. As interruptions continued, Westmoreland countered, “I’ve 
talked at about 30 campuses in the past four years, but I’ve never had one quite like this. I 
guess this place isn’t as conservative as I thought.”52   
A few months later, when addressing a crowd at the more conservative Dartmouth 
College, he “received a warm welcome and extended ovation when he finished.”  But he 
continued to receive challenges from “a substantial part of the audience.”  After his 
appearance, he reiterated his speech’s revisionism to the college’s newspaper, The 
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Darmouth, complaining that the American media bore responsibility, coupled with 
“certain elements in this society.” To him, they undermined the war effort and “did 
everything they could to degrade the man in uniform.” The opinion of the “current 
generation,” which he encountered during his speeches, absorbed all of this propaganda, 
according to him, explaining why they attacked him so much.53 
By 1980, he began to argue that a reexamination of the war was in fact underway 
but somewhat stretched the truth when he suggested, “the situation is now being seen in a 
more accurate perspective.”54 In October 1980, he told talk show host Phil Donahue, 
“Revisionism is underway. As I speak on college campuses, which I do frequently, a 
changed mood is much in evidence.  Meanwhile there is a decided shift in public attitudes 
toward the Vietnam veteran.”  An unconvinced Donahue denied his request to reappear 
on the journalist’s popular talk show to discuss this new “development and trend” in 
American perspectives of the war, as well as to promote the paperback version of his 
best-selling A Soldier Reports.55  
For the next few years, Westmoreland continued on the speaking circuit, but he 
shifted his focus from unfriendly college campuses to dedications of war memorials and 
other military-friendly events. At one dedication, a year before the opening of the 
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national Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Westmoreland proclaimed, “I am particularly 
proud of speaking for the Vietnam veteran. Few have had the anguish that has been mine 
for that man and woman who did in Vietnam what the leadership of the country asked 
them to do and did it well.” He lamented, “in return these men and women have been 
ignored and often abused by their fellow countrymen and neglected by their Nation.”56 
This statement marked a change in his rhetoric that as well. Although he never gave up 
on refashioning the image of the military and revising the history of the war, his 
campaign took a different and more successful turn in the early 1980s, concentrating on 
the reshaping the image of Vietnam veterans.  
 
The Valorous Man: Redeeming the Image of the Vietnam Veteran to Salvage the 
Martial Tradition 
In the matter of polishing the image of the American military and its members, 
Westmoreland had a kindred spirit in Ronald Reagan, whom he strongly supported and 
stumped for during the presidential campaign of 1980.  Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, 
Casper Weinberger, wrote to him near the end of the president’s first term, lauding the 
great strides made by the administration’s campaign to re-strengthen the American 
military. Not only was Weinberger happy with “the progress we have made in restoring 
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the pride and performance of our people in uniform,” but he also reported on the rise in 
“recruitment and retention” that he felt illustrated “a renewed respect for the honor of a 
military career.”57  
An element of that change had much to do with the efforts of people like 
Westmoreland, particularly after the focus of their public campaigns turned away from 
buttressing the war itself and toward highlighting the valor of the conflict’s participants.  
When the thought of a national memorial commemorating America’s role in the 
Vietnam War came about in the late 1970s, Westmoreland had already spent years 
supporting various smaller ones around the country honoring soldiers who died in the 
Vietnam War. Beginning in the late 1960s, veterans groups, city councils, and even the 
parents of those who served, worked in their local communities to create monuments for 
those who made this ultimate sacrifice; Westmoreland rarely missed a chance to lend his 
support.58  The creation of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was no different.  
The general’s desire to support a national project stemmed from his belief that a 
memorial supported by “prominent Americans of diverse backgrounds” might actually 
bring the country together. He had great faith in the all-encompassing nature of a 
“patriotic project” like the Wall that would be “a memorial to the American Vietnam 
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Veterans who made the supreme sacrifice” and would “become an appropriate tribute to 
all” who served. 59  Consequently, he quickly moved to support the efforts of the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF) in order to solidify the war’s place in the annals of 
history. 
In the spring of 1980, Westmoreland presented unsolicited financial and moral 
support to the VVMF, which eventually built the Vietnam Wall.60 He wrote the fund’s 
president and founder Jan C. Scruggs to express his desire to assist in any way he could. 
He congratulated Scruggs on his initial victory to start the project, offered one of the first 
contributions to the official fund, and stressed to the former grunt, “if you believe my 
association could contribute to the success of the fund, please do not hesitate to contact 
me.”61  
Scruggs jumped at the chance to have the retired general on board with the project 
and quickly wrote him back, thanking him for his contribution and his desire to assist.  
He praised him as “the first high ranking military officer to write to us offering to help,” a 
role he said was not surprising, as it was “consistent with the kind of leadership you 
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showed during those painful years of Vietnam.”62 By the end of the year, Westmoreland 
had become a prominent part of the effort to build the Wall, lending his name to 
fundraising letters, including one sent to his West Point classmates; soliciting 
contributions on his own; and becoming a member of the VVMF’s National Sponsoring 
Committee along with Gerald Ford, Barry Goldwater, and Bob Hope.63   
A few months later, Scruggs wrote to Westmoreland, “Although the peculiar 
political and historical situation denied you the victory that could have been won, this 
memorial is not quite as encumbered by the difficulties inherent in the war.”64 However, 
Scruggs was wrong. When the VVMF unveiled the design for the memorial in late 1981, 
the uproar over its design threatened its existence.65  Artist Maya Lin’s concept presented 
the memorial as two slabs of black granite embedded into the ground and engraved with 
the names all who perished in the war. Many conservatives opposed her plan for the 
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memorial, which they found disrespectful. They believed Westmoreland might feel the 
same way about what they described as “the black gash of shame.”66   
Many of those conservatives wanted Westmoreland’s support to alter aspects of 
Maya Lin’s design or even to withdraw his approval for the entire project. Former Marine 
James Webb was one of them. A member of the original group of individuals who sought 
federal authorization of a memorial on the Washington Mall, he wrote to Westmoreland 
in late 1981. Webb told the general it would be “beyond my conscience,” to remain a part 
of the VVMF because the project had become “at best a memorial to those who died, and 
in my opinion, a nihilistic political statement regarding the war.”  Webb’s suggested 
changes of the addition of “an American flag at the juncture of the two Walls of the 
memorial, a change in the color to white, bringing it above ground, and listing the names 
in chronological order” had been denied by the VVMF, and Webb quickly decided to 
withdraw his support.67 He wanted Westmoreland to do the same. 
When conservative veteran Tom Carhart, who vehemently opposed Lin’s design, 
contacted Westmoreland only a few weeks later, his agenda was much less ambiguous 
than that of Webb.  He asked the general to “consider helping us alter this design to one 
that can be reasonably seen to ‘honor and recognize’ all Vietnam veterans,” and “to 
resign from the Board of Sponsors.”  Carhart argued that Maya Lin’s memorial was “not 
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only inappropriate, but also was directly insulting to the sacrifices made for the country 
by Vietnam veterans.” Like Webb, he suggested changes “of black to white, bringing the 
walls above ground, and installing an American flag.” However, Carhart indicated a 
much larger hope to pressure the general into withdrawing his support entirely.68 
They failed to sway Westmoreland’s opinion on the design.69 No amount of 
cajoling by the opponents of the Wall’s design would keep him from fully supporting it. 
In response to Webb, Westmoreland firmly expressed his great displeasure with those 
against the design, barking, “The War in Vietnam sadly…divided our nation. Those of us 
who served in Vietnam believe that we fought for a worthy cause and are proud to have 
done so.  It is now sad indeed to see efforts to divide us. Such efforts are unnecessary 
and…not justified by the facts.”70  
In reality, some elements of the design were unsavory to Westmoreland as well, 
and he even met with Scruggs in late 1981 to review them and to discuss the concerns.71 
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However, after this meeting, he saw no reason for those elements to make or break the 
building of the monument. Of the few things he sought for alterations, he believed none 
should hinder the project. The inscription, already set to be modified “to reflect honor, 
courage, and devotion to country,” and the placement of an American flag, which he 
deemed highly necessary, would not interfere with commencement of the memorial’s 
construction, in his estimation.72 
On a whole, Westmoreland believed Maya Lin’s design would not dredge up the 
divisiveness of the war or send some sort of liberal political message about it.  He felt the 
monument would be elegant, tasteful, and fit in quite well on the National Mall. As he 
wrote to James Webb, “it is in no way a “trench”, black polished granite is far more 
handsome than any other possible stone, the chronological listing of names is not 
inappropriate, the structure reflects dignity and good taste and blends in aesthetically well 
with the environment of that beautiful area of the mall.” 73 Although he made sure that 
Webb knew he took his concerns quite seriously, in the end, Westmoreland told him “my 
verdict is not in agreement with yours.” To the general the most important issue was a 
completed memorial, unveiled to the country, and working to change public perceptions.   
The similarity between Scruggs and Westmoreland’s desire to keep politics out of 
Americans’ psyches when it came to the Wall, stemmed from the fact that they both 
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wanted reverence for the men who served.74 Westmoreland staunchly stood by Scruggs 
and the VVMF, the project, and the design and never flinched under the pressure put on 
by conservative veterans and politicians. He knew conflict would not only destroy the 
Wall, but it would also kill any chance he had of changing the public’s opinion on the 
military and its veterans. Honoring, and therefore, salvaging the reputation of the men 
who served in Vietnam would, in turn, save the military tradition of the United States.  
After rejecting conservative calls for change, Westmoreland continued his support 
of the VVMF. He was quite pleased when Scruggs wrote him in March of 1982 with one 
of his many update letters, bringing news of a settlement.75 A bit off schedule now, 
Scruggs wrote, the issues that threatened to halt the memorial in its tracks had dissipated.  
The VVMF would move forward and install a flag at the site and a statue connected to 
the monument, a human representation of those who served. At the bottom of this official 
letter from the VVMF’s president, was a handwritten note meant for delivery to Scruggs: 
“Congratulations on your success in solving the design controversy. I admire the way you 
handled such a sensitive and important problem.”76  
Within two weeks, Westmoreland had a letter on his desk, requesting his 
attendance and participation in the official groundbreaking ceremony for what would 
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become the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.77 Scruggs hoped he would attend, particularly 
because he believed that for the monument to be accepted “we need a prominent general 
at the podium that day.”78   
Westmoreland obliged, attending the dedication of the Memorial, a celebration he 
believed “should have a positive impact.”79 He also led the parade of veterans who 
marched on the nation’s capital. According to Scruggs, the general “loved the Salute. 
Enjoyed the camaraderie, etc….he likes the Entrance Plaza.”80 In fact, numerous veterans 
contacted Westmoreland in the year after the dedication, telling him how they liked the 
monument.  According to him, he received fifty letters from veterans everyday stating 
how much they “like the memorial,” even though many initially “thought that they would 
not like it.”81 
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After Westmoreland’s desire for a national memorial came to fruition, he shifted 
his attention to other related projects. His next contribution to Americans’ perceptions of 
Vietnam veterans came via the promotion of the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program 
(VVLP), a flagship of the Reagan administration, to help those who had returned from 
the war reintegrate into society.82  
In fact, the initiative mainly served as a means to re-shape the image of veterans 
and offered little substantial help or leadership training. This outcome corresponded with 
Westmoreland’s objectives. He promoted it as “an effort designed to affirm pride and 
integrity in military service, while demonstrating that Vietnam Veterans are a leadership 
resource not to be pitied or treated as guilt-ridden victims.” The program might have had 
the dual effect of making “a lasting impact on the American society as well as on the 
individual lives of those who served their country with such distinction in Vietnam,” but 
clearly, Westmoreland was most interested in what the public thought about the veterans, 
rather than its ability to help those who served.83  
The general often spoke to associations and groups regarding the promise of the 
VVLP, focusing on proving the men who served were valiant and represented the best 
America had to offer. The man who served in Vietnam, according to Westmoreland, was 
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not “a drug ridden psychotic outlaw,” but “a man of pride and initiative.”84 Even if some 
might need assistance with reintegration, he contended it had little to do with their service 
and everything to do with labels attached by the American public, leaders, and 
institutions.  In fact, Westmoreland would counter, a recent poll concluded that nearly all 
were happy they served, more than half would do so again, and almost three-fourths liked 
their experience in the American military.85  
To him, those who served in Vietnam were “a precious national asset” that was 
“as good a force as we have ever put on any battlefield.” 86 He adamantly opposed their 
being “ashamed” of themselves because they performed their orders, emphasizing that 
the defeat was not their fault.87 In fact, he acknowledged his own reintegration problems, 
what journalist Jack Norman called “Vietnam-veteran syndrome.” According to 
Westmoreland, however, the maturity that came with his age, his previous experience in 
war, and his lack of confusion over the justness of the war saved him from becoming 
stuck in that phase.88 
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Throughout the 1980s, Westmoreland continued his work to change American 
perspectives on the war, its participants, and the American military, particularly “trying 
to give a boost to Vietnam veterans.” But even a decade after Saigon fell, he 
acknowledged there was significantly “more ground to break.”89 His prescription was to 
participate in parades throughout the country to celebrate the Vietnam veteran as a 
belated thank you and welcome home.90 The general believed these parades enhanced the 
way veterans felt about themselves, while presenting them in a new light to Americans. 
He acknowledged that parades like the highly attended one held in Washington, D.C. 
during the dedication weekend for the Vietnam Wall marked “a turning point in the 
attitude of the vet towards himself” and, in turn, positively affected Americans’ 
perspectives, one of the reasons why veterans’ groups and American cities chose to throw 
them. One reporter noted Westmoreland believed, “the period of mistreatment has ended 
for the Vietnam veteran.”91  
A Veterans Day parade held in Atlanta in 1985 underscored how much things 
really had changed.  As grand marshal of the parade, Westmoreland spoke to the crowd 
and, unlike the scene at numerous colleges across the country, any interruptions from the 
crowd came from cheers rather than boos and verbal protests. The veteran-friendly 
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crowd, according to The Atlanta Constitution, celebrated as the veterans passed. The only 
placards seen were those in support of veterans’ causes and in contempt of anti-war 
protestors.” They also gave Westmoreland “a hero’s welcome.” At a luncheon later in the 
day, he praised the men who served in Vietnam who did not lose the war because they 
“won a strategic victory by holding the line for 10 years.”92  But his message centered on 
the veneration of the veteran. Declared the general, “the Vietnam veteran is not the drug-
crazed, psychotic, reluctant warrior as he has been wrongly portrayed,” in fact, he “is a 
valuable national asset who is assuming a position of leadership in our society.”93  
In 1986, Westmoreland continued to speak at college campuses, visiting twelve in 
that year and twelve more in the next.94 He also continued to visit veterans around the 
country and to participate in parades.  The first year anniversary of a small chapter of the 
Vietnam Veterans of America in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, was one of the many stops 
he made that year.  Around fifty veterans gathered to hear their former commander speak 
about their valor, stating they were as good, and maybe even better, than the men who 
fought in America’s previous wars. He told them how proud he was of them for 
answering the call of duty, rather than running away to college or Canada or protesting 
the war in the streets. At the end of his speech, after telling his men they had a right to 
feel proud of their actions in Vietnam, he quietly announced his participation in what 
                                                           
92
 Westmoreland quoted in Scott Thurston and Monte Plott, “Westmoreland lauds Vietnam heroes 
in Atlanta’s Veterans Day ceremonies,” The Atlanta Constitution, November 12, 1985, File: Clippings, 
Topical, Veterans Activities, (1984-1986), Box 67, William C. Westmoreland Papers, South Caroliniana 
Library, University of South Carolina. 
 
93
 Ibid.  
 
94
 Paul Vitello,“The General Explains His War,” Newsday, October 10, 1986, File: Clippings, 
Topical, Education, 1980s, Box 65 File: Clippings, Topical, Veterans Activities (1980-1983), Box 67, 
William C. Westmoreland Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.  
 
 69 
would be his shining moment as the “commander” of his Vietnam veterans, the Chicago 
homecoming parade the next spring.95  
Once, when a journalist asked Westmoreland why he spent so much of his 
retirement speaking and appearing at veterans’ events, he explained “it is for the Vietnam 
veterans, who have been treated ‘terribly unfairly’ by their countrymen…to set the record 
straight on their behalf.”  The writer had his reservations, believing that Westmoreland 
was most interested in his own image. Westmoreland’s impact was not lost on him, 
though.  Although some at Stonybrook University, where the journalist was observing 
Westmoreland, “were mildly skeptical of the general’s version of history,” the majority, 
of all backgrounds, accepted him and listened to his message. From an ROTC member 
excited to see him to a boy with “hair to shoulders and crucifixes dangling from his 
earlobes” who spoke of the general’s “sincerity,” it was clear the stigma of Vietnam had 
lessened. In fact, during dinner at the student center, the young man characterized by his 
long hair and earrings commented he would serve under him gladly.96 
The end of the 1980s saw the forcefulness and frequency of Westmoreland’s 
campaign regarding the reshaping of the war, the image of its participants, and the 
American military tradition wane. Although it is possible his age slowed him to this 
point, it is likely, given his continued involvement in veterans’ ceremonies, that he 
believed he completed his job. He still criticized the media, especially Walter Cronkite, 
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for “misleading” Americans.97  He still worried about what he called the “Vietnam 
psychosis.”98 He continued his attempts to shape what others thought and said about the 
conflict, a prime example of this being his participation in a letter-writing campaign to 
slander Oliver Stone’s Platoon.99  
However, he saw his journey as just about complete and believed by the late 
1980s that “people see him differently these days. ‘Ten years ago, I was kind of just the 
bad guy with horns. I was a curiosity, he said. ‘I was really popular as a speaker because 
of curiosity. Now it’s all different…They think of me as a retired officer who performed 
to the utmost of his ability.” 100 Even though this statement is a strong indication that his 
efforts had as much to do with his own image as those of his men, he also believed their 
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images changed immensely, since the end of the war, in part due to his influence. In an 
interview conducted with Soldier of Fortune in 1988, Westmoreland got to the heart of 
why he campaigned so hard to save the image of the men who served in Vietnam. He 
declared, “When I retired I had the choice of going back to ‘the farm’ and lowering my 
golf handicap, or devoting my energies to more constructive things. I felt terrible about 
the way Vietnam veterans were being treated and I decided that was going to be the 
number-one priority of mine—to do what I could to support that Vietnam veteran and try 
to explain to the American public that it was not he who lost the war.”101  
William Westmoreland’s attempt to tell the story of the Vietnam soldier went well 
beyond the hope of changing the image of the Vietnam veteran, as that was simply a 
means to a very particular end. His condemnation of the media for negative perceptions 
of the war, his challenges to the historical narrative, his praise of the men who served as 
best they could were for a much greater cause than the redemption of his men.   
He felt the need to alter Americans’ perceptions of the performance of the 
American military in Vietnam, opinions that significantly altered the institutions’ once 
untarnished image, undermined the valor of its members, and threatened the American 
military tradition, and possibly, the military itself. His loyalty to this cause went beyond 
simply informing the public about the war and its events from the standpoint of someone 
who served.  His public activities heavily focused on reshaping the public’s beliefs about 
the war in order to save the institution and the tradition to which he committed his life 
and to which, he believed, the United States owed much of its exceptional success.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
USING THE PEN TO STRENGTHEN THE SWORD: JAMES WEBB’S FIGHT TO 
SAVE MARTIAL MANHOOD IN THE WAKE OF THE VIETNAM WAR 
 
“Man’s noblest moment is the one spent on the fields of fire.”  
 
James Henry Webb, Jr., 19781 
 
On June 3, 1990, fifteen years after the fall of Saigon, James Henry Webb, Jr. 
stood at the Confederate Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery admitting to his 
audience that this “is by no means my first visit to this spot.”2 The monument, dedicated 
in 1914 by President Woodrow Wilson, honors those who died fighting for the 
Confederate States of America in a war that split the United States in two.  A veteran of a 
modern war that figuratively did the same, Webb, who regarded himself as an honorary 
son of the South, declared he often came to the site after his return from the Vietnam War 
to contemplate his relationship to one of its inscriptions.3  Attributed to a Confederate 
chaplain, it reads, “Not for fame or reward, not for place or for rank, not lured by 
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ambition or goaded by necessity, but in simple obedience to duty as they understood it, 
these men suffered all, sacrificed all, dared all, and died.” 
Webb felt he understood the plight of his numerous ancestors who served in the 
Civil War. They were men who, in his words, struggled with the same “misperceptions 
that seemed rampant about the people with whom I had served and what, exactly we had 
attempted to accomplish.” The soldiers of the Confederacy “whose enormous suffering 
and collective gallantry are to this day still misunderstood by most Americans” had much 
in common with him and his comrades, he said.  Although hyperbole, Webb’s remarks 
reveal his personal belief, shaped by his experiences as a Vietnam veteran, that all 
soldiers who fought for their country’s ideals had performed their duty as martial men. 
The inscription, in his mind, could describe “all soldiers in all wars…who desire more 
than anything to sleep with the satisfaction that…they had fulfilled their duty -- as they 
understood it.”4 
Although he already had a significant understanding of duty to country by the 
time he arrived in Vietnam, the period he spent “in country” during the conflict in 
Southeast Asia augmented his belief in it. The American public’s dismissal of his 
valorous participation in that tradition defined the course of his life.5 In the rocky first 
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years after his return to the United States, the treatment he encountered personally and 
often observed toward his former comrades shocked and angered him, pushing him to 
vocally campaign against it. Through much of the 1970s and 1980s, Webb worked to 
gain for his Vietnam comrades the respect he believed they all deserved, the same respect 
so easily afforded to all of the American soldiers who came before them.  
The loss of esteem felt by the veterans of the conflict, more often than not, came 
from traditional understandings of martial masculinity in the United States that defined 
manhood as linked to men’s successful performance in war. These beliefs combined with 
the country’s long history of martial victories to turn many within the American public 
against those who fought in Southeast Asia. Most importantly, the loss of the war 
threatened this time-honored ideal of martial manhood, which drove men to fight for their 
country, and therefore, threatened the strength of the American military, the nation, and 
notions of American exceptionalism.  For Webb, his personal background, participation 
in the military, and political beliefs made him place great stock in what these long-
standing American myths signified.   
The former Marine chose to use his literary prowess and his position within 
political circles in the nation’s capital to help reconfigure martial manhood and the 
martial tradition. He campaigned for the better part of a decade to diminish the belief that 
veterans of the Vietnam War did not fit into the mold of the martial man.  His contention, 
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much like the sentiment he expressed at the Confederate Memorial, was that fighting in 
an unpopular war that the country eventually lost should not preclude veterans from 
having a place among the noble and masculine ranks of the men who established and 
maintained American military tradition. If he could prove this thesis or, at least make 
others believe in it, he had the chance to save martial masculinity, the martial tradition, 
American exceptionalism.   
The Origins of a Martial Man 
Born in St. Joseph, Missouri in 1946, James Webb was a military brat who grew 
up on what journalist Robert Timberg termed “dusty, rundown military bases.”6 As his 
family followed his father, a World War II bomber pilot, from one Air Force base to 
another, Webb developed a “love of military life” that would lead him into the Marine 
Corps.7  
Webb’s manhood developed, much like other young men, around observing his 
father and interacting with him. When on leave, according to his son, James, Sr. “was 
making up for the time we’d lost to his deployments, and he was teaching me his version 
of what it took to be a man.”8 That education included intense spankings and painful 
boxing lessons from a very young age that Webb now excuses as his father realizing “that 
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as I grew older I would be measured by the timeless standard of whether or not I could 
meet the demands of manhood.”9 
Webb’s masculine identity also formed around his Scots-Irish ethnicity. Webb 
defined himself as “a product of a culture that really took a couple of hundred years to get 
its feet on the ground,” an ethnicity that “did it by the rules, no special privileges.” 10 His 
father’s career in the Air Force undoubtedly influenced his choice to become a martial 
man. However, his opinion of the culture of his Scots-Irish ancestors, including his 
immediate family, also informed this decision. The family’s first foray into combat in 
North America came during the Regulator War in the 1760s, according to Webb.11 As he 
saw it, the Scots-Irish blood that ran through his veins was the life force behind not just 
his own desire to defend his country, but also the tradition of American militarism itself.  
In his book devoted to the importance of this ethnic group in the United States, he writes, 
“these are loyal Americans…They show up for our wars. Indeed, we cannot go to war 
without them. They haul our goods. They grow our food. They sweat in our factories. 
And if they turn against you, you are going to be in a fight.”12    
In the mid-1980s, Webb suggested how all of the threads of his life tied together 
when he told journalist Brad Lemley he “fought” for everything he achieved in his life.  
                                                           
9
 Ibid. Kindle Edition, Loc 729. 
 
10
 Brad Lemley, “Never Give an Inch: James Webb’s Struggle with Pen and Sword,” Washington 
Post Magazine, December 8, 1985. This article also presents the family of Webb’s mother (Vera Hodges 
Webb) as sharecroppers in Arkansas.   
 
11
 James Webb, Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America, (New York: Broadway 
Books, 2005). Webb discusses the warrior nature of his family and the Scots-Irish in general from 154-173.  
 
12
 Ibid., 19.  
 
 77 
 
To him, a hardscrabble and upstanding background coupled with his time in the military 
created a man with “duty, integrity, principles, loyalty.” Webb declared to the reporter, 
“those are the words that form the framework in which I operate.”13   
His time in the military only served to increase this sentiment, and tapped into his 
desire to prove himself a martial man in the tradition of his ancestors. Although he 
possessed reasonable intellect, he was unable to attend college straight out of high school 
due to money woes, a working class issue that had haunted the Webb men for decades 
and left them uneducated.14 What saved Webb from a similar fate was a Navy ROTC 
scholarship that sent him to the University of Southern California, with a nomination to 
the U.S. Naval Academy coming soon after.15  By the time he graduated in 1968 at the 
age of 22, he had more than proven himself, with a Superintendent’s Letter of 
Commendation for outstanding leadership.  Shortly after that, he graduated from basic 
infantry training with the United States Marines at the head of a 250-person class.16  
The young Marine’s drive for martial excellence accelerated during the Vietnam 
War, especially given the reputation he gained in the academy.  When sent “in country” 
in March of 1969 as part of the Fifth Marines, within one day commanders put him in the 
infamous First Battalion’s Delta Company in the Arizona Valley because they 
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desperately needed help.17 Eventually the Marine Corps made him commander of the 
company; then, “a year ahead of his peers,” the Marines promoted him to Captain.18  
In many ways, Webb’s time in Vietnam signified the best martial manhood had to 
offer, and the Marines not only promoted him for it, but also decorated him accordingly. 
As the previous commander of his company joked, he was always writing up an award 
for Webb because his men were always nominating him.19 He received two Bronze Stars 
with the “V” (valor) device, as well as the Silver Star for heroism in combat, but it was 
his decision to throw himself between a comrade and a grenade that earned him the 
distinguished Navy Cross, as well as a Purple Heart.20 
Although those wounds eventually ended his military service, as later infections 
related to his injuries led to his premature retirement in 1972, health concerns did not 
slow down Webb nor deter him from his quest for masculine excellence in his civilian 
life.21  In 1975, he graduated from Georgetown University with a law degree and quickly 
entered into life as a public servant who worked for years as an advocate for veterans and 
members of the military. Although his political affiliation had always been with the 
                                                           
17
 Ibid., 153. 
 
18
 Ken Biffle, “Jim Webb, author—and more,” Dallas Morning News, October 23, 1983. A strong 
history of the U.S. Marines that illustrates how Webb’s characteristics fit into the institution is Aaron B. 
O’Connell, Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2012).  Moreover, O’Connell’s discussion of what he calls “Marine exceptionalism” (pages 5-6), 
indicates how Webb’s belief in his Scots-Irish background and his time entrenched in Marine culture 
helped to inflate his understanding of his own importance.  
19
 Robert Timberg, The Nightingale Song, 158. 
 
20
 “Webb Nominated for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,” contains 
information regarding his Bronze and Silver Star. Robert Timberg, The Nightingale Song, 161 contains 
information regarding his Navy Cross/Purple Heart.  
 
21
 Kent Biffle, “Jim Webb, author—and more.” 
 
 79 
 
Democratic Party, Webb switched during the 1976 presidential campaign, recalling later 
“Jimmy Carter made me a Republican.” 22  
In the late 1970s Paul Hammerschmidt (R-AK) hired him as the assistant minority 
counsel and then chief minority counsel for the House of Representatives’ Veterans 
Affairs Committee.  He rapidly gained a reputation as the “key Republican staff member 
in the congress for all issues regarding veterans, including employment, Agent Orange, 
posttraumatic stress disorders, studies on former prisoners of war, and the workings of 
the VA hospital system.”23  
Webb soon realized that his successes and influence could have an impact on how 
veterans viewed their service, and how Americans perceived the symbolic image of 
martial manhood.  Working toward this goal became a constant of his professional efforts 
from that moment forward.  What better person to rebolster martial masculinity, he 
thought, than a man who was born into the traditions of martial manhood, who lived and 
breathed it throughout his adult life, and who Dallas Morning News reporter Kent Biffle 
described in this way in 1983: “My ego is deep in an inky corner of some forgotten 
basement. My rattled macho is down there too. I just met James Webb.”24 
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A New Martial Man: Recapturing the Image of the Vietnam Veteran 
 Maintaining one’s masculine image in the wake of service in Vietnam became a 
difficult endeavor for veterans, given many Americans perceptions of them. Webb, due to 
his own heightened sense of machismo and his dedication to the armed forces, lamented 
this problem and struggled with the thought that Americans did not place him or his 
brothers-in-arms within the country’s martial tradition. In his estimation, the 
“quintessentially male” role in life was “[t]aking up arms and defending the society,” 
and, since Vietnam veterans performed this duty, regardless of America’s loss of the war, 
they deserved the same recognition as any other man who served his country.25 
Since Americans saw placement within the martial tradition as linked to martial 
success, they left Vietnam veterans out of its history.  Webb felt he needed to do 
something to change this widely-held system of beliefs. He anticipated the initial key to 
this alteration was for veterans of the war to shape their own image in the eyes of the 
American public.  
In a 1976 speech accepting the Vietnam Veterans Civic Council’s Outstanding 
Veteran Award, he argued that he and his comrades were invisible to the American 
public, a sentiment that surfaced when he read a newspaper article discussing how the 
Vietnam War altered America. The writer of the piece consulted over fifty Americans, 
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but not one Vietnam soldier, according to Webb. At that point, he began to recognize that 
Americans saw Vietnam veterans as an “irrelevant” part of their own image shaping. 26  
He believed the public relegated them to this place of insignificance because of their lack 
of success in meeting the supposed objectives of the war, but Webb arrived at a more 
complex understanding of it too, suggesting that others stole their ability to speak for 
themselves. 
In the turmoil of the 1960s, he believed war protestors took control over how 
Americans viewed those who participated in the war, and how the country would receive 
them when they arrived home.27 Since the war was over, it was time for men such as 
himself, someone who had subverted the negative aspects of that image with his wartime 
heroics, his military rank, and his no-nonsense personality, to take back control of their 
image and reconfigure their lives and experiences into a more masculine portrait. 
The presentation of awards to Vietnam veterans, like the one the council 
bestowed on him, he stressed had the ability to give “notice to the community” to readjust 
their perceptions of the men who served.28  But, understandably, it would take much 
more than prizes to alter Americans’ beliefs. Webb knew this, and to achieve such an 
objective, he considered it essential for Americans to understand that serving in Vietnam 
“required sublimation of self to what, at least then, was perceived to be in the public 
good,” an action that connoted duty, honor, and masculinity.  An acknowledgement of his 
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thoughts among the American public, he hoped, might lead to a marked change in how 
the public treated them and garner them the “dignity and respect” he knew they had been 
worthy of all along. 29 
Webb chose the written word as his first major contribution to the modification of 
the Vietnam veterans’ image and the definition of martial manhood.30  The decision came 
after a tough first year at Georgetown University in the early 1970s, during which he 
encountered numerous painful instances of discrimination due to his status as a Vietnam 
veteran.31  A short story written by Ernest Hemingway about a U.S. Marine whose long 
delayed return home from World War I meant he missed the array of the welcome home 
events held for its veterans, initially moved Webb to put his own experiences on paper.32  
It was during this time that he came to realize, as he mentions in a 2014 
biography, “the value of fighting not with my hands or with weapons but with my 
brain.”33 In a fit of anger during a constitutional law class discussion deriding Vietnam 
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veterans’ roles in the war, Webb tuned out his classmates and his professor and started 
writing what would become his first novel, Fields of Fire. As journalist Robert Timberg 
claims, “with no advance, no publisher, and little more than anger, pride, and ego to 
sustain him,” Webb began the arduous journey to write “the war as he knew it.”34 Five 
years after he began the process and numerous rejections from major publishers later, 
Fields of Fire made it to the bookstores in the fall of 1978.35 
The novel, which Webb called his own “personal catharsis,” tells the story of 
three soldiers from disparate American backgrounds whose wartime experiences in 
Southeast Asia helped them create a type of martial brotherhood that closely resembled 
that of other wars.36 Although, at times, a conventional war tale that highlights the 
violence of the firefights undertaken by the soldiers, Fields of Fire also contains elements 
of extreme machismo missing from other Vietnam War novels of the 1970s.37 
Supposedly, “Webb despised the post-modern, experimental novel favored by such war 
critics as Tim O’Brien and Larry Heinemann,” which pushed him to highlight the theme 
of martial masculinity in the novel.38  
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 Early in the book, for example, the main character Hodges reflects Webb’s 
distinct belief in the performance of military responsibilities as the rightful inroad to the 
respect typically afforded to the successful martial man. He shrugs off any attention to 
the details of the cause, since “it was the fight not the cause that mattered,” claiming a 
common feeling of completed duty among the men who pass down the tradition from 
generation to generation, regardless of the specifics of the conflict.39  
Webb also wanted to prove that the war’s participants deserved a place in it. At 
one point in novel, Hodges explains why he belongs in that history even though he came 
from a generation of men who seemed not to understand duty.40 In language reminiscent 
of Webb’s beliefs regarding his Scots-Irish background, Hodges cries at a picture of the 
father he lost in World War II: “. . . my war is not as simple as yours was, Father. People 
seem to question their obligation to serve on other than their terms. But enough of that. I 
fight because we have always fought. It doesn’t matter who.”41  
In the novel, Webb describes this masculine tradition of duty to country as a 
belief as old as the Civil War, but the war of Hodges’s father, World War II, is his main 
example for connections between the soldiers of Vietnam and America’s martial men.42  
This wedding of the oft-condemned Vietnam solider to the overtly heroic and honorable 
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Second World War participant is a consistent theme throughout the book. At one point in 
the story, a friendly conversation between a Vietnam veteran and a World War II veteran 
suggests their common link to martial manhood as fighting on the battlefield, an 
experience that allowed them to relate to one another, and bond over “how scared they 
were and how many people they had seen killed.”  Webb suggests through the thoughts 
of the Vietnam soldier Gilliland that it was “as if each had touched the devil and could 
talk about it because the other person had also touched him.”43  
The long-held tradition of martial brotherhood, both among those battling 
together on the “fields of fire” and among all who spent time on them, is the main tool 
utilized by Webb to portray his comrades as men who took their responsibility to country, 
their countrymen, and their comrades to heart. Hodges describes this brotherhood as one 
that developed on the battlefield, a bond with “a purity…that could not be matched 
anywhere else.”44  
The battlefield itself, the bush, also becomes a part of this demonstration because, 
Webb argues, it was where boys learned how to be men.  As one character relates, “it was 
all here…[a]ll of life’s compelling throbs condensed and honed each time a bullet flew: 
the pain, the bother-love, the sacrifice. Nobility discovered by those who’d never even 
contemplated sacrifice, never felt an emotion worth their own blood on someone else’s 
altar…none back there, back in the bowels of the World.” 45 For the men of Webb’s war, 
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as well as those before them, the battlefield was where they learned the real meaning of 
nobility, manhood, and brotherhood, regardless of the outcome. 
 The main hero of Webb’s book, Hodges, whose background closely resembles 
that of Webb, gives his life for the cause on this all-important battlefield.  As Hodges’ 
Japanese wife explains the news to their son, she embarks on a monologue that honors his 
masculine role not only as a warrior, but as an American man. She tells her son, “…he 
was a warrior there [in Vietnam]. These men—these Americans you see. They are 
warriors. They fight in many places.”46  His son replies, “Is it good to be so brave? To 
fight for your country like that? Was it a good thing that my father did?”47 When his 
mother explains that it was, the boy proclaims “Then I too will be a warrior.”48  
 By suggesting that a Vietnam soldier symbolically passed the role of warrior 
down to the next generation, just like his counterparts of previous wars, Webb indicated 
to his readers the tradition of martial masculinity had not been tarnished by the war or its 
loss, and it would continue to be passed down to future generations of martial American 
men.  His participation on the “fields of fire” was the only rite of passage needed to attain 
this warrior status, what Webb once called “the most respected tradition in the military.” 
Final victory was unnecessary.49 
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Fields of Fire would only reach a moderate level of popularity, and because of 
that, one could consider its impact on Americans’ perceptions of Vietnam veterans and 
martial masculinity, as quite modest.50  However, the former Marine achieved his 
personal goal of putting his experiences and his opinions on paper for the world to see. 
He would go on to write numerous other books, some also touching on the topic of the 
Vietnam War, but none would focus on schooling the American public on the masculine 
nature of the men who served their country in the same way as his first.51  The creation of 
this novel was just the beginning of James Webb’s long-term campaign to recapture the 
image of the men he believed had a right to “a far better place in history than that now 
offered them by the so-called spokesmen of our so-called generation.” 52  They were the 
boys who became martial men, at least to him, in the bush of Vietnam. 
 
The Successful Veteran: Establishing the Masculinity of the Warrior at Home 
The act of writing Fields of Fire left Webb “ambivalent” about the war, even 
though he believed America’s “attempt to help the Southvietnamese [sic] people was one 
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of the most moral acts we’ve attempted as a nation.”53  These mixed feelings indicated a 
continued disgust over the marginalization of his comrades in American society and 
among the military tradition, and since it had yet to be seen if the publication of Fields of 
Fire would have an impact on Americans perceptions, Webb decided not to rest on the 
possibility.  
He remained haunted by his time at Georgetown living in the shadow of the 
predominately negative image of those who served in the war, even though he began to 
find considerable success as a lawyer.  He continued to wonder how to prove to 
Americans that Vietnam soldiers were men cut from the same noble cloth of those who 
already were a part of the standard martial tradition.  One of the ways he could do this 
was to debunk the idea that Vietnam veterans were the poster boys for failed 
reintegration, making them much different from their predecessors, and prove that they 
had the ability to reestablish themselves as stable and successful men after the war. Since 
his view of the possibilities for himself and his comrades ran counter to popular belief, he 
needed to find a way to sell their value to the American public. 
He also worried that Vietnam veterans could be fooled by Americans’ opinions of 
them, a problem that reinforced reintegration issues. He felt that when “a Vietnam 
veteran looks for success stories within his own age group,” he finds only draft dodgers 
and protestors highlighted as positive representations of their generation.  Such 
understandings of the Vietnam era, particularly in the press, left the veteran confused 
about his identity and alienated, according to Webb, and “[h]e cannot help but feel the 
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knife twist every time he reads articles that elevate the ones who fled, collectively, to the 
level of prophets and moral purists” while he is condemned for using his own moral 
conscience to perform his duty to his country.54  
The media’s insinuation that these soldiers were immoral, rather than heroic, 
signified a lack of appreciation for their service and led to a significant sense of isolation 
and self-doubt, and therefore a lack of significant personal success. Although Webb often 
explained that he and his comrades were no different from Americans who served in 
other wars, he made a strong exception when it came to reintegration issues, since his 
own experiences taught him that those who returned from Vietnam encountered much 
different circumstances and, therefore, had much more to overcome than their 
predecessors. 55  
Webb argued that “…all men who undergo combat feel alienated when they 
return to their society. The difference is that previously there has been a form of catharsis 
once you come back . . . a catharsis that was generated from your community to the 
individual.” Purging the effects of the war came to men of other wars much more easily 
because the American public treated them as heroes and thanked them profusely for their 
duty.  Their service positively defined them.56 
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Vietnam veterans, however, did not have a chance at such a catharsis, as Webb 
termed it, particularly because of the unpopularity of the war.  However, he suggested 
Americans also “lost their curiosity about the experience,” given the extreme amount of 
media coverage during the war, and this lack of inquisitiveness caused them to ignore 
those who served even more so.  Therefore, the retuning veteran “was left to deal with it 
alone.” Webb lamented that they were at a great disadvantage when they arrived home, 
and it took its toll: “…you can feel it in their voice. There’s a true sense of isolation…It’s 
not just the sense of alienation or even the sense of rage, it’s having nothing, nowhere to 
vent it. No way to be brought back into the community on the terms of the experience.”57 
Because of these reintegration issues, Webb recognized that simply focusing on 
how Vietnam veterans’ time on the battlefield established them as dutiful martial men 
was not enough. If Americans were to accept them within the martial tradition, then the 
American public had to see them as capable of performing their masculine duties at home 
too. With that in mind, he began a campaign to destroy the stigma placed on Vietnam 
veterans and to illustrate their future worth to American society. 
In the early 1980s, Webb explained why he thought Americans would accept his 
message. He suggested the societal trend toward traditional values and principles in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s could push Americans to the same understandings. The public 
had begun to search for role models “who have manifested a sense of country in any way 
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that that has been manifested.”58 Since Vietnam veterans already completed that task, in 
his estimation, there now was room for an adjustment in how Americans viewed their 
leadership skills.  
The only thing standing in his way, according to Webb, were liberals whom he 
believed had declared war on such aspects of traditional manhood.  As evidence of such 
hostility, he cited feminist Betty Friedan who supposedly said “. . . machismo is dead. It 
died in Vietnam.”59 He adamantly denied Vietnam was the reason for any faltering of 
American manhood stating, “. . . if it died at all in this society it died among the people 
who had to question who they are as male because through one way or another they 
avoided what is quintessentially male function in society and that’s going into 
uniform.”60 
He argued Vietnam actually proved that virility was very much alive in America 
because so many men, regardless of their personal desire to do so, performed the epitome 
of masculine behavior, warfare, out of masculine duty to country. If they proved their 
masculinity in wartime now, Americans should accept them as men and strong leaders at 
home.61  
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In the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program (VVLP), Webb found a partner in 
his campaign to prove Vietnam veterans’ ability to function successfully as civilians. The 
program, a part of the Reagan administration’s national volunteer agency, ACTION, 
enlisted men like Webb “who successfully made the transition back to civilian life” as 
mentors to their less fortunate comrades who had trouble reintegrating into society.62  
This initial objective of the VVLP prompted Webb to back the program 
immediately after its inception. He became a strong supporter and advisor to the program 
and volunteered as a mentor.63 For the hyper-masculine Webb, the thought of leading his 
men once again had major appeal. Most importantly, he could assist them in the act of 
transforming into productive members of the community, maybe even community 
leaders, and move forward with what was his most significant goal, regaining control 
over their image.  
Webb’s success as a lawyer and a writer made him a poster boy for the efforts of 
the VVLP. The program’s administrators saw him as a perfect example of how well 
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Vietnam veterans could fare once they returned to their everyday life.64 Their official 
biography of the former Marine highlighted his major achievements from his 
extraordinary time at Annapolis to his time as a Marine commander to his successes after 
the war. Webb was to the VVLP the Vietnam veteran made good.65  
Webb also pinned his hopes on the ability of the program to highlight that 
traditional element of the martial tradition often overlooked in Vietnam veterans: the 
martial brotherhood. 66  The camaraderie possessed by the men of other wars was a major 
element of the tradition of martial masculinity.67 However, this type of fellowship among 
those who served in Southeast Asia was often overlooked until after the dedication of the 
Vietnam Wall and the popular veterans parades of the 1980s that illustrated its existence 
to Americans.  Webb hoped the mentorship involved in the VVLP would bring this 
brotherhood’s reality to the forefront, further supporting the notion that veterans of the 
war were just like their predecessors. 
This type of camaraderie among Vietnam veterans, according to Webb, was the 
hallmark of VVLP efforts. The brotherhood that remained among them after the war 
worked as a coping mechanism for them, solidifying a sense of community that eased 
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their mistreatment by the American public. Webb called this communal comfort “a 
delicious secret among those who had served, a reservoir of strength,” since they could 
not talk publicly about their experiences without shame. The power of this network 
became stronger as the years went on, and especially “for those lucky enough to stay in 
contact with fellow veterans, it became heady stuff, the glue of a fierce, unbending 
friendship.”68 
The brotherhood at home signified the ability of Vietnam veterans to overcome 
the social stigmas placed on them and to move forward with their domestic duties, in 
Webb’s estimation.69 He, the VVLP, and the community of veterans proved that they 
were not men to be pitied or men to be thought of as less virile because of their time 
spent fighting in the losing battle of Vietnam and its effects at home.  They were, for the 
most part, successful men who had the strength to overcome any obstacle the same way 
those who participated in World War II took advantage of the G.I. Bill to become 
upstanding and productive male members of society.  If some Vietnam veterans did not 
successfully reintegrate, maybe it was the fault of those who did not welcome them home 
and the responsibility of their successful brothers to make sure they did.  
As Webb melded the agenda of the VVLP with his own to promote the masculine 
image of the Vietnam veteran, he and the organization worked in tandem “to honor the 
validity of service to country” and illustrate the normalcy of the men who returned from 
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the conflict.70 He believed if the country could accept them as normal and successful 
members of society, their manhood, and the symbolic manhood of all Vietnam veterans 
would be elevated to the heights of their predecessors in the martial tradition. For Webb, 
this was another piece in the puzzle to establish their nobility.  There was only one piece 
left: a symbolic, national recognition of their valorous efforts in the war.71 
 
The Noble Warrior: Solidifying the Masculine Honor of the Vietnam Soldier  
In the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Webb seemed to find a vehicle for melding 
the conflict’s American participants with the martial tradition.  However important it was 
to him, though, he also helped turn what was already a difficult endeavor into a tug of 
war over control of its design.  The eruption of the ideological argument between 
conservatives such as Webb, who supported strong political meaning for the monument, 
and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF), which strived for an apolitical 
tribute to the war’s dead, threatened to halt its creation. In the years of struggle that 
followed, one thing remained certain: James Webb vehemently wanted a national 
monument to honor his comrades and to restore their martial manhood, as long as it was 
on his own terms. 
Because of Webb’s views regarding the reverence owed to Vietnam veterans, it 
seemed fitting that he be a part of the VVMF and the creation of the memorial. Therefore, 
it was not surprising when Jan Scruggs, enlisted his help early on, as he gathered funds 
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and worked to create public support for what would become the Wall.  Webb recalled 
that Scruggs and other members of the organization approached him during a 
promotional tour for Fields of Fire in 1979, to ask for his support, and he “resolved to 
help them.”72 By that summer, the former marine had become an unofficial member of 
the VVMF, giving “advice, counsel, and participation” to the organization, mainly 
regarding financial and legal issues. 73  
At first, the relationship between Scruggs and Webb seemed genial and quite 
necessary, given the immense amount of ideologically broad assistance needed to create a 
national monument for a war most Americans wanted to forget.  As leader of the VVMF, 
Scruggs recognized the importance of having successful and well-connected veterans 
such as Webb within the organization.  When he wrote to Webb officially asking the 
former Marine to join the VVMF’s National Sponsoring Committee, Scruggs emphasized 
that his presence and approval for the project would “add immeasurably to the prestige 
and credibility of our efforts.”74 
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As it turned out, Webb’s affiliation with the VVMF became more trouble than it 
was worth after the unveiling of Maya Lin’s design for the memorial. The winning 
design, two large slabs of black granite with the names of those who perished etched into 
them, made little sense to Webb, and he felt it threatened his plan to establish the nobility 
of all who served. As a result, somewhere near the center of the firestorm created by the 
design, a battle that divided the veteran and the conservative community alike was James 
Webb and his notions of a new martial manhood.  
Webb voiced concern immediately after the VVMF revealed the design. As 
Scruggs remembered it, “[t]he first rumblings had started close to home. Shortly after 
Maya Lin’s first press conference, James Webb—who had considered himself 
unqualified to sit on the [design] jury—said Maya Lin’s design was unacceptable. ‘Why 
is it black?’ he asked. ‘Why is it underground?’” These questions haunted the VVMF as 
Webb and others began to call the Wall design the “Black Gash of Shame.”75  
A few months later, in September 1981, Webb recommended to the VVMF that 
Lin alter the design by placing a flag at the site of the memorial and adding an inscription 
that referred to the nobility of the war. He told the main members of the VVMF that he 
would oppose any final product that did not contain these modifications. Writing to 
Robert Doubek, the executive director of the VVMF, he “emphatically” maintained that 
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individuals who supported the Memorial tended to desire a “strong correspondence 
between this memorial and the war.”  He claimed he did not want to insert himself in the 
actual design and placement of these components because of his lack of experience with 
architecture; but he wanted them to know “how important” he and the American public 
found these modifications.76 
A few weeks later, Webb’s tone changed, and he demanded the changes, telling 
Scruggs, “I do not like the winning design; in fact, I feel insulted by it. But I have been 
operating by default, as something of a moderating influence on people who are rabidly 
opposed to it, and who wish to destroy the project all together.”  He promised he had no 
desire to halt the project completely because he understood its importance, but he had 
become terribly apprehensive about its current incarnation that did not “honor and 
recognize all who served in Vietnam.”77 
Webb felt the VVMF purposefully wanted to neglect the soldiers’ roles as 
honorable male warriors as a way to prevent stirring up old controversies and generating 
ill will toward the project. He warned Scruggs, “understatement is not called for when we 
are dealing with the heroic and honorable loss of life.”78 Webb threatened Scruggs, if the 
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VVMF continued to refuse to incorporate his personal desires for the project “this is as 
far as I can go,” with the organization.79 
The VVMF never responded, officially, to any of the suggestions Webb made 
regarding design. When it became evident to him nothing would happen without a 
significant fight, the former Marine escalated his efforts and initiated a political battle to 
alter the design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Fed up with the lack of consideration 
from the VVMF over his and others’ concerns, Webb began his crusade to fix the 
monument. 80   
In late November 1981, the issue came to a head. Webb privately wrote to 
Scruggs to tell him he decided to remove himself from the fund’s efforts “for so long as 
this design continues to be the plan for the Memorial” and that he would take legal action 
if the fund used his name or suggested he backed the project in its current incarnation.81 
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Three days later, he officially resigned from the National Sponsoring Committee and 
demanded that the VVMF remove his name from all of its literature because of his 
problems with the design.82 
After he cut ties with the organization, Webb turned to his talent as a writer to 
begin a public campaign criticizing the Wall’s design, the VVMF, and Scruggs. He hoped 
to make enough of a stir that it would force the VVMF to make the additions. His first 
attack came in the form of an editorial piece printed in the Wall Street Journal, he was 
the first of many conservatives to present his opinion on the Wall to Americans.83  
Appearing on December 18, 1981, the article, simply titled “Reassessing the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” took the VVMF to task for its approval of Maya Lin’s 
“memorial only to the dead.” As a veteran of the war and a significant participant in the 
early stages of solidifying support for the fund, Webb believed he had as much of a right 
as anyone to criticize a memorial that was “…a nihilistic statement that does not render 
honor to those who served.”84  
The lack of conservative political meaning irked him as well, suggesting that it let 
its viewers make up their own minds about the war.  The design missed the opportunity 
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to memorialize “heroic and honorable loss of life” and symbolically signify the nobility 
of all who served in the war. To create respect for all who served, the “…design should 
not be neutral.” Webb wrote, because “we are invading for all time the privacy of those 
who perished in the war by publishing their names on the memorial, and this should not 
be done except in the most affirmative sense of honor and recognition.”85 
According to Webb, the VVMF’s rigid stance on the design put him and other 
veterans in a difficult situation.  They could either accept the design as it stood or 
withdraw their support from the memorial, leaving them on the opposing side of the only 
major national commemoration of the Vietnam War to date. Frustrated by the no-win 
situation placed in front of him, Webb pled to the American public, “What is one to do? 
Is any memorial better than no memorial? At what point does a piece of architecture 
cease being a memorial to service and instead become a mockery of that service, a 
wailing wall for future anti-draft and anti-nuclear demonstrators?”86  
Webb’s opinions and those of other conservatives regarding the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial caused enough of a stir for the federal government to step in, reluctantly. 
Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, the official that Congress charged with overseeing 
the project, ordered new talks on the design. During this re-evaluation, Webb worked for 
the changes he desired, making his thoughts known in a written statement to the Fine Arts 
Commission overseeing the talks.87 
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Webb insisted in his statement that modifications to the design were necessary 
and to “honor and recognize those who served.” He also stressed, the VVMF be forced to 
consult the opinions of more Vietnam veterans because a personal understanding of the 
war was imperative in order to create an appropriate monument that gave little credence 
to the limited perspective of those who did not serve.88  
Webb knew the perspectives of Vietnam veterans created problems too, but their 
input would create the best scenario, in his estimation, because others are “only now 
beginning to assimilate Vietnam in a context that breaths dignity into the acts of those 
who served.” He condemned the VVMF for leaving veterans out of the process because, 
as “[t]his monument will last into the eons . . . it will reflect the incomplete assimilation 
process of the judges . . . rather than making the definitive healing statement we all had 
so hoped for.”89   
With some simple changes, he believed the monument would have a different 
tone, one that emphasized honor. An onsite American flag was the most important 
modification to Webb, although he would have liked what he called “artifacts of war” 
included too. He indicated that the flag, especially if placed at the apex of the monument, 
“would symbolize the coming together of all factions, under the unity of our system of 
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laws and values.” He also wanted the monument raised above the ground and/or changed 
to a white stone, which he believed would remove any unacceptable connotations of 
shame or dishonor brought about by the original design’s “black hole in the ground” 
appearance.90 
Webb recognized that a full rejection of the design “would probably injure the 
efforts of the VVMF to build any monument whatsoever,” 91  so his goal was to force the 
VVMF to construct a monument that met his personal requirements for attaching martial 
honor and traditional military symbolism to the men who served the United States in the 
war. This lack of desire to stop the creation of the memorial reflected his concern that 
starting from scratch would be the death knell for the any type of national monument for 
the Vietnam soldier. But it also illustrated a deep-seated personal belief that 
memorialization was a significant key to establishing honor for those who served.92  
In an opinion piece written for the Washington Post on Memorial Day, 1981, 
Webb argued, “there is strength to be gained from remembering” those who made the 
ultimate sacrifice for their country. Although Webb does not specifically mention the 
Vietnam War in “The Power of Remembering,” he consistently hints at it, thinly 
disguising his comments.  The Japanese reverence of their warriors is Webb’s focus, as 
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he grapples with the question of how the participants in such a war could maintain their 
masculine nobility in the eyes of the nation.  He asks, “How could a nation beaten on the 
battlefield find meaning and momentum in the events of its defeat?”93 
The ability of the Japanese to separate military service from the act of war, 
according to him, is the answer. The nation’s capacity for venerating those who fought in 
a failed war and their recognition of them via memorials, he suggests, set them on a path 
to restrengthening themselves in the post-war world.94 Memorials particularly created a 
situation in which “[i]t was as if each death involved a transfer of energy, the soul of the 
soldier feeding into the soul of the nation, until the very enormity of Japan’s defeat 
became itself the fuel for its post-war re-emergence.” The lesson taught by the citizens of 
Japan and their ability to overcome their loss in World War II, was a faith in the “spiritual 
power of commemoration and the nobility of military service.” They, unlike Americans, 
learned to separate their “dedicated warriors” from the outcome of the conflict.95 
These ideas regarding commemoration lend further explanation to why Webb 
rejected the original design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.  Although he believed in 
using the memorialization of others to help create that separation between the warrior and 
his war, the Lin design made that memorialization too emotionally heavy. The Wall, as it 
stood, in black granite, “a nihilistic slab of stone” as he called it, put too much emphasis 
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on the darkness of the war, the domestic conflict surrounding it, and its penchant for 
ripping apart the fabric of American society and its tradition.96  
Even though commemoration of death was an important part of memorializing the 
war, Americans strong feelings about the conflict would keep them from understanding 
any subtle messages that might be contained in Maya Lin’s design.  A way to assist them 
would be to connect the Wall to American values and nationalism. If the VVMF refused 
to change the design, Webb knew he had to make sure the American public got the point 
and realized the value of the warrior of Vietnam.  Adding patriotic elements to the 
memorial that validated the service, and therefore the nobility, of the men who served in 
Vietnam were, in his estimation, the only ways to achieve this goal.   
Eventually, the parties involved in the fight over Maya Lin’s design for the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial reached the interesting compromise in March 1982 that 
included Frederick Hart’s statue, “The Three Soldiers.” The design of the monument 
would not change, but they VVMF would add an inscription in the granite and place a 
flagpole on site, set far enough away as not to disrupt the monument’s architectural 
integrity.97   
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One sees James Webb’s imprint on the final design modifications, differences that 
enhanced the national and martial symbols of the Wall.  The sculptor of “The Three 
Soldiers,” Frederick Hart declared, “If it were not for him, none of those changes would 
have taken place.”98  The true meaning of the Wall for James Webb went well beyond 
Jan Scruggs’ desire to promote healing and to wash away the stain of the war on its 
veterans. To him, the memorial solidified the honor, nobility, and martial manhood of 
those who served, regardless of the outcome of their war, and placed them in the martial 
tradition that defined the nation and its exceptional nature. 
For perspective on the dedication of Hart’s statue in 1984, The Washington Post 
interviewed James Webb. Reluctantly, he gave the Wall some credit for helping troubled 
veterans overcome their psychological scars, but he added that their plight should not 
define the memorial.99 The VVMF’s desire to make the monument what he considered a 
wailing wall disrespected those who served and made them look effeminate and weak in 
the eyes of the nation.  If that became the main perception of the Wall, Webb worried it 
could rob them of their manhood for good and disastrously affect America and its 
exceptional nature.    
With the dedication of the statue, though, it was now time to bury the controversy 
and move ahead.  Earlier in 1984, Webb wrote to Scruggs to tell him of the futility he 
saw in keeping the controversy alive, indicating that the VVMF might learn from those 
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who promoted the theme of nobility throughout the design dispute.  He claimed, “I am 
very satisfied with the compromise, and in fact feel that we in the ‘dissent’ have done a 
valuable service, not only to our country, but to the Memorial as well . . . the starkness of 
the wall now has context . . . and I have moved on. 100 
The end result of the Vietnam Wall seemed to close a chapter for James Webb. 
From that point, his focus centered on his career, as though he stepped back to see the 
fruits of his work develop.  Earlier in the 1980s, he lost his chance to head the Veteran’s 
Administration when he was not nominated, a job he might have turned down after it 
became clear that the Reagan administration was not interested in his attitude or his 
inevitable and, possibly, singular focus on helping Vietnam veterans.101  In May of 1984, 
he became Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, a post he left to become 
the Secretary of the Navy.   
As naval secretary, Webb focused on shoring up the Navy and the American 
military from the effects of a war that “dealt a vicious whiplash to those who sacrificed so 
much in the name of duty and country,” but he would not get much time to make 
changes.102 Less than a year later, Webb resigned in a huff due to ideological problems 
with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci that included disagreements over policy in the 
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Middle East and hard feelings over a slashed budget that would stall efforts to expand the 
Navy.  Many suggested Webb’s “stubborn and uncompromising” personality did him 
in.103 
Regardless of these efforts for the military, Webb’s writings on the war, his 
participation in the remasculinization of the returned veteran, and his role in the creation 
of a respectful national memorial brought the former Marine’s campaign for nobility full 
circle. The masculine honor of the Vietnam veteran had been solidified symbolically; 
now it was up to the American public to absorb it as the truth. As for the Wall, in a 1985 
interview he confessed his continued disdain for the process that ignored his agenda.  
Asked if he ever visited the memorial, the future Democratic senator from the state of 
Virginia claimed, “I don’t go. I’m still too mad.” 104 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SALVAGING THE AMERICAN MARTIAL TRADITION: THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE POSITIONING OF THE VIETNAM SOLDIER 
WITHIN THE NATION’S FOLKLORE OF MILITARISM 
It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause…[w]e dishonor the 
memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that cause when we give way to 
feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful, and we have been shabby in 
our treatment of those who returned.  They fought as well and as bravely as any 
Americans have ever fought in any war.  They deserve our gratitude, our respect, and our 
continuing concern. 
 
Ronald Wilson Reagan, August 18, 19801 
 
On November 11, 1988, Ronald Reagan observed his last Veteran’s Day as 
President of the United States.  The outgoing commander-in-chief, in a speech much like 
any given by a president on the day reserved to honor those who fought for the United 
States, spoke of Americans’ reverence and gratitude for the sacrifices of those who gave 
their lives in service of their nation.  He declared, “what they died for was worthy of their 
sacrifice—faith, too, in God and in the Nation that has pledged itself to His work and to 
the dream of human freedom, and a nation, too, that today and always pledges itself to 
their eternal memory.”2  
The difference in 1988, however, was the location of this speech, the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial. When tens of thousands of American veterans of the Vietnam War 
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gathered to dedicate the new monument in a weekend-long “National Salute to Veterans” 
six years prior, Reagan chose not to attend any formal events, save a brief appearance at 
the National Cathedral during the reading of the names of those who died in the conflict.3 
Now at the end of his eight-year tenure, he stood at the Wall defining them and the 
veterans of all American wars as “what we can only aspire to be: giving, unselfish, the 
epitome of human love to lay down one's life so that others might live.”4 
Though Reagan encountered some hostile reactions during this official visit to the 
memorial, particularly in relation to his lack of action on the POW-MIA issue, the 
scheduling of a formal Veteran’s Day ceremony and presidential remarks at the Wall 
underscored vast changes that had taken place in the national narrative of the war over 
the course of Reagan’s presidency.5  The president and his administration’s role in these 
changes, although often suggested as a means to gain support for foreign policy 
endeavors in Central America, stemmed from their larger desire to rebuild the nation’s 
faith in its military tradition and its presumed exceptional nature.6  The reestablishment of 
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these elements of the American mythology, they hoped, would restore America’s image 
in the wake of the Vietnam War.  
Through numerous events in the 1980s, the Reagan administration worked to wed 
the American participants in Vietnam to the military valor so vital to American military 
tradition. By situating them in the same historical folklore as those who served in 
previous wars, the White House hoped the men of the most contentious military conflict 
in American history would gain the admiration of all Americans. The bestowal of this 
esteem on Vietnam-era soldiers and the reshaping of their image had the potential to 
lessen the scars the war and to rebuild the country’s national and international image, 
saving the notion of “the shining city upon a hill.”7  
Reagan first acknowledged this quest during his failed presidential campaign in 
1976, and revived it four years later as he faced incumbent president, Jimmy Carter.8 A 
strong supporter of the Vietnam War throughout the conflict, Reagan noted in a speech to 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Convention in the summer of 1980 that he 
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considered U.S. military efforts in Southeast Asia a “noble cause.”9 However, the 
hallmark of Reagan’s message in this speech and on the campaign trail was the need to 
restrengthen the country and its image after the trauma of the 1960s and its supposed 
further weakening during the presidency of Jimmy Carter.  The combination of these 
issues damaged the United States’ position in the world and all but destroyed America’s 
faith in itself, according to the former actor and governor of California.10  
As ardent nationalists, the central figures of the Reagan administration, who often 
had strong differences of opinion regarding foreign policy endeavors, were of one mind 
about the preservation of the American traditions and ideals that supposedly led to the 
country’s supremacy in the world.11 Their reshaping of what the Vietnam War meant to 
America became an attempt shore up and sustain the country’s martial tradition by 
enveloping the soldiers of Vietnam into the same valorous history of those men who 
defended the nation through the ages. The often nameless, faceless, men of the Vietnam 
War, who according to Reagan, “fought as well and as bravely as any Americans have 
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ever fought in any war,” would become the administration’s focal point for reestablishing 
confidence in the fabled American nation, both at home and abroad.12  
 
Putting the Valorous Veteran Front and Center: The Symbolism of the 
Congressional Medal of Honor and the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program 
Soon after the president took office, the Reagan administration marked its first 
official step in its campaign to wed the American soldiers of the Vietnam War to the 
country’s time-honored tradition of military valor. A mere five weeks to the day of his 
inauguration, in a highly-visible ceremony, Reagan presented the Congressional Medal of 
Honor, the highest decoration of the American military, to a veteran of the Vietnam War. 
Meticulously planned by the White House, every aspect of the event was meant to draw 
the attention of the public to the fact that the Reagan administration was willing to 
publically honor a member of the most vilified group of veterans to fight in a foreign war.     
The storied background of the Congressional Medal of Honor fit perfectly with 
the desire of the Reagan administration to position Vietnam soldiers within the historical 
framework of the martial tradition.  The history and prestige of this honor dates back to 
the Civil War, while the actual tradition of decorating valorous American soldiers dates 
back to the Revolution. The first military honor for the lower ranks of the army was the 
Badge of Military Merit, the modern day Purple Heart, established by General George 
Washington in 1782.13  
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Although this decoration for the lower ranks waned after the Revolution, the Civil 
War, in particular, brought back the desire to honor all valorous military men, and in 
1862, Abraham Lincoln signed into law the establishment of a Congressional Medal of 
Honor.14 The criteria for the medal changed over the years, but by World War I, Congress 
solidified the modern meaning of the award, noted by President Reagan in his remarks: 
“The President may award . . . a Medal of Honor to a person who . . . distinguishes 
himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond 
the call of duty.”15 
The field reports of how Sergeant Roy P. Benavidez met these criteria for the 
Medal of Honor underscored the type of bravery the Reagan administration wanted to 
highlight in the Vietnam soldier and contradicted the way many Americans viewed 
participants of the conflict.16 During an in-country rescue mission in May of 1968, Green 
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Beret Benavidez saved eight members of a Special Forces team and recovered the bodies 
of several more, all while under heavy fire.  He suffered gunshot and shrapnel wounds 
from head to toe, including a nearly severed arm and a gruesome wound to his 
abdomen.17Although initially turned down for not meeting some of the award’s technical 
criteria, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approved his nomination for the medal in 
1980.18 
The decision to decorate Benavidez for his actions provided the Reagan 
administration with an official opportunity to present its message about Vietnam and on 
February 24, 1981, the Medal of Honor ceremony for Benavidez took place at the 
Pentagon.  Standing in the Hall of Heroes, Ronald Reagan emphasized the valor of this 
new recipient of the Medal of Honor and highlighted the nobility of all who served in the 
war.  Although the soldiers of Vietnam were not “permitted” to win by the government, 
Reagan declared, they were “a group of American fighting men who had obeyed their 
country’s call and who had fought as bravely and as well as any Americans in our 
history.” But unlike those before him, Reagan lamented, the Vietnam veteran received 
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“no parades, no bands, no waving of the flag they had so nobly served,” and never were 
thanked, respected, or honored for their service.19  
The short five-minute speech discussed how many of them acted above and 
beyond their normal duties while in Southeast Asia. Specifically, he mentioned 
humanitarian efforts of American servicemen who spent a great deal of time assisting the 
women and children of South Vietnam, rather than merely fighting.20 These soldiers 
helped to build schools and hospitals, distributed food and toiletries, and often did so with 
their own money. Americans at home, he said, ignored such gallantry and “it is now time 
to show our pride in them and to thank them” for all they did.21  
Reagan then read the citation that told the harrowing story of Sergeant 
Benavidez’s actions twelve years earlier. The final lines read: “His fearless leadership, 
tenacious devotion to duty, and extremely valorous actions in the face of overwhelming 
odds were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service, and reflect the 
utmost credit on him and the United States Army.”22 For Reagan, each of these words 
described that nameless, faceless soldier of the war, the man so mistreated and 
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disregarded by the American people. Moments later, the president pinned the medal to 
the Benavidez’s chest.  
Although other veterans of the war received the award before Benavidez, the 
nature of Reagan’s remarks in the ceremony highlighted the administration’s larger 
agenda. Washington Post columnist, and early Reagan biographer Lou Cannon, termed 
the ceremony “a platform for declaring the United States had lost the war in Vietnam 
because its soldiers had not been permitted to win.”23 In stressing this, Cannon was 
correct but he missed the larger symbolic meaning. The president had placed the 
participants in the “noble cause” of Vietnam—soldiers who had received so little support 
after their return, men who many Americans considered incompetent embarrassments—
front and center.  He had portrayed them as heroic and fearless. Far more than making 
excuses for the loss of the war, the administration designed the Medal of Honor 
ceremony as a platform for salvaging and reinvigorating the American martial tradition 
via the Vietnam veteran.  
The major revision that the Reagan administration had in mind for the collective 
image of the Vietnam War-era soldiers could not take shape with a simple ceremony, 
though.  If it was to make public perceptions of these men similar to those of veterans of 
other wars, a significant reshaping of the negative stereotypes that many Americans held 
toward Vietnam veterans needed sustained attention. These opinions of those who served 
in Vietnam extended to their ability to reintegrate into American society. The significant 
problems experienced by some Vietnam veterans as they tried to reenter society 
amplified negative perceptions of them and created greater concerns among conservative 
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about the long-term effects of the war on the martial tradition. Reintegration problems 
even more so separated the recently return veteran from those of earlier wars, men who 
won their wars, retained their warrior images, and, with the exception of World War I 
veterans, made a seamless reintegration into their daily lives upon their return home.24 
The strongly engrained societal belief that Vietnam veterans were crazed losers 
made the Reagan administration’s placement of them in the martial tradition more 
difficult.25 Moreover, the negative perceptions of their masculinity due to their role in the 
loss of the war augmented this difficulty. These issues led the Reagan administration to 
support a new program for veteran assistance, the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program 
(VVLP), meant to bring troubled Vietnam veterans together with highly successful 
comrades who could mentor them through their long journey to reenter the “world.”26  
The VVLP also had a much broader social agenda that appealed to the Reagan 
administration. The creator of the program, Tom Pauken, suggested in a memo to the 
White House staff that the activities of the VVLP would go a long way to debunk 
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stereotypes of Vietnam veterans as “guilt-ridden victims” not to mention “dope addicts, 
killers, and/or fools.”27 In fact, the parent agency of the VVLP, the national volunteer 
organization ACTION, argued that the chief reason for the creation of the program was to 
help Americans “recognize that Vietnam veterans are a leadership resource, not a group 
to be pitied or to be treated as victims.”  If successful, the program would affirm “the 
integrity of military service during the Vietnam War” and “help to restore a national 
perception that military service is an honorable calling.”28   
Because of its potential to restore to Vietnam veterans their rightful place within 
the mythology of the American military tradition, President Reagan approved the 
Vietnam Veteran Leadership Program in July 1981.  Immediately, the administration 
opted to create a high profile Veterans Day event at the White House in which the 
president would formally announce it.29  
A presidential briefing memo regarding the event indicates that the main reason 
the White House decided to announce the program publically was its significant emphasis 
on the merit of Vietnam veterans. The administration also liked the idea of using the 
success of the mentors to reshape opinions about all veterans of the war.30 Elizabeth 
Dole, director for the White House Office of Public Liaison, avowed that the event would 
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“stimulate public notice of the emerging leadership role of the nation’s Vietnam 
veterans.”31 The stage was set for a public unveiling of a program that had a significant 
opportunity to influence Americans’ understanding of the masculine nature of those who 
served in Vietnam.  
Invited guests for the ceremony included exactly the type of men the VVLP and 
the administration were trying to highlight, men who had reached great heights in 
business, government, and society after the war.32 They included future senator John 
McCain, who had just retired from his career in the Navy; James Webb; and Reagan aide 
and chairman of the Vietnam Veteran Memorial Fund, John “Jack” P. Wheeler—men 
whose heroic service to country and significant post-war success exemplified the 
country’s military tradition.33 As Wheeler suggested to the White House, each of the men 
selected to represent the successful veteran would “reflect very, very positively on the 
President.”34   
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When Reagan took to the podium on November 10, 1981 to unveil the project, 
highlighting its actual services seemed a mere footnote to the true task at hand. Although 
he claimed the leadership program would “provide guidance for those with lingering 
problems,” the majority of his remarks referred to the administration’s greater message.  
“On this eve of Veterans Day in 1981,” Reagan began the ceremony, “we meet to 
inaugurate a program that’s aimed at helping a group of veterans who have never 
received the thanks they deserved for their extraordinary courage and dedication.”  The 
men who participated in the war, he continued, “fought as bravely as any American 
fighting men have ever fought.” They were soldiers who “did their duty and 
demonstrated courage and dedication in the finest tradition of the American military in a 
war they were not allowed to win.”35  
An examination of the administration’s interaction with the VVLP over the years 
illustrates that it primarily viewed the VVLP as a tool to re-shape the image of the 
Vietnam veteran. The president rarely met with the project’s leaders between late 1981 
and the expiration of its federal funding in September of 1984.36  Any publicized meeting 
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that did take place only focused on congratulating the men involved in the program for 
their efforts and their presumed success.  The administration gave little help to the VVLP, 
if assistance meant something other than using the program as a platform for recasting the 
image of the veteran.37  
In the final year of federal sponsorship of the program, the White House held a 
short reception for the VVLP.38  Over 150 veterans participated in the event meant to 
thank them for their efforts and “recognize the leadership role of the nation’s Vietnam 
veterans.”39 Reagan, for one final time, used the opportunity to exalt the war’s soldiers 
both in combat and at home. Near the end of his speech, he wove together the recent 
accomplishments of this group of Vietnam veterans with their previous “loyalty” and 
“commitment” to the nation during the war.40 The door closed on the administration’s 
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utilization of the program to reshape American opinions of those who served in the war, 
without consideration of its tangible results for veteran reintegration.  
 
Priming the Public and Avoiding Controversy: Reagan and The Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial Fund 
The VVLP thanked Reagan with “heartfelt appreciation for his loyalty to and 
support of Vietnam Veterans,” for the duration of the program, declaring him “an 
honorary Vietnam Veteran.”41 This symbolic pronouncement was a strange honor for a 
variety of reasons.  The president’s concern for the men who fought in the war merely 
amounted to rhetoric, as his dealings with the Veterans Administration illustrated 
throughout his two terms.42 The bestowal of this title on Reagan was an obvious media 
tool for the VVLP, considering the limited amount of support the administration actually 
gave to the program’s assistance measures.   
Early on, it was evident that the administration had little use for the program, even 
in terms of its rhetorical value and ability to change Americans opinions of Vietnam 
veterans. This had largely to do with the creation of the highly successful Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial in the early 1980s.  By 1984, when the federal version of the VVLP 
petered out, the Wall had been open to the public and assisting the White House in its 
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campaign to change Americans’ understanding of the war’s participants for almost two 
years. Although the process to erect the memorial proved bumpy for everyone involved, 
the contention of the administration was that it was a necessary component of Reagan’s 
campaign to save the martial tradition.   
Although the administration backed its completion, the project did without a 
significant amount of public support from the President from day one. Much like the 
administration’s superficial participation with the VVLP, its role in the creation of the 
Vietnam Wall was minimal and always calculated to fit the White House’s agenda 
regarding the martial tradition.  
In the administration’s eyes, the eventual point of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
was to take away the sting of the war and honor its participants, not to rehash the 
domestic conflicts created by it. Therefore, just as William Westmoreland believed, they 
felt it should be as non-controversial as possible. When the project became contentious, 
the White House turned as much of a blind eye as it could. If Vietnam and its veterans 
were to become a positive part of national history and the American military tradition, the 
administration believed the country had to bury the pain associated with the war, rather 
than analyze it.43 
The Reagan administration and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund’s (VVMF) 
leaders had a similar objective regarding the Wall, the honor and recognition of those 
who served. However, the White House had minimal interest in taking on a role to 
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promote it in any major way, preferring instead to wait and reap any symbolic benefits 
the memorial might bring.44 A lack of visible participation in VVMF events and a lack of 
strong administrative support was a hallmark of the early days of the memorial project, 
although it lent a modicum of assistance to solidify a connection to the project, once 
completed.45  
The administration’s first major denial of the VVMF was in response to chairman 
Jan Scruggs’ request for a presidential appearance at a Memorial Day 1982 service at the 
future site of the Wall. Correspondence between administration officials indicates some 
concern about focusing on Vietnam alone on Memorial Day, rather than centering efforts 
on American soldiers as a whole. This signified the White House’s wait-and-see attitude 
toward the monument and its possible ability to reignite or quell the controversies of the 
war.  As one member of the administration wrote, “If the P. is going to be in Washington 
that day, we’ll be doing the POW’s dinner and have addressed the Vietnam issue. 
Further…it would seem more appropriate for him…to go to the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldiers in Arlington and pay tribute to all vets…I would hate for his day to be spent on 
such somber subjects.”46 
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From its actions, it appears that the Reagan administration wanted the VVMF left 
on its own in order to keep the administration away from rehashing negative aspects of 
the war.  Yet, as much as they wanted to avoid a major connection to the Wall, the White 
House also knew it could not seem against memorialization of the war. Such a stance 
would have been counterproductive to their efforts. 
 Therefore, the administration lent help in small doses that kept it from getting 
heavily involved in an official way.  In early 1981, they accepted a role for the first lady 
as a board member of the VVMF National Sponsoring Committee. Keeping with the 
rhetorical message of the president, Mrs. Reagan stated she accepted the position because 
she believed the memorial would “be a symbol of recognition” for the efforts and 
sacrifices of the men who participated in the war.47 “The time is long overdue,” she 
declared, “for the nation to recognize the sacrifices of those who served in Vietnam” and 
recognition of them at the Washington Mall would extend American gratitude and 
support to all living veterans.48 Assistance to the VVMF by Nancy Reagan, however, 
always remained at this fundraising level, as requests for personal attendance at events 
met with consistent rejection.49 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
47
 “Press Release from Office of the First Lady’s Press Secretary, February 17, 1981;” Folder: 
Release on Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund 2/17/81, OA 6026; Box 1: First Lady, Office of: Press Office 
Records, Collection—First Lady, Press Office: Records, Contents OA 6025-8550, LOC 122/13/1; Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library.  
 
48
 “Message from Mrs. Nancy Reagan for VVMF Radiothon, May 8-10, 1981;” Folder: WHORM 
Subject File: WE 004, 023809; LOC 28/6/6; Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
  
49
 “Letter from Jan C. Scruggs to First Lady Nancy Reagan, May 14, 1981” and note saying she 
regretted by phone on May 19, 1981. Both documents from Folder: Vietnam Veteran Memorial Fund (2); 
Box 59: Collection: WHORM Alpha File, Contents U-Vig; LOC 02710815; Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library. This minimal support seemed to wane even more after controversy erupted regarding the design of 
the project. A good instance of this came about when the First Lady’s staff denied a major request from 
Scruggs to discuss the design and meet architect Maya Lin. They rejected the call from Scruggs due to the 
 127 
Even without strong, official support from the administration, Scruggs and the 
VVMF were able to break ground on the memorial on March 26, 1982.  Reagan was 
absent from the ceremony, even though Scruggs asked him to participate and deliver a 
speech keeping with the White House’s rhetorical themes of recognition and dedication 
to service.50 However, the president’s disregard for the groundbreaking was no longer 
simply due to the desire to maintain distance from the unproven Wall; it was now linked 
to a brewing controversy over the selection of Chinese-American architect Maya Lin’s 
design for the memorial.51 
Because of the nature of Lin’s design, black granite engraved with the names of 
the fallen, serious questions arose about what the memorial meant, what it was to convey, 
and how it would honor the fallen and the living veteran. These discussions brought up 
old controversies, issues that the VVMF wanted to circumvent and the White House 
wanted to bury. At this point, the design had the potential to destroy not only the project, 
but also the Reagan administration’s desire to place the Vietnam soldier within the 
American legacy of military service and valor. 
Even though the administration hoped to stay out of any political issues regarding 
the memorial, the squabbles over Lin’s design forced it to engage on some level, lest the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
First Lady’s supposedly jam-packed schedule.  Information from “Letter from Jan C. Scruggs to First Lady 
Nancy Reagan, December 2, 1981” and “Letter from Ann Wrobleski to Jan C. Scruggs, December 15, 
1981;” Folder: Vietnam Veteran Memorial Fund (2); Box 59: Collection: WHORM Alpha File, Contents 
U-Vig,; LOC 02710815; Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
 
50
 “Letter from Jan C. Scruggs to President Reagan, March 19, 1982;” Folder: Vietnam Veteran 
Memorial Fund (2); Box 59: Collection: WHORM Alpha File, Contents U-Vig; LOC 02710815; Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library. The president’s regrets are noted on letter.  
 
51
 New York Times printed a contemporary interview with Maya Lin on June 29, 1981: B. 
Drummond Ayers, Jr., “A Yale Senior, a Vietnam Memorial, and a Few Ironies.” A recent biography of 
Lin is Donald Langmead, Maya Lin: A Biography (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2011), Langmead 
discusses the Wall design and controversy on pages 89-105.  
 
 128 
project and its larger ambitions crumble. What was most troublesome for the White 
House was the fact that those who turned against the chosen design of the project were 
fellow conservatives such as Pat Buchanan and James Webb.52 
As Webb did in late 1981, Buchanan expressed his issues with the Vietnam War 
Memorial in the syndicated editorial “The Crypt on the Mall” released on January 20, 
1982. He argued the aesthetics of the Wall carried with them a liberal agenda to subvert 
the true history of the war. That agenda was not to honor the men and women who served 
in the war, as the Congress intended when it approved the memorial, but to etch in stone 
a “final statement” on the conflict.  This “unwritten” meaning of Lin’s supposedly 
morbid, black, buried-in-the-ground design was, in Buchanan’s estimation was “these 
thousands died for nothing—and we are all responsible.”53 
 That same month, White House officials discussed whether to block the Lin 
design. They clearly worried about the mournful nature of the memorial and its possible 
anti-war message too, but they also were frightened the monument never would be built, 
given the awakened controversy. Quickly, the administration decided it wanted small 
changes that addressed the complaints of those against the current incarnation, such as the 
inclusion of the flag and a more fitting inscription highlighting “Duty, Honor, and 
Country,” while leaving the design itself untouched. Settling on this compromise gave 
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them “a way out of the all-or-nothing controversy,” somewhat placating their 
conservative counterparts, while making sure the memorial did not stop in its tracks.54  
By the time the dedication of the Wall occurred in the fall of 1982, the Reagan 
administration had reverted to its minimized role in the memorial.  In fact, during the 
numerous days of ceremonies surrounding the dedication of the Vietnam Wall, the 
president barely acknowledged the event, but not because the VVMF did not ask him to 
attend.  The initial call for presidential participation came from the obvious source of Jan 
Scruggs, who asked Reagan to give the keynote speech at the formal dedication during 
the National Salute to Veterans weekend. He assured the commander-in-chief that the 
VVMF could “think of no greater honor than to have you address the veterans who 
served our country.”55 But the White House declined the high-profile invitation.56 
What the administration did accept was a ceremonial title for the president and 
Mrs. Reagan to serve as Co-Chairman of the events surrounding the wall dedication, 
rather than any type of active participation.  Scruggs presented the less formal role to the 
White House in June of 1982, when he told the president he was a perfect candidate for 
the “position” because of his consistent advocacy for those who served in Vietnam. Even 
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a limited role such as this, according to Scruggs, would reinforce the “long-awaited, 
patriotic spirit of unity and reconciliation engendered by the memorial project.”57  
Even though the official position of the administration was to support the VVMF 
quietly, some within the White House wanted Reagan to make a stronger stand. They 
worked almost up to the last minute to convince him to accept the invitations, calling it 
the “right” thing to do. Elizabeth Dole, director of the White House Office of Public 
Liaison, suggested that the President at least go to Arlington to lay the wreath at the 
Tomb of the Unknown in conjunction with the salute, as did Allan Myer, a member of the 
National Security Council. Dole, in a memo to Special Assistant to the President, Morton 
Blackwell, expressed her anger over the President’s rejection of her proposal and his 
refusal to attend events surrounding the dedication of the Wall. “The veterans 
organizations all urged that the President speak at the November 13 dedication of the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” Dole wrote, “but the President will be in Chicago that day 
for a tribute to his late father-in-law.”58  
Allan Myer believed “[t]he President should make a strong statement honoring 
the Vietnam veteran” for this Veteran’s Day, given the ceremonies formally dedicating 
the Wall. Myer pleaded with William Clark in early November to pressure the president 
to accept Dole’s request to visit Arlington, lay the wreath, and give a short speech. This 
type of participation, according to him, “would have been right on the mark.” If this plan 
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still remained unpalatable to Reagan, Myer argued, then he should at the very least use 
his weekly radio address as a vehicle to talk about the ceremonies at the Wall.59 
Eventually, the administration did bend to Myer’s request for the president to 
devote his radio address to the subject of the memorial, and much of the finished product 
sounded like the president’s typical rhetoric regarding the war. Reagan spoke words of 
gratitude for the sacrifices of the war’s participants and asked the American public to 
realize that, because they answered the call to duty like the men of all other American 
wars, Vietnam veterans deserved recognition for their efforts. The monument, according 
to the president, “simple, but eloquent…will take its rightful place in America’s 
history.”60 
These remarks show a greater willingness of the administration to associate itself 
with the Wall in order to garner some of the credit for a rise in reverence for the Vietnam 
veteran that surely would take place over the dedication weekend.  Reagan continued, in 
his radio address, that, in the last few years, “America began to awaken from a decade of 
pain…and slowly began to remember the Vietnam veteran.” He alluded to his part in this, 
recalling the Congressional Medal of Honor ceremony for Sergeant Benavidez and 
commenting on the successes of the VVLP.  Reagan proclaimed, “Our Vietnam veterans 
have taken their rightful place as leaders of our great land.”61   
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For the VVMF, the White House also agreed to submit a message for the souvenir 
booklet handed out at the Wall’s dedication.  It highlighted the administration’s long-
standing message regarding participants in the war, thanking Vietnam veterans for their 
“valor” and “distinguished performance” in the conflict and confirming its pride in them. 
Reagan noted that the week of festivities surrounding the dedication gave Americans “an 
opportunity to reaffirm their heartfelt gratitude for the courage and devotion” for those 
who performed this marital duty for the country.62 Now, he believed, “they have earned 
the undying esteem and respect of all thoughtful and freedom-loving Americans for their 
overriding devotion and sense of duty to our nation.”63 The only other way the White 
House attached itself to the dedication of the Wall was a brief appearance by Reagan at a 
candlelight vigil at the National Cathedral, indicating the administration’s continued 
desire to play it safe to dodge the controversies of Vietnam. 
Over the years, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial did much to gain those who 
served in the war the respect they desired, but that reaction emphasized reverence not 
necessarily martial valor. The Reagan administration knew it needed an event that finally 
solidified the position of the soldiers of the Vietnam War within the hallowed folklore of 
American militarism, if the defeat of Vietnam’s influence on the martial tradition were to 
occur. The Wall, a step toward this result, primed the American public for the final 
element of the administration’s campaign.  
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Saving the Martial Tradition through Symbolism: The Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier 
In 1982, while the debate over the design of the Vietnam Wall raged, the White 
House began discussing what they believed, eventually, would make the major link it 
desired between the Vietnam soldier and his martial predecessors.  Members of the 
administration wanted to bury the remains of a Vietnam soldier in the nation’s sacred 
Tomb of the Unknown as a final step in bringing him and his comrades into the American 
martial tradition.64 
Unlike the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, a monument specific to that war, the 
burial of a Vietnam soldier’s remains within this sacred tomb would place him directly 
within a common and highly revered military tradition.  The intention of the 
administration, therefore, was to give the participants in Vietnam an honor that was not 
exclusive to their generation. As Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger suggested, 
burial in the tomb was “the highest honor” that could be bestowed on the soldier.65 
Initially created by Congress in 1921, the tomb held the remains of an 
unidentified soldier from World War I, World War II, and the Korean conflict. In the 
summer of 1982, the entombment of a soldier from the Vietnam era became a priority for 
the Reagan administration.  A statute passed in 1973 by Congress placed all power for the 
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burying remains in the Tomb of the Unknowns in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.66 
Therefore, Weinberger was the primary force behind plans for the internment, and he 
wanted the administration to move forward with the process as soon as possible.67 
To make that happen, Weinberger began to court Reagan and others in an attempt 
to create an administrative consensus for proceeding with the burial. The defense 
secretary suggested to cabinet members that veteran organizations and leaders in 
Congress believed the time was right for the placement of the remains of a Vietnam era 
soldier in the tomb.  Weinberger revealed that he advocated it, as well, particularly 
because he was convinced the Central Identification Lab of the United States Army, after 
ten years of extensive testing and investigation of remains, had identified the best 
candidate.68  
Rather than the opinions of administration officials stalling the process, what 
really stood in the way of burying an unidentified soldier of Vietnam in the tomb was 
apprehension from organizations dedicated to searching for prisoners of war (POWs) and 
soldiers missing in action (MIAs). They were concerned that such a ceremony would end 
public support for them because Americans (and possibly the administration) would view 
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the ceremony as an official closing of the war.69 They also raised an even more pressing 
concern: the possible future identification of the four sets of remains initially considered 
candidates for interment. 
The apprehensions of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and 
Missing in Southeast Asia became apparent as soon as word began to spread about the 
administration’s plans. The organization’s initial concerns came from its Executive 
Director Ann Mills Griffiths who contacted Weinberger in July of 1982 to express the 
League’s opposition. The director appealed to him to withdraw support because a 
“[c]ontroversy over qualifications” would undermine the very purpose of the memorial.70 
When the White House ignored her concerns, Griffiths accused the administration 
of “a conscious effort to obscure or eliminate identification data to meet political 
objectives.”71  She implied that it had ordered the destruction of information and evidence 
about the four sets of remains in order to ensure the ceremony occurred. The political 
reasoning for placing a Vietnam soldier in the tomb was quite transparent, according to 
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the director, because the administration believed the event to be “a means to satisfy those 
Vietnam veterans who feel slighted.”72  
Griffiths’ comments were on the mark. The plans of the White House left no 
room for considering identification issues any further. Three of the four sets of remains 
had been disqualified. That left only one set of remains for possible burial that, according 
to Griffiths, had a high probability of identification, once the Vietnamese cooperated in 
re-surveying the area where they had discovered them.73  
The Secretary of Defense did not address her concerns, however, and in March of 
1984, he informed the president it was time to proceed with the ceremony. He cited the 
continued support of veterans organizations and select congressmen, as well as the 
backing of other POW/MIA organizations. This greater acceptance, according to 
Weinberger, came about because of a new round of efforts to identify the remains held by 
the United States. After an “intensive effort,” he told Reagan, there was now a set of 
remains that “although not complete as we would like, meets the legal requirements…and 
therefore is qualified” for burial.74  
National Security Advisor, Robert McFarland, expressed the same sentiments to 
the president, stating that they had “slowed the interment action until we were absolutely 
sure that all records were available and the partial set of remains was truly 
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unidentifiable.”75 Regardless, the administration continued to receive protests from the 
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, 
although no longer from Griffiths, who now approved of the plan.76  
Anne Hart, the Vice-Chairman of the League’s board, renewed the argument that 
going forward with the entombment would endanger efforts to find POWs and MIAs.77 
McFarlane, believing the board was merely acting out of concern “that interment will 
close the book on Vietnam and . . . the POW/MIA issue,” made a concerted effort to 
make sure the families of those missing or possibly held captive understood the 
importance of the interment as a tool to shed additional light on the plight of their loved 
ones.78 Reagan stepped in to assure the vice-chairman that the administration’s 
“commitment to the issue of American servicemen prisoners or missing in Vietnam” 
would be “strengthened,” and the White House began to finalize the events surrounding 
the burial.79  
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As they planned the ceremony, the administration took painstaking measures to 
ensure that the entombment followed the protocol for previous ones. The White House 
initially consulted the ceremonial unit of the Military District of Washington (MWD) and 
it advised two ceremonies: one at the Capitol Rotunda in which Reagan would give a 
eulogy and lay a wreath by the casket, the other, a funeral with full military honors at 
Arlington National Cemetery, presided over by the commander-in-chief. The MWD 
suggested this scenario particularly because it would follow and in many ways exceed the 
“historical precedent” set in 1958, when Vice-President Nixon delivered the eulogy at the 
funeral for the World War II and Korean War remains and President Eisenhower presided 
over their interment at Arlington.80  
These ceremonies greatly appealed to the White House, and it moved ahead with 
making them as historically symbolic as possible. Such attention to detail had much to do 
with simply wanting to live up to protocol, but it also indicates the administration’s desire 
to play up the event’s pomp and circumstance in order to prove and solidify the place of 
the Vietnam soldier within this tradition. In early May, Secretary of Defense Weinberger 
increased the ceremonies’ symbolism when he proposed the president issue a 
proclamation declaring a national period of mourning for the unidentified serviceman. 
Weinberger suggested it was more than appropriate, since, “[b]efore interring previous 
Unknowns the President declared a period of mourning while the Unknown lay in state in 
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the Capitol Rotunda.”81 He attached copies of the proclamations used by Dwight 
Eisenhower for the interment of the World War II and Korean War soldiers, well aware 
of the importance for the president of following in the famous general’s footsteps.82   
The events surrounding the Memorial Day weekend entombment thus started with 
an official proclamation from the president ordering flags around the country to half-
staff.  The document’s wording was a strong mixture of protocol and rhetoric that 
highlighted the valor of the American soldiers of the Vietnam War. Reagan officially 
instated a mourning period and suggested the “nameless” soldier would “be known well 
by his embodiment of that most noble of all sentiments – patriotism.”83 But there would 
be another way these sacred remains would influence the nation, according to Reagan.  
Through the coming years, “there will be families from across the land,” he declared, 
“who will come to view this place. To them it will mean that their son, husband, or 
father, rests before them. And, in spirit, it will be true. For they, as we, know him well as 
one who, as Lincoln said at Gettysburg, gave his ‘last full measure of devotion.’”84 
Unlike the dedication ceremonies of the Vietnam Wall, it was necessary for the 
president to play a major role in the burial of the unknown soldier, if it was to have the 
impact desired by the administration. The early suggestions of a major presence by the 
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president at the ceremony in order to meet historical precedent indicate the significance 
of national symbols for their larger efforts of salvaging the American martial tradition.  
Moreover, the words delivered by the commander-in-chief were of the utmost 
importance, and Reagan’s speechwriters wove together an intricate dialogue for the 
occasion, one designed to change Americans’ understanding of Vietnam-era soldiers and 
veterans.85    
On Memorial Day 1984, President Reagan stood poised at the Capitol Rotunda 
for the hallowed first ceremony. He began his eulogy of the Unknown with the simple 
line, “An American hero has returned.” The speech lasted only a few minutes, but in it, 
the president spelled out the character of the symbolic veteran as “the heart, the soul, and 
the spirit of America.” He offered the gratitude of the nation for the sacrifice made by 
him and his comrades, presenting the new Unknown Soldier as a man who “accepted his 
mission and did his duty.”86 With these words and the ceremonial symbols of the nation, 
the commander-in-chief made his attempt to transport the men of Vietnam into the 
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martial tradition. From this point forward, according to Reagan, upstanding Americans 
had a major responsibility to the Unknown of Vietnam to “protect the proud heritage now 
in our hands” and “not betray his love of country.”87  
Reagan’s speechwriters saved much of the rhetorical pomp and circumstance for 
the burial ceremony that followed at Arlington National Cemetery, however. With the 
backdrop of the national cemetery and the actual tomb, Reagan began: “Throughout 
America today, we honor the dead of our wars. We recall their valor and their 
sacrifices—we remember they gave their lives so that others might live.”88  
Referencing Abraham Lincoln’s words in the Gettysburg address, he noted the 
eloquence with which the war dead illustrate their loyalty to the country on Memorial 
Day and then married that sentiment to the healing powers of the Vietnam Wall.  The 
dedication of the memorial, less than two years earlier, he professed, had led the country 
to feel as though “as a Nation we were coming together again and that we had—at long 
last—welcomed the boys home.” The men “who were never defeated in battle and were 
heroes as surely as any who have ever fought in a noble cause” finally had the chance to 
show the country they deserved to be respected for performing their duty for America.89   
According to Reagan, the unknown soldier was now one with those who perished 
before him in the name of the United States, a man who “is symbolic of all our 
missing…He saw the horrors of war but bravely faced them, certain his own cause and 
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his country’s cause was a noble one.”  On this Memorial Day, it was now time “to 
embrace him and all who served us so well in a war whose end offered no parades, no 
flags, and so little thanks” for that service. In the future, he told the American public, the 
best way to live up to the gallantry of these soldiers and give value to their sacrifices 
would be “honoring their commitment and devotion to duty and country.”90 
Near the end of his speech, Reagan made a final move to break down the traumas 
of the Vietnam War and to rectify the toll they took on Americans’ understanding of the 
nobility of the martial tradition.  His words serve as his final task in the campaign to 
preserve the country’s martial tradition. Standing next to the tomb, Reagan argued that no 
matter how contentious the war had been the reputations of the men who fought in it 
should never be a part of that contention.  The president then extended the country’s hand 
to Vietnam veterans acknowledging, “[a] grateful nation opens her heart today in 
gratitude for their sacrifice, for their courage, for their noble service. Let us, if we must, 
debate the lessons learned at some other time; today we simply say with pride: Thank you 
dear son; and may God cradle you in His loving arms.”91   
With this, the book closed on the administration’s attempt to curb Americans’ 
distaste and disrespect for the men who served in the war. The influence of the president, 
his use of American national symbols, and the rhetorical merger of the symbolic soldier 
of Vietnam with his valorous predecessors, constituted a robust attempt by the president 
and his administration to reconfigure American perceptions of these men and their war in 
order to salvage the nation’s image.   
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Initially, there was an overwhelming and positive public response to the 
entombment of what would turn out to be the remains of First Lieutenant Michael J. 
Blassie.92 Although the administration preserved letters from a few public figures such as 
the National Commander of American Veterans (AMVETS), who called the interment 
“one of the most important days for this country in the past two decades,” the majority of 
the correspondence received by the White House came from Vietnam veterans, their 
families, and other Americans.93 Special Assistant to the President and Director of 
Correspondence, Anne Higgins, sent a package full of thank you notes written to the 
president immediately after the ceremony to Reagan’s main assistant, Dick Darman, with 
the message, “the response to the President’s Memorial Day address has been very 
heartwarming…he might like to see these.”94  
All of the correspondence either thanked him for the honor the ceremony brought 
to the Vietnam veteran or the sense of pride it brought to America.95 One praised Reagan 
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for “having the courage” to pay tribute to the soldiers. 96 Another showed appreciation 
that Reagan went “that extra mile to help Americans once again stand tall.”97 Veterans of 
the conflict expressed gratitude for the “stirring patriotic tribute for [their] Vietnam 
counterparts who served willingly and with great pride” and for the “administration’s 
untiring efforts to help heal the wounds” the war created among its participants and the 
American public.98 “When you pinned the Medal of Honor on the Unknown Soldier,” 
wrote Sgt. Jay Toler, “I felt as though you had pinned it on me.”99  
The efforts to insert the Vietnam soldier into the same martial tradition defined by 
the successes of the men who fought for the country from the Revolution to World War II 
were now complete in the eyes of the Reagan administration.  Whether its campaign 
changed the Vietnam Syndrome or not was irrelevant to the larger task at hand: saving 
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the traditions and folklore attached to successful American militarism and maintaining 
their role in substantiating the allegedly special nature of the United States.   
The next time Reagan participated in a ceremony honoring the soldiers of 
Vietnam was Veterans’ Day of the same year.  Exactly two years after the dedication of 
the Wall, the statue, The Three Soldiers, meant to appease those who disliked the design 
of the memorial, was ready to be unveiled.100   
Reagan officially attended the unveiling, and although he only spoke briefly, he 
reiterated “the loyalty and the valor” of those who served in Vietnam and yet received 
little gratitude for their sacrifices.101 Beyond those comments, however, the speech stands 
as a defining moment in wiping away the previous exclusion of these men from the 
American military tradition.   
Speaking next to the Wall, he told the audience “[t]he Memorial reflects as a 
mirror reflects, so that when you find the name you’re searching for, you find it in your 
own reflection. And as you touch it, from certain angles, you’re touching too, the 
reflection of the Washington Monument or the chair in which great Abe Lincoln sits.” 
Their image no longer carrying the tarnish of the conflict, Reagan proclaimed to the 
soldier of the war “you performed with a steadfastness and valor that veterans of other 
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wars salute, and you are forever in the ranks of that special number of Americans in 
every generation that the nation records as true patriots.”102  
                                                           
102
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
SAVING THE ‘CITY ON A HILL’: NATIONAL REVIEW’S CRUSADE TO RECLAIM 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM 
 
Vietnam was indeed an all-American effort, and one that, some of us contend, will one 
day take its place in the annals of national nobility: a witness to America's disposition to 
endure special sacrifices in discharge of its heavy international responsibility: to contain 
the movement that brought death, oppression, and poverty to so many millions for so 
many years.  
 
William Frank Buckley, Jr., October 28, 19921 
 
In the April 1, 1991 edition of the conservative periodical National Review, the 
magazine’s founder, conservative icon William F. Buckley proclaimed after the close of 
the Gulf War, “it is widely remarked that we have exorcised the ghost of Vietnam.” He 
continued with the caveat, “this is true, though it must be said with a certain caution.”2 
Despite any underlying concerns that lingered, Buckley believed the United States and its 
military proved themselves in a way they were unable to for decades. The America of the 
post-Gulf War era, he declared, could celebrate itself once again because of what he 
described as “the most spectacular military victory of the century.”3 Mused Buckley, the 
outcome of the war should compel the city of New York to “repeal its ticker-tape ban.”4 
 Unlike after Vietnam, the country had the right to celebrate the military’s defeat 
of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, in his estimation. Of course, this success occurred with 
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the expertise of soldiers well aware of the stain of the earlier war, men who cut their teeth 
in Vietnam. They included General Norman Schwarzkopf who became one of the most 
popular generals in U.S. history because of his high profile and strong performance in 
Operation Desert Storm.5 Buckley approved of the abundance of accolades America and 
the media directed at the general, arguing “although the historical credit for our 
achievement goes to George Bush, the hero is the general in the field, and never was 
there one more satisfactory than Norman Schwarzkopf.”6  
The leader of American conservative intellectuals Buckley also had a personal 
reason to celebrate.  The victory against Iraq was the culmination of a long-term 
campaign to reestablish American military tradition and exceptionalism. The strategic 
and technological successes of warfare in Operation Desert Storm had all but removed 
the stain of Vietnam from the military, and the only real remnants of the war were 
concerns that future civilian meddling in military affairs could create additional 
quagmires. This vindication of the American armed forces was something Buckley and 
his editors at National Review struggled to achieve for almost twenty-five years.  Until 
1991, they had just gone about it the wrong way.  
From the 1968 election of Richard Nixon during the most tumultuous year of the 
war through the administration of George H.W. Bush, they focused on the creation of a 
conservative savior who would reaffirm the strength of America and its military by 
leading victorious martial endeavors.  But the inability of post-Vietnam Republican 
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commanders-in-chief to renew the armed forces via warfare and revive the country’s 
image of exceptionalism due to their own weaknesses proved a formidable roadblock.  
Frustrated from almost a quarter of a century campaign to salvage the shining city on a 
hill, William Buckley and the National Review ran with the powerful performance and 
quick successes of the military during Gulf War.  The country’s redeemer turned out to 
be the American military and it martial men, in their eyes, and Buckley soon proclaimed 
the war the epitome “of everything the American people wanted to be proud of: 
leadership, morale, intelligence, technology.”7   
 
The Intellectual Power of William F. Buckley and National Review 
Born to his oil baron namesake in 1925, William F. Buckley lived a life of 
privilege. His early life consisted of private schools, residence in multiple countries, and 
a staunchly Catholic upbringing. After graduating from high school too young for the 
draft, the U.S. army finally inducted him in the summer of 1944.  Buckley noted in his 
literary biography, Miles Gone By that his time in the military was “brief and bloodless,” 
and by the fall of 1945, he began his education at Yale University.8 
Combining his intellect, his virulent anti-communist stance inspired by his 
Catholicism, and his knack for writing, he created the conservative periodical National 
Review in 1955, five years after he graduated. Already known for his 1951 book God and 
Man at Yale, a scathing critique of the Ivy League institution’s professors, whom he 
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believed pushed a liberal ideology on their students, he set out to assemble a variety of 
conservative writers “to consolidate and mobilize the right.”9   
Buckley succeeded in that difficult endeavor, as historian Bruce Schulman 
suggests, because he “managed to unite disparate factions of conservatives” concerned 
with moral issues and a free market economy, along with one particularly important 
group, “hard-line anti-communists primarily interested in the twilight struggle against the 
Soviets.”10 Their common goal was the empowerment of the United States through 
conservative ideals of tradition, virtue, and moral order.11 Although “peaceful 
coexistence” rarely described the “relationship between the various factions at the 
magazine,” according to historian Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, somehow, ideologically, it 
worked.12  
One of the most important men recruited by Buckley for the periodical was James 
Burnham: philosopher, academic, and former radical.  Virulently anti-communist by the 
time he met the founder of National Review, he steadfastly believed “the only alternative 
to the communist World Empire is an American Empire which will be, if not literally 
worldwide in formal boundaries, capable of exercising world control.”13   
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Conservatives working for the magazine, particularly its editors, adhered to 
Burnham’s belief in the U. S. Empire too, and created in National Review a strong 
medium for their opinions and those of their contingent of like-minded Republicans.14 
While their “arguments were more often intellectual than pragmatic,” according to 
historian John A. Andrew, they continued to build an audience and a solid reputation for 
criticizing the agenda of their ideological enemies, the liberal establishment.15 As 
Burnham argued, the magazine served to create “intellectual credibility” for 
conservatism.16   
The magazine thrived while the situation in Vietnam deteriorated. The U.S. 
military’s performance against North Vietnam and the Viet Cong threatened the basic 
principles and belief system of conservatives, in which “patriotic concern for the nation 
and its culture” was of the utmost importance, according to Buckley.  The war had the 
potential to undermine all they believed in and what they felt the United States 
represented.17 
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The editors of National Review held a rather flippant stance on the Vietnam War 
during the Kennedy years.  Although they desired a strong anti-communist agenda by 
Kennedy and any president, it was much more important, in their eyes, for the United 
States to focus on the larger Cold War.  Before Lyndon Johnson came to power in 
November 1963 and the Gulf of Tonkin incident gave Johnson the chance to use force in 
the region, they made few recommendations for how to proceed with the conflict.18 It was 
Johnson’s handling of the war that caused Buckley and his editors to step up their 
discussion of the situation.  The editors predicted a loss of the Cold War, not just 
Vietnam, and as historian Sandra Scanlon argues, “conservatives at National Review 
emphasized the paramount importance of U.S. military supremacy and saw Vietnam as 
an opportunity to forestall the communist wave of success.”19 
Richard Nixon: National Review’s Questionable Savior of American Exceptionalism 
The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 gave National Review a precarious 
opportunity to start their efforts to quell the effects of Johnson’s fiasco in Vietnam. 
However, promoting Nixon as the country’s redeemer was not easy for the editors, 
particularly Buckley, since they merely tolerated him as a political figure, one they 
refused to endorse in 1960.20  
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Jeffery Hart, an eventual editor for the periodical, wrote in his book, The Making 
of the American Conservative Mind that a begrudged acceptance of Nixon among the 
editors began during his candidacy in 1968, a result of “a gradual change . . . from 
paradigm, conservative politics to consensus, strategic politics.”21 The editors of National 
Review realized if they wanted a Republican president, they had to accept other types of 
conservatives into the fold to make that a reality.  Regardless of their opinion of the man 
and any issues they might have had with his politics, he was the lesser of the evils laid in 
front of them by George Wallace.  So, to beat Hubert Humphrey, the editors ended up 
endorsing Nixon in the 1968 campaign and “hoping for the best” from him in terms of 
policy.22 
The tenuous support Nixon had among the editors of National Review eroded 
quickly, at least internally. Surprisingly, it was not the policies of Vietnamization and its 
proposed withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam that destroyed it. The 
president’s desire to create better relations between the United States and the communist 
power players of China and the Soviet Union irked many at the magazine.  The main 
issue became his courting of Mao Zedong in the People’s Republic of China.  Because of 
Mao’s ideology and the repression of his people, conservatives throughout the Cold War, 
despised the leader and supported the Republic of China (or Taiwan) instead.23  Nixon’s 
trip to China in the spring of 1971 solidified this disgust, particularly for Buckley, who 
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traveled with the president as a member of the press corp.24 Hart suggests the pundit 
found Nixon’s “deference to Mao excessive and undignified.”25   
Even though Nixon and Kissinger attempted to court the highly influential 
Buckley as a means to stop the bleeding with conservatives, it clearly failed.26  The trip 
and Nixon’s interaction with Mao made it clear to Buckley and the editors of the 
magazine that détente carried greater weight in the administration’s objectives than 
winning the war in Vietnam.  In fact, the ambiguous nature of Nixon’s Southeast Asia 
policy was something they feared since his election; now their concerns accelerated.27  
Burnham warned in the spring of the following year, “For Richard Nixon, South 
Vietnam’s survival as an independent non-Communist state has a lower priority than 
American withdrawal and his own re-election.”28 
In the last years of the Nixon administration, it became evident the president 
could not fill the shoes picked for him by the National Review editors. The continued 
difficulties of the U.S. military, the perception created by the continued withdrawal of 
American troops, the impotency of the Paris Peace Accords, and the broken diplomatic 
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promises the United States had made to the South Vietnamese government created an 
ideological problem for the editors.29  They came to see the policy of Vietnamization as a 
smoke screen for Nixon’s true strategy: cut and run.  The White House hoped handing the 
prosecution of the war over the South Vietnam would “make it look as if ARVN had lost 
the war, not the United States,” and fool Americans into forgetting about the national 
nightmare.30 Burnham saw it for what it was “a tightrope walk,” and “a much more 
complicated and problematic course” than anything Johnson attempted.31  
Then, in the midst of trying to salvage Nixon’s reputation, the break in at the 
Watergate complex occurred.32  The matter confirmed the National Review’s suspicions 
of Nixon, as information came to light regarding the administration’s role in the event.  
They found the scandal that followed humiliating to conservatives and the nation, and if 
their campaign to redeem the United States were to go forward, they would have to find a 
way to positon Nixon, his administration, and their blunders as anomalies in the 
conservative narrative when it came to Vietnam.  
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In Watergate, surprisingly, they found opportunity in the distraction it created in 
Washington, blaming Congress, particularly liberal Democrats for the failure of Nixon’s 
plans for Vietnamization. National Review used Watergate to plug holes the nation saw in 
Nixon’s Vietnam policy. George Will, writing after the fall of Saigon in 1975, explained 
how America’s defeat in the “nation’s longest, losingest war,” actually originated with 
Watergate.  The scandal, in his estimation, “contributed directly to the defeat of a cause 
in which two million Americans fought” because of the lack of resolve liberals in the 
American Congress had toward the conflict in Southeast Asia.  He blamed them for 
worrying more about their partisan reaction to the president’s woes, than their 
responsibilities to South Vietnam.33  
America’s foreign policy troubles only worsened during the Watergate era, 
according to Will, because if the administration asked for enforcement or revocation of 
the Paris Peace Accords it “risk[ed] provoking” already angry congressmen.34 In other 
words, Nixon’s weak performance in the final years of the war occurred because 
Congress could not look past his transgressions and work with him.  Burnham jumped on 
this bandwagon too, albeit ambiguously, when he argued just before the fall of Saigon: “it 
is extremely doubtful, to say the least, that the North Vietnamese would have launched 
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the present blitzkrieg if they had been obliged to face a politically unwounded, post-1972 
Nixon in the White House.”35   
Years later, the remnants of this manufactured story still floated around with the 
editors and contributors to the periodical. A 1988 piece by historian and regular 
columnist Brian Crozier declared that the Congress of “a defeated superpower” destroyed 
Nixon’s efforts to support the South Vietnam government and military. He contended the 
president “pulled out of Vietnam because he could see no way of winning there,” but he 
“left the forsaken forces of South Vietnam the wherewithal to hold their own against the 
northern aggressor.” It was Congress that “frustrated his honorable intentions, starved the 
South of ammunition and spare parts, and condemned the Vietnamese people to the bitter 
choice between slavery and the hazards of rickety boats on the high seas.”36 
After Gerald Ford took over for the disgraced Nixon, National Review continued 
blaming the same villains for supposedly undermining the conservative commander-in-
chief and the military from salvaging the U.S. position in the war.37  Ford once mentioned 
to the press that, although he did not mean to place responsibility on anyone in particular, 
“there was a substantial reduction made by Congress in the amounts of military 
equipment requested for South Vietnam.”  This statement “to the untutored ear” Will 
argued, “sounded a bit like an assessment of blame” for why the United States lost.  
When a reporter asked Ford to clarify if he believed the current turmoil in Vietnam meant 
                                                           
35
 “Suicide of the West: Accelerating,” 382. 
 
36
 Brian Crozier, “The Afghan Turning Point,” National Review 40, no. 10, “The Protracted 
Conflict,” (May 27, 1988) : 26.  
 
37
 See Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington: University 
of Kentucky Press, 2005), especially 273-350. Ford published his autobiography A Time to Heal: The 
Autobiography of Gerald Ford (New York: Harper and Row) in 1979.  
 
 158 
that “55,000 lives were wasted,” Ford claimed “the tragic sacrifices…would not have 
been made in vain,” if only the United States would have “carried out the solemn 
commitments that were made in Paris.”38  
Will took it upon himself to translate the intentions of the president’s words for 
his readers, pretending that if Ford had “said with cutting precision what he seemed 
inclined to say—that Congress made a mockery of 55,000 dead—the roof would have 
been blown off the Capitol.”39 If the president would not say it with conviction, Will 
would in the pages of National Review.  Congress ruined the U.S. ability to protect its 
ally and keep its promises, sullying the efforts of Nixon to salvage the country and the 
military’s image.    
Even Buckley turned to calling out Congress for failing to meet the promises of 
the Treaty of Paris and allowing for the defeat of the South.  Although he knew “it was 
certainly a mistake of President Nixon not to have insisted that Congress…either accept 
or reject responsibility for enforcing the terms of the treaty,” he blamed the members of 
Congress who did not hold the North Vietnamese to the Accords. His disdain for them, 
however, read much more like an indictment of the weaknesses of liberals and others in 
Washington for their supposedly soft stance on communism.40  Buckley barked, 
“Congress ran under the pressure of moral fatigue. I’d sooner, fighting for my life, do so 
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in the company of 15 South Vietnamese soldiers, than of the 15 members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.”41 
But the editors of National Review knew the U.S. still appeared weak, even after 
this elaborate blame game. This was especially true as the political situation in South 
Vietnam further deteriorated in the late 1970s.42  Burnham started to worry that pro-
American nations, some holding significant communist forces internally, would retreat 
out of fear that they could no longer trust the United States.  Indeed, he said, many within 
the world might “begin to conclude that the Soviet Union is a serious world power, while 
the United States is not.”43 
George Will agreed, and borrowed from British counter-insurgency expert Sir 
Robert Thompson’s assertion that the United States had weakened itself by surrendering 
rather than stopping the horrors of war.44 Although Will did not believe the situation to be 
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irreversible, he suggested Thompson’s thoughts “highlighted real trends,” in U.S. foreign 
policy, one that clearly undermined American authority and strength.45 
Buckley, in the meantime, struggled with how to change this perception of 
weakness. He contemplated, “it is difficult to answer the question how to maintain one’s 
dignity” after the loss of a war.46  In 1977, he suggested the United States could save face 
and regain respect, if it focused on promoting human rights in South Vietnam.47 He 
argued the nation’s image could improve if it refused to cower from its supposed original 
motives “to give South Vietnam an opportunity to be free and independent.” Doing so, 
the country could preserve not only its dignity, but also uplift its principles.  Performing 
with strength in this realm would be “an affirmation of ideals that survive, or ought to 
survive, defeat on the battlefield.”48 
Burnham did not have the same sense of confidence, however, worrying that the 
wounds of Vietnam would never heal, domestically or in the international community, 
because the country had not squared itself with the “morality of fighting in Vietnam” let 
alone the “moral qualms about the consequences of pulling out.” In fact, “[t]he severance 
pay and temporary pension we gave the old girl when we parted company don’t quite 
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seem to wipe out the obligation our past behavior saddled us with,” he sarcastically 
noted.49 If Americans could not figure it out, how would other countries sort through the 
American performance in the war and at the diplomatic table, and understand its meaning 
for the future of the international system. 
The United States, according to Burnham, had to make major changes, if it was 
ever to save face, especially since the weakened state of the country’s national security 
and international political power was “no different from the way it looked during the 
decade of fighting.” Without a significant overhaul of the American image, there would 
be a “further loss of confidence in (and fear of) U.S. integrity and power,” while a 
continued lack of introspective examination of the war would sully the country’s destiny 
to expand first territorially, and then ideologically and economically, across the globe.50 
 
Ronald Reagan: National Review’s New Hope for the Salvation of American 
Exceptionalism 
The hope to re-establish those traditions came with a variety of solutions from 
National Review.  Burnham suggested the United States needed to “sweep up the litter” 
of the Vietnam War and leave the region behind, rather than continuing to subject the 
country to such negativity.51 However, collectively, the editors presented the same idea as 
Buckley that the United States should respond to a significant moral and ethical problem: 
the plight of Vietnamese refugees.  
                                                           
49
 James Burnham, “Go East Old Man,” National Review 27, no. 3 (January 31, 1985) : 96.  
 
50
 Ibid., 96.  
 
51
 Ibid., 96. 
 
 162 
In the summer of 1979, they declared, “there can be no more rock-bottom human 
rights issue than the right of our former allies to live, and set foot on free land.”52 
Although the editors probably cared little about the refugees’ experience, they believed a 
U.S. response held promise to salvage the country’s global image. They particularly liked 
the assessment of George Will that assisting the exiles could also pull the country out of 
the funk it had been in since the Vietnam War. He wanted to “send an armada of rescue 
boats now to save who can be saved,” arguing, “What could more elevate our national 
spirit than participation in a great humane enterprise? What could more lift our hearts—
and evoke world admiration— than the spectacle of a flotilla of our own ships embarked 
on the most spacious operation of mercy ever undertaken?"53 But Jimmy Carter, 
surprisingly, did not give any substantial humanitarian aid, and such a fantastical display 
of American military power never occurred.54 
Obviously, National Review had many more problems with the strongly liberal 
Democratic president than his out of character stance on Vietnam refugees, so it set its 
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sights on the next presidential election.  The prospect of a new American leader, a 
conservative who could do a better job at elevating the nation brought back into focus the 
editors’ previous plans for finding a national savior. 
While president of the Citadel, former Navy Vice Admiral James Stockdale wrote 
about Ronald Reagan’s potential to redeem the country. Like most conservatives, 
Stockdale, worried that “public confidence in our defense establishment” continued to 
erode during the Carter administration, comparing it to “five years of inept executive 
leadership” under Lyndon Johnson.55 
Stockdale was unsure if Reagan could reclaim the reins of defense policy from “a 
self-serving cult” of liberal Democrats who refused to listen to Americans “tired of 
apologizing” for their nation and her supposed weakness. But he hoped the former 
governor could correct the country’s negative image and focus on traditional issues of 
“honor and idealism.”56  
Reagan seemed to deliver what Stockdale and the editors of National Review 
wanted, at least with his rhetoric.  A week after the publication of Stockdale’s optimistic 
article, the future president accepted his party’s nomination. In his acceptance speech, he 
made a promise to redeem the country, declaring “I will not stand by and watch this great 
country destroy itself under mediocre leadership that drifts from one crisis to the next, 
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eroding our national will and purpose . . . the American people deserve better from those 
to whom they entrust our nation's highest offices.”57 
The National Review and Reagan already had a rather strong relationship, 
particularly due to the ideological and personal bonds between him and Buckley.  Jeffery 
Hart, who worked on Reagan’s short-lived 1968 presidential campaign, described how 
“Reagan was an assiduous reader of National Review, had a particularly high regard for 
Burnham’s prudential and realistic foreign policy, [and] was a friend of Buckley.”58 His 
support of the magazine as president included appearances at the editors’ galas for the 
establishment of the Washington bureau and their thirtieth anniversary, an indication of 
the extent and importance of their association. They, he suggested, along with other 
conservatives, saw the 1980 election and Reagan’s leadership as “a culmination” in the 
rise of American conservatism.59 
Although the editors of National Review believed Reagan one of the main leaders 
of American conservatism, his foreign policy in the Third World, particularly Central 
America, presented significant roadblocks for his supposed role as the country’s 
redeemer in the post-Vietnam era.60  During his eight-year tenure as president, the 
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editors’ high hopes that he would re-bolster the country’s powerful image dwindled, even 
as Reagan waged his own campaign to shore up the United States’ martial tradition. The 
administration’s lack of intervention in the region militarily made it clear to those at 
National Review that its decision-making echoed the Vietnam Syndrome and maintained 
the country’s weak image.  
Reagan’s response to civil war in El Salvador was the first major foreign policy 
criticized by National Review.61  They argued the Salvadoran Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN), a group made up of organizations with varying political 
ideologies working to defeat the country’s military junta, had multiple attributes similar 
to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, the least of which being its communist ties.62  The 
administration, however, worried any correlation would destroy American support for 
intervention, and therefore worked hard to deflect any discussion regarding real or 
imagined similarities. The editors saw this as a shortsighted tactic doomed to Vietnam-
like failure because inattention to the truth about the FMLN would allow it the same 
chance to lure the United States into another quagmire in the “jungle.”63 
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American military intervention in El Salvador never came to fruition, while 
conflict there and throughout the region raged in the 1980s.  The supposed weakness of 
Reagan’s response to Central American turmoil raised the editors’ fears that his actions 
(or reactions) in the region had minimal desired effect both in terms of foreign policy and 
American regeneration.  
To them, it appeared as though Reagan and his advisors made many of the same 
errors as their predecessors during the Vietnam era. Their greatest concern was the 
president’s failure to convey to the American public why stability in the region served the 
country’s best interests, an issue that echoed Vietnam. The president, they argued as early 
as 1982, “has not laid the political groundwork for a serious assertion of U.S. interest,” 
and therefore, the “public has no clear conception of that interest as it applies to Central 
America.”64  
The shining moment of Reagan’s foreign policy in Central America was October 
1983’s Operation URGENT FURY, in which American Marines and Special Forces 
invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada.  Taken over by socialist revolutionaries with 
close ties to Fidel Castro just a few months earlier, the instability of the small country 
served as a reminder of Soviet influence in the United States’ backyard. Under the guise 
that American citizens studying at Grenada’s medical school were in danger, Reagan and 
his military advisors quickly planned the invasion.  Within six days of the operation’s 
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commencement, U.S. forces removed the socialist government, albeit with significant 
planning and coordination issues among the military forces.65   
Surprisingly, National Review focused little on the issues leading up to the 
invasion or on its success. In September of 1982, the editors published an article by 
Trinidadian lawyer Keith Charles that outlined Cuban and Soviet influence on Grenada.  
Charles did not believe that the United States would send in troops and that the small 
Caribbean island would continue its role as a Cuban satellite.66 That, however, was the 
extent of a pre-invasion discussion. 
 It was only after the offensive took place that any of the editors weighed in on the 
subject. Simply suggesting that the move was the right one to take, even though many 
objected, William Buckley had little to say about the Reagan administration’s 
accomplishment. He expressed pleasure because the United States “rescued a little island 
in the Caribbean from a monstrous tyranny whose script was being written in Moscow 
and Havana,” but otherwise, he did little to praise the White House administration.67  
He did commend U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick on 
her role in defending the action to the world and announced to his readers “whatever the 
complexion of the White House, it is capable of decisive action.” But this was insincere 
praise for an administration Buckley and his editors believed was unable to make the 
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decisions necessary to curb the effects of Vietnam.68 The invasion of Grenada, to the 
editors, was insignificant more than likely because of its severely limited nature and its 
disclosure of continued military disorganization.   
Throughout the 1980s, the expectation of the editors was for Reagan to act as the 
nation’s savior from a perceived weakness in its traditions, rather than behaving in a way 
that highlighted it.  As a result, unlike him and other conservatives, National Review 
refused a significant emphasis on changing the public’s understandings of the Vietnam 
War. This reasoning likely was due to fear of re-drawing attention to the negative aspects 
of the war that damaged the country’s image and traditions and keeping them in the 
public’s consciousness. Buckley explained this away when discussing why the magazine 
declined to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the war’s end, unlike many 
mainstream periodicals such as Time and Newsweek. He claimed memorialization would 
make the war into something it was not and would gloss over the real and thorny issues 
of the loss.69  
Even with this attitude, the magazine became a part of the controversy over the 
design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. In late 1981, the publication of the editors’ 
note “Stop that Monument,” a short, but extremely negative opinion piece on Maya Lin’s 
concept for the memorial, set off a firestorm and marked a curious episode in the history 
of National Review. The editors deemed the buried, black granite design created by the 
young artist an embarrassment that had a “clear political message” against the war. They 
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demanded the Reagan administration halt the project and begin the process of replacing 
the design “with suitable sculpture.”70  
Their position seemed to be in line with James Webb and Tom Carhart, adding 
credence to their dispute with the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF). But just 
two months later, the magazine made an about face and published an article by Norman 
B. Hannah asserting that the editors had made a “premature evaluation” of a war 
memorial that in actuality would “be beautiful, imposing, and fitting.” In a meeting with 
Maya Lin about the design, he came to see the design as a piece of “austere, principled 
simplicity” that honored those who served and did not highlight controversial aspects of 
war. He dubbed it “the open book memorial” through which the United States faced its 
history, mistakes and all, and would proudly display Americans’ “respect for truth and 
history.71 
National Review never questioned the memorial’s design again, in accordance 
with Buckley’s wishes to examine the war and its lessons, rather than commemorating it. 
When the dedication of the Wall occurred, the editors only briefly readdressed the issue 
by dismissing the assertions of Webb and Carhart that the memorial was a “V-shaped 
slab of black granite,” and lauding the now tangible monument for conveying to its 
viewer “considerable power and even eloquence.” The “high-gloss surface on which both 
the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument reflect,” they suggested, presented 
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“some of the ideals for which the men fought and died.”72 If the Wall had any real value, 
to them it was, as John McLaughlin suggested in 1986, that the country finally accepted 
the past and had moved toward a “patriotic surge” for the first time in a long while.73  
McLaughlin also suggested that the popularity of the Wall illustrated “the nation’s 
burgeoning love affair with the military.”74 Even so, that romance did not extend to 
support for Reagan’s foreign policy in Central America, not among the public or the 
editors of National Review. In fact, El Salvador turned out to be the least of the problems 
encountered by the Reagan administration in relation to the ghosts of Vietnam.  In 1979, 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the dictatorship of the 
Somoza family in Nicaragua. The socialist leanings of Nicaragua’s new leaders and their 
ties to Fidel Castro alarmed virulently anti-communist American conservatives. Soviet 
support of the new government and its leader, Daniel Ortega, terrified them and gave 
them a new crusade.75   
Multiple and diverse groups within Nicaragua opposed the Sandinista 
government, uniting to form the Contras. Since the group sought to overthrow the new 
government, it quickly gained the support of the Reagan administration.  To the editors of 
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National Review the country and its current turmoil served as a possible location for 
Ronald Reagan to prove America’s mettle.  
Many conservatives, including the magazine’s editors, believed the American 
public had the ability to see Central America as “vital” to U.S. interests in a way they 
never saw Southeast Asia, making it possible for them to support anti-communist efforts 
in the region with the proper coaching. It is “ten times closer to U.S. borders than 
Vietnam and bound infinitely closer by history, culture, and trade,” they wrote in early 
1985, making any communist activity in the area of utmost importance.  Nicaragua, they 
claimed, had the power to create “a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist state closely allied with 
Cuba and the USSR,” and therefore was the place for a strong stance by the Reagan 
administration.  To them, the world’s perception of the United States hinged on how the 
White House dealt with the situation.76  
The editors, Buckley in particular, felt Reagan should stop short of major 
American military intervention in Nicaragua because neither Congress nor the American 
public would support using force to overthrow the Sandinistas.77 But, they did condone 
strong military support and assistance to the Contras, as well as seeking diplomatic 
solutions in the international community, in order to overthrow the Sandinistas and, in 
turn, bolster the United States’ image. They knew their strategy, one that Reagan 
followed to some extent, might necessitate “some use of force,” but the point was to 
place the burden on “Nicaraguans to fight for their country’s freedom, not American 
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troops” and prove to the American public and the world that post-Vietnam America had 
what it takes to resolve foreign matters.78  
Buckley considered the administration’s inability to destroy the Sandinistas and 
resolve the threat of another strong communist state in America’s backyard a 
disappointment.  It reminded him of the same mismanagement that he criticized during 
the Vietnam War, which he suggested, made the government and its military advisors 
look weak and inept. He and his editors felt they now found themselves in a situation 
eerily similar to the one they endured with Nixon.  Reagan’s rhetorical work to 
restrengthen American military tradition may have changed perceptions about the 
Vietnam era and its participants, but when it came to shoring up the government and the 
military’s abilities to act aggressively on the country’s ideals, he failed miserably in their 
eyes.  
As Reagan’s second term continued, National Review continued to fear that his 
lack of strong action in Central America would make him a failure in the foreign policy 
realm. In hindsight, the rapid decline of communism and the Soviet Union from 1989-
1991 would prevent that from happening. But as for the desire for him to be the savior of 
American exceptionalism and its inherent military tradition, their fear was not unfounded.   
Buckley cried to his readers “anyone who wants to use Vietnam as an appropriate 
metaphor to describe our involvement in Nicaragua can justly do so.” He believed 
Reagan, like Vietnam-era presidents, made promises he did not keep and kept the public 
in the dark regarding his objectives in Central America, goals that were, according to 
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Buckley, directly important to them.79 He stressed to the administration that the way to 
make intervention in Nicaragua palatable to the American public and something they 
knew directly affected them was to appeal to their basic understanding of the country’s 
ideals and strategic concerns. However, Reagan still had yet to tell them it was “a U.S. 
responsibility to see to it that the Sandinistas do not succeed in the way that Castro 
succeeded in Cuba.”80 
Transparency was not the Reagan administration’s strong suit, though. Much like 
Watergate, the Iran-Contra scandal, which revealed secret sales of arms to Iran for money 
to fund the Contras, embarrassed conservatives and somewhat sullied Reagan’s 
reputation. Buckley found the White House’s clandestine efforts to fund the counter-
revolutionaries inane, but not criminal, unlike his opinion of Nixon’s behaviors.  “The 
worst that can be said of Mr. Reagan,” his long-time friend defended, “is that he stood by 
acquiescently when a sum of money was delivered to the Contras so that they could buy 
arms that Congress was to give them a few months later.”81  
Yet, the administration’s actions left Buckley and his editors infuriated and 
questioning why the administration “chose…a clandestine route, which was flawed both 
politically and strategically.”  They tried to defend Reagan, arguing that a “paralytic 
Congress and a McGovernized Democratic Party” prevented him from competing with 
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the $2 billion investment made in the region by the Soviet Union, but they knew it was a 
moot point.82  
The scandal closed the door to using Central America to flex the country’s 
muscles and forced them to abandon Reagan as the redeemer of the country’s exceptional 
nature. Reagan’s performance in Central America, though tempered later by successes in 
foreign relations with the USSR, made it clear National Review needed to find another 
avenue for shoring up the United States and its traditions.  
The American Military of the Gulf War: National Review’s Savior of 
Exceptionalism 
When George H.W. Bush became the commander-in-chief of the United States, 
National Review continued, albeit cautiously, its campaign to liberate the United States 
from the effects of the Vietnam War. The new president held very similar opinions to the 
magazine’s editors regarding Vietnam’s damage to the country’s strength. He clearly saw 
this as a problem that still needed solving and moved to do so in his inaugural speech. 
“That war cleaves us still,” Bush lamented, “but, friends, that war began in earnest a 
quarter of a century ago; and surely the statute of limitations has been reached. This is a 
fact: The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by 
a memory.”83  
Twice during the Bush administration, the White House took the opportunity 
given by international events to try to exorcise the ghosts of Vietnam. The difference 
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between this administration and Reagan’s was how it used the military to eliminate them. 
The first chance occurred in December of 1989, when Bush chose to invade Panama in a 
campaign to depose dictator and drug lord Manuel Noriega. Previously, Ronald Reagan 
used sanctions against the despot after collaborating with his government for many years, 
but Bush and his military advisors chose a very different strategy that gave the American 
military a much needed boost.  
Operation “Just Cause” lasted approximately five days. It ended with the removal 
of Noriega and the installation of a new president. The editors of National Review 
quickly ran an article lauding the “post-Vietnam military” that produced this quick and 
relatively painless victory for the United States. Recognizing the value of the event for 
their cause, they challenged their readers to see this as a new American military 
disconnected from that of the Vietnam War. “The overwhelming majority of the soldiers 
involved,” they stressed, “joined up after helicopters plucked the last Americans off the 
embassy rooftop in Saigon.”84 
Bush’s predecessor deserved some of the credit for the victory because of his role 
in rebuilding the armed forces, they suggested, but so did the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act that resolved some of the military’s issues with the defense 
establishment during Vietnam, namely it streamlined command.85 Both were key factors 
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in the Panama victory, according to the editors, creating a stronger post-Vietnam armed 
forces the deemed “the Reagan military: smart volunteers, amply equipped…confident of 
popular support at home, and infused with the high morale born of hard, expensive 
training.”86 
Although the editors saw this victory as a step forward, the achievements in 
Panama, used by some to declare the Vietnam Syndrome dead, were not enough for them 
to see the effects of Vietnam as finally over. Yes, the short duration, the “mercifully 
light” casualties, and the victorious result worked wonders to alter ideas about America’s 
military prowess. But, a highly ideal scenario for victory marred the operation’s ability to 
fully show off the strength of the armed forces, with fifty percent of the troops 
participating already stationed in the region. The editors warned, “one hopes that the 
victory celebrations will be tempered with awareness that they met a relatively easy test” 
in an operation that also highlighted “artificial jointness, an initial failure of the changes 
in the command system, and . . . significant strategic lapses.”87  
The better chance for full redemption came in the summer of 1990, when Saddam 
Hussein’s army invaded Kuwait. From the start of tensions with Iraq, the magazine 
worried American military intervention could have two effects. On one hand, it could 
help further break down the American perceptions about the war and its long-term 
consequences, or on the other hand, it could reinforce those issues.  The editors warned 
Bush if he remained “obsessed” with building an international coalition against Hussein 
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and did not take a stand quickly, the result could be devastating and reminiscent of 
Vietnam to Americans.88 
They also believed continued focus on diplomatic means like the Geneva Peace 
Conference in early January of 1991 undermined the White House’s ability to 
demonstrate the military’s and the country’s strength.  By “continually postponing action, 
we risk losing our allies, our principles, and our opportunity,” they argued. At first, they 
blamed the military, and the “doctrinal preferences” of Colin Powell, Norman 
Schwarzkopf, and the U.S. Army for their adherence to the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine 
and its prohibition of military action without full mobilization and significant public 
support.89 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft recalled a few years after the end of 
the war that he and the president believed the editors were right. The Vietnam conflict 
still made many in the upper-ranks of the military skittish about moving too fast and 
“some among our military were less than enthusiastic about the prospect” of war.  The 
problem for Bush was that he “did not want to appear to be second-guessing the military 
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experts. Still vivid in his mind was the image of Lyndon Johnson during Vietnam, 
hunched over aerial charts selecting individual targets for airstrikes.”90  
William Buckley was more worried about how this slow decision-making process 
made the country look sluggish and reminded people of Johnson’s indecisiveness more 
than his micromanaging. He admonished Bush for not going in quickly and taking 
advantage of the ever-important early support of the public, even if that support was not 
as much as the military desired, arguing, “if Mr. Bush had struck Iraq on or about Labor 
Day, the probability is high that he’d have had the near-universal backing of the 
American people.”91 
They believed Bush would “fight if he must,” but the editors became concerned 
that the stationing of a large number of troops in the Gulf was less about military 
preparedness and more about wanting “to scare Saddam out of Kuwait without having to 
fight,” for fear it would become another Vietnam. A military buildup, when used to cover 
hesitation to make a move, they felt, would simply give Hussein more time to prepare 
and indicated weakness on the part of the United States.92 This affliction of “short war 
psychosis,” the belief that the country still could not “tolerate a long war” had to stop. 
All of these problems combined in the mind of the editors to make American 
operations in the Persian Gulf a possible recipe for disaster. They immediately presented 
a prescription for war. If the administration stopped worrying about another Vietnam, did 
not bend to politics or military dogma, and stopped leaving the American public in the 
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dark about its objectives; the United States would swiftly achieve its goal of driving 
Hussein out of Kuwait. 93 
Buckley especially resented that the administration could not let go of their fears 
of another Vietnam, because, in reality, the situation was “as night to day” when 
compared to Southeast Asia in the 1960s, and it could make all the difference in 
redeeming America.  The terrain differed and Iraq lacked support from nations like China 
and the Soviet Union in Vietnam, but most importantly new technological advances 
improved prospects. He trusted that new military technology perfected in the last 20 
years, especially in terms of airpower, made this war winnable. This prospect more than 
any other aspects of the war could help sweep up the remnants of the Vietnam Syndrome, 
if only the Bush Administration and the country’s military leaders would just act.94  
As the January 15, 1991 U.N. deadline for Hussein to leave Kuwait loomed, 
National Review called in Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and 
Iran-Contra player, Elliott Abrams, to reflect on the president’s progress. Abrams had 
little problem with Bush’s decision making in the Persian Gulf, as he felt the president 
displayed “an instinctive grasp of international politics . . . particularly of the need for 
American firmness and leadership at a time of great change and uncertainty.”95 However, 
much like the editors, he found Bush’s concern over public approval astounding. In a 
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“classic case of a bad move dictated by domestic politics,” he saw the president as 
squandering the support he already had.96 
Their last plea for a declaration of war came as they warned “open-ended 
negotiations,” between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq’s foreign minister 
Tariq Aziz could become “endless, ambiguous, with no incentive for resolution,” just like 
Vietnam. The only real solution for Bush, they declared, was war, and he “should not 
shirk from waging it.”97 
After Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw his troops from Kuwait, the 
international coalition led by the United States commenced the Gulf War on January 16, 
1991. For over a month, the coalition forces bombarded Baghdad and strategic military 
targets from the air, embarking on a ground war in late February. The last of the Iraqi 
troops in Kuwait retreated before March 1.   
The editors professed during this period that they stood by their earlier criticisms, 
but they acknowledged, “since all of them were in a hypothetical mode…we now sweep 
them, practically, into the desk drawer.” The time had come to support Bush fully in his 
endeavors and to make their readers see they had faith in him as a commander-in-chief. 
With hopes high for a successful outcome, they declared Bush’s “instincts were right. 
And his vision was clear. He has earned the country’s and the world’s, gratitude.”98  
This shift benefitted them when hostilities ended in the Persian Gulf War, and as 
they reimagined what the war meant for their decades long desire to reestablish 
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America’s exceptional nature.  The military and the commander-in-chief’s performance 
displayed a reassertion of American strength and martial superiority.  Very different from 
the end of Vietnam, Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell became modern military 
heroes, while military personnel returned home to parades and slaps on the back.   
For National Review, Bush’s war and its focus on American technological 
dominance did what Nixon’s handling of Vietnam and Reagan’s often impotent Central 
American foreign policy could not accomplish. The editors saw American pride in its 
military restored, particularly in relation to its active service members and veterans, but 
they correctly divined that the public’s fear of long-drawn out wars would remain, rearing 
its head in 2002, when George W. Bush began his own campaign against Hussein.  
Contributor William Bennett remarked in his article, “The Rebirth of a Nation,” 
published just after the war, that the win would “put…doubts to rest” about the strength 
of the United States and its military. He also thought it held great promise to “replace 
Vietnam as one of the defining events in the American psyche.”99  Although he was right 
that the Gulf War would help the military’s image with a major victory in its column and 
newfound confidence, he made a much more compelling argument that “the big winner” 
of the Persian Gulf War was the U.S. military.100  
As Buckley would say just over a year later, Vietnam might “one day take its 
place in the annals of national nobility,” but for now, it still resided in America’s stream 
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of consciousness, as well as that of the world.101  What changed through the Gulf War 
were not American understandings of the Vietnam War; it was American and world 
perceptions about the U.S. military and its traditions.  The National Review’s campaign 
reached its completion in 1991.  The elimination of “the ghosts of Vietnam” through the 
flexing of martial muscle raised from the graveyard the folklore of American dominance 
and its role in U.S. exceptionalism in a way that conservative politicians could not 
realize.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
On July 6, 1987, Newsweek released an Independence Day related special edition 
dedicated to everyday American heroes. Vietnam veterans, those whose names appear on 
the Vietnam Wall, as well as those who paid tribute to their fallen comrades by visiting 
and leaving mementos at the monument, received recognition. The editors focused 
heavily on how “58,132 of them died, some bravely, some just unluckily, all in the 
service of their country,” men who “became an abstraction to all but their buddies and 
their loved ones, one more statistic in the debate over the justice of the war.” They noted, 
“it is only lately that we have given them back their names, etched on a wall of black 
granite on a handsome green in Washington. Their memorial has become a national 
shrine, a place of pilgrims and offerings, and votive candles in the night.”1  
The article, “Heroes, Past and Present,” admonished the American people for their 
earlier behavior toward these men noting, “In the time of Vietnam, we had heroes and 
didn't see them.” The magazine’s discussion of Vietnam veterans underscores both the 
climate to which they returned home and their acceptance by the American people as the 
1980s closed.  In the eyes of Newsweek’s editors, they deserved a place among America’s 
heroes. 2   
The location of these men, both living and dead, within the discussion of 
conventional heroism illustrated that the American public now accepted them as a part of 
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the country’s military tradition, a concept in which the act of serving now defined what it 
meant to be a martial man, rather than the traditional act of martial victory. This change 
reflected years of work by veterans, politicians, journalists, writers, Hollywood directors, 
and the families of the fallen to change the image of the men who fought in Southeast 
Asia, work that both intentionally and unintentionally altered the definitions of martial 
masculinity, the martial tradition, and American exceptionalism.  
The efforts of this eclectic group of people paved the long road to the realization 
that, regardless of their lack of martial success, Vietnam veterans had performed their 
societally prescribed duty. The conservatives who played a role in these changes receive 
very little representation in the historiography. Perhaps, since they believe conservatives 
worked to reframe the Vietnam War as a “noble cause” and to refashion the images of its 
veterans to pave the way for future, unencumbered military intervention, or perhaps 
because that attempt clearly failed, many historians see conservatives as an unimportant 
part of the topic.   
However, as this dissertation illustrates, not all conservatives who worked to 
change American perceptions of the Vietnam War or its veterans did so to breakdown the 
Vietnam Syndrome.  In fact, few made this their ultimate aim. More often than not, their 
main common goal was to revive the martial tradition after the Vietnam War in order to 
save their own reputations, their ideology’s tenets, the military establishment, and the 
notion of America’s special nature.  They each picked a unique element of the martial 
tradition on which to rest this revival, one that often played to their perceived personal 
strengths. 
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Their campaigns, when coupled with the efforts of non-conservative Americans 
during the 1970s and 1980s to change social and cultural understandings of Vietnam 
veterans, contributed to the redefinition of martial manhood, martial tradition, and the 
notion of American exceptionalism. It was their determination to change how Americans 
viewed the war and the use of military force that failed, miserably.  
The argument that the Vietnam Syndrome, or fears of another military quagmire, 
died with the American victory in the Middle East in 1991 fizzled during the Clinton 
administration, when the president’s decisions regarding the possibility of intervention in 
the Balkans, Africa, or the Middle East often reflected fear of another Vietnam.3 In the 
twenty-first century, some within the American government and many within the 
populace had the same reaction after George W. Bush announced his desires to rid the 
world of the threats presented by the supposed “axis of evil” of Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea.4   
Bush’s choice to enter into the Iraq War led to comparisons to Vietnam 
immediately in the press.5 Many who protested the war rallied against Bush, but after 
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their efforts failed and just months into the war, the comparisons and protests continued.6 
One reporter suggested, “parts of the current debate seem to be almost as much about 
Vietnam as about Iraq.”7 Vietnam veterans’ personal stories began showing up in the 
news again, and in the New York Times a story appeared about how a trip to Vietnam 
revealed why the United States needed to stay the course in Iraq.8 So far, in the twenty-
first century, only the military operations meant to rout out Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
shortly after the September 11 attacks met with significant initial support from the 
American public.9   
What changed between the end of the Vietnam War and these late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century conflicts was American perceptions and treatment of those who 
served in them.  Those who participated in the Persian Gulf War sixteen years after the 
fall of Saigon received support for their service independent of the citizenry’s opinion of 
the war.  Americans tied yellow ribbons around trees to signify support for military 
service members stationed in the Middle East, although some used them as a sign of 
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protest that meant they wanted the military personnel sent home.10 When Operation 
Desert Storm ended, Americans welcomed returning troops with parades and pats on the 
back. In the spring of 1991, the city of New York held a public parade to ensure that 
returning veterans felt revered and appreciated.11 
The same reverence and appreciation holds true today. In airports across the 
country, men and women either leaving for service or returning from tours of duty 
receive handshakes, thank-yous, and pats on the back.  Most Americans consider military 
service an honorable role, regardless of their political persuasion, and they provide 
immense charity to assist disabled veterans and returning soldiers with post-traumatic 
stress disorder. They help build and remodel houses for them, and there are significant 
efforts to employ them.12  This current treatment in many ways resulted from calculated 
efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to change how the public viewed and treated Vietnam 
veterans.   
Vietnam continues to shape how some politicians and their constituents view 
interventions and war.  It made them skittish about the use of American military power 
that until the 1960s seemed charmed and unstoppable.  However, while the United States 
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continues the process of learning to live with the consequences of a war that affected its 
international power and its mythological understanding of itself, Americans’ perceive 
military service itself in a very different way.  The act of serving the United States 
elevates men’s masculinity and indicates nobility, regardless of whether or not one sees 
combat.  The military tradition remains intact and many use its long, evolving history to 
prove American power.   
Although the use of military force continues to be a point of contention in any 
American foreign policy situation, as seen with the Iraq War, dissent or fear of a 
quagmire does not stop the government from entering into conflict if the government 
wants it.  For conservatives whose principles include a belief in the superiority of the 
United States, that shining city on a hill, the loss in Vietnam led them on a specific 
journey. 
While attempting to convince a wary public of the importance of military tradition 
in the wake of the Vietnam War, they not only persuaded them, they also gained an 
adherence to that tradition and the military service that drives it, removing the need to 
break down the Vietnam Syndrome. Solidifying the narrative of nobility in warfare re-
indoctrinated much of the American public into an acceptance of a culture of militarism 
that provides enough nationalistic and martial manpower to override dissent.  
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